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This thesis brings together the three chapters that together form my PhD thesis. As 
indicated by the title, Frameworks for Evaluating Macroeconomic Policies, the common theme 
linking the three is a focus on the development of modeling frameworks that can be used for the 
evaluation of Macroeconomic policies. Ways in which these models can be compared with each 
other and with the data are recurrent themes. 
The first chapter How to Model Money? Racing Monetary Frameworks against the 
Quantity Theory of Money is about finding frameworks for evaluating monetary policies. 
Currently three main approaches exist: Cash­in­Advance, New Keynesian, and Search­Money. 
Using empirical facts on the Quantity Theory of Money as a yardstick we compare these three 
frameworks. It results that all three frameworks are display the Quantity Theory of Money over 
the long­run, as in the data. But all three frameworks display way too much of the Quantity 
Theory of Money over the short­run. The race thus ends in a draw, but one illustrative of the 
strengths and weaknesses of all three frameworks. The results suggest that better modeling of 
other causes of inflation, and of heterogeneity, are important to improving monetary models. 
The second chapter Evaluating a Flat­Tax Reform is a quantitative modelling of a flat­tax 
reform for the US. The modeling focuses on replicating the details of current US taxation and 
inequality. This later is important as the effects on inequality of such a tax reform are one of the 
main arguments given against it. 
The third chapter Estimation of Bewley­Huggett­Aiyagari Models: Theory and 
Implementation present in­progress work developing theory relevant to simulated moment and 
simulated likelihood estimation of a class of heterogeneous agent models. Theory focuses on 
developing the required assumptions directly from model fundamentals, and from accounting for 
the dependence of the estimation on numerical solution and simulation of the models. Attention 
is also given to implementation of the estimators, in particular which algorithms work 
computationally. 
The three chapters are presented here in the form of three separate articles. However 
the common thread of developing frameworks for the evaluation of macroeconomic policies is 
clearly evident throughout. I hope they may be of interest to the reader. 
 
 
How to Model Money? Racing Monetary Frameworks against the
Quantity Theory of Money
Javier Dı´az-Gime´nez and Robert Kirkby
May 5, 2014
Abstract
We show that, between 1960 and 2009, the Quantity Theory of Money held in the United
States in the long run and that it failed to hold in the short run. We ask whether standard mon-
etary model economies from the Cash-in-Advance, the New-Keynesian, and the Search-Money
frameworks can replicate these results, and we find that they do in the long run, but that they
fail in the short run because prices respond too quickly to changes in the growth rates of money.
Keywords: Monetary; Quantity Theory of Money; Cash-in-Advance; New-Keynesian; Search-
Money.
In the monetary economics literature there co-exist three main frameworks for modeling money:
Cash-in-Advance, New-Keynesian, and Search-Money. Is one framework better than the others?
To answer this we need to directly compare the frameworks, to see which one would win in a race.
Such direct comparison of these different frameworks to model money is rare. Often an argument is
made for, say, New-Keynesian models on the basis that we observe price stickiness. Or for Search-
Money on the grounds that money should arise in the model to solve some problem, rather than
be preordained. But such arguments really just repeat the main assumptions of each framework.
Here we directly compare the three main approaches to modeling money in terms of their ability
to replicate empirical facts related to the Quantity Theory of Money.
The empirical facts of the Quantity Theory of Money — that it holds in the long-run, but fails
in the short-run — can be shown for the United States economy using the Lucas Illustrations; as
we explain shortly. It is in reproducing these empirical facts on which we evaluate the different
approaches to modelling money. The choice of the Quantity Theory of Money and the Lucas
Illustrations is motivated on two grounds. First, as a major theorem of monetary economics,
present in undergraduate textbooks, it is clearly considered as important in and of itself. Second,
the Lucas Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money do not depend on structural assumptions,
and so can be used to make genuine comparisons across the monetary frameworks. This is in
contrast to more commonly used tools in monetary economics, such as impulse response functions,
which depend upon structural assumptions. Since different monetary frameworks involve different
structural assumptions such tools cannot be used to genuinely compare the different frameworks.
The Lucas Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money thus provide a test based on a major
theorem of monetary economics which can be used to make genuine comparisons between monetary
frameworks.
So what does the Quantity Theory of Money look like the the data? The first and most stricking
feature of data is the complete absence of the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run. This
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short-run failure of the Quantity Theory of Money to hold, in the United States and elsewhere, can
be illustrated by simply plotting the rate of inflation—plus the rate of growth of output—against
the rate of growth of money. In this article we start by plotting those two series for the United
States for the 1960–2009 period using quarterly data. If the Quantity Theory of Money relationship
held in the short run, the data points would trace a 45 degree line. Instead, we show that their
scatter plot forms a vague cloud, out of which no clear pattern emerges (see Figure 1).
Whether the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run is harder to establish, because we
must make operative the meaning of “long run”. To do this, we replicate the method used in Lucas
(1980). In that article, Lucas identifies the long-run with the low frequency fluctuations of the rate
of inflation and rate of growth of money. He then uses a two-sided moving average filter to extract
the low frequency movements from those series, and he shows that the plots of the filtered series
move closer to the 45 degree line as he filters out the higher frequencies. Lucas considers the period
between 1955 and 1975 and he does not include the rate of growth of output in his calculations.
He concludes that the Quantity Theory of Money held in the long-run in the United States during
that period.
Lucas’ results are telling, but they are qualitative. Whiteman (1984) shows that one way to
quantify Lucas’ findings is to estimate the slope of the ordinary least squares linear regression of
the rate of growth of prices plus the rate of growth of output on the rate of growth of money.
Whiteman argues that, when the Quantity Theory of Money relationship holds, the slope of this
regression will be close to one.
We replicate Whiteman’s calculations, and we also compute an additional measure of closeness
to the 45 degree line: the average Cartesian distance of the data points from the 45 degree line that
goes through the grand mean of the sample. When the Quantity Theory of Money relationship
holds, the data points will be close to the 45 degree line and this average distance will be close to
zero. We compute these two measures for the United Sates in the 1960–2009 period and we conclude
that the Quantity Theory of Money relationship did not hold in the short-run in the United States,
but that it held in the long-run during that period. Our results confirm quantitatively both Hume
(1742a)’s thought experiment and Lucas (1980)’s findings.
Next, we ask whether the Quantity Theory of Money holds in three monetary model economies,
which we consider to represent the standard frameworks that economists currently use to evaluate
the implications of monetary policy—the Cash-in-Advance framework, the New-Keynesian frame-
work, and the Search-Money framework. Our research should be understood as part of the search
for a monetary model economy whose predictions we can trust. The methodological idea is that the
more dimensions along which model economies replicate the known behavior of the monetary time
series of real economies, the more we trust their predictions along other, harder to test, dimensions.
Monetary economists often test their model economies, for example using impulse response
functions. But these methods do not allow them to compare model economies from different
frameworks because impulse response functions depend on structural and modelling assumptions
that usually differ across frameworks. Meaningful comparisons of alternative ways to model money
are harder to perform because they force researchers to use evaluation methods that do not depend
on the specific modelling assumptions of each framework. Using Lucas’ illustrations of The Quantity
Theory of Money relationship and our measures to quantify this relationship are meaningful ways
to evaluate and compare these three leading monetary frameworks. As one of the major theorems
of monetary economics the Quantity Theory of Money also seems an inherently desirable property
for monetary models.
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That the Quantity Theory of Money should hold in monetary model economies is both com-
pelling and quite easily achieved formally. In the standard neoclassical models, the Quantity Theory
of Money holds every period. This result is mathematically known as the “zero-degree homogeneity
of real decisions in the price level”. Instead, the challenge for monetary model economies is to break
away from the Quantity Theory of Money relationship in the short-run. Or, in other words, to find
a way of modelling money that makes prices respond sluggishly to changes in the money supply.
The three monetary frameworks that we study here represent different ideas about how to
model money: the Cash-in-Advance framework focuses on the transaction role of money, the New-
Keynesian framework on the role of money as a nominal anchor around which prices are sticky,
and the Search-Money framework on the role of money as a way to solve problems created by the
absence of double-coincidence of wants in barter. To find out whether any of these three ways of
modelling money succeed in making prices react sluggishly to changes in the money supply, we
ask whether the Quantity Theory of Money holds in these three frameworks both in the short-run
and in the long-run. For each one of these frameworks we have chosen a canonical model economy.
These model economies were not designed with the specific aim of delivering the Quantity Theory of
Money relationship. They were designed to capture some of the sluggishness of nominal variables,
the question here is how much they deliver.
The Cash-in-Advance framework makes the use of money in exchange compulsory by forcing
households to buy consumption goods using money carried over from the previous period. In
general, this cash-in-advance constraint is inefficient, but it solves the informational problem that
would arise when trying to coordinate all the simultaneous trades; a problem that non-monetary
economies ignore. In the words of Lucas (1980) the cash-in-advance framework “is an attempt to
study the transaction demand for money in as simple as possible a general equilibrium setting”.
In this article, we use Cooley and Hansen (1989)’s cash-in-advance business cycle model as our
canonical example of the cash-in-advance framework. We chose this model economy because it
combines a cash-in-advance constraint and the standard neoclassical model of business cycles.
The New-Keynesian framework models the relationship between money and interest rates using
a money demand equation. To break away from the short-run neutrality of money, New-Keynesian
models assume that prices are sticky. In this framework, prices either cannot be changed every
period by assumption, or doing so is costly, also by assumption. This price stickiness assumption is
justified using empirical evidence that prices do not change often in the real world. In this article,
we use the New-Keynesian monetary model economy described in Chapter 3 of Gal´ı (2008) as our
canonical example of the New-Keynesian framework. We chose this model economy because it
includes money explicitly.1
The Search-Money framework is a successful attempt to satisfy Wallace (1998)’s dictum that
“money should not be a primitive in monetary theory”; that is, that there must be an endogenous
reason that justifies the existence of money. In the Search-Money framework this reason is to
enable trade. Search-Money models assume that people meet in pairs and exchange goods using
barter. But this means that trade only occurs when both trading partners have a good that the
other one wants. This is the well-known problem of barter: trade is often limited by the absence of
a double-coincidence of wants. Money solves this problem because everyone always wants money,
1Many New-Keynesian models often omit money entirely and they use a Taylor rule on interest rates instead.
They rationalize this modelling choice on the grounds that modern central banks tend to focus on interest rates,
and not so much on monetary aggregates. When they model money explicitly their standard approach is to use of
a money-demand equation. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Sargent and Surico
(2011).
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at least as an enabler of trade. In this article, we use a stochastic extension of the Search-Money
model described in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) as our canonical example of the Search-
Money framework. We chose this model economy because it includes capital. Capital accumulation
plays an important role in these economies because it reduces the number of monetary trades and,
consequently, it amplifies the effects of monetary innovations on the rest of the economy, where
monetary exchanges take place.2,3
We choose standard implementations of all three frameworks. There are three reasons for this:
(i) we suspect that using more complicated models models would not solve the difficulties of the
models, (ii) most of these complications, such as capital-adjustment costs or consumption habit
formation, could be just as easily applied to any of the three frameworks and so would not tell
us about how best to model money, and (iii) by using standard implementations the models are
easier to follow and understand, and we are better able to provide intuition and explanation of the
results.
The first of these three points deserves further explanation. In the body of this paper we use the
Lucas Illustrations to describe the performance of the three frameworks to reproduce the empirical
facts of the Quantity Theory of Money — our preferred method due to its easy to understand
and intuitive nature. As an alternative Appendix C provides a Bayesian estimation view of the
same issue. We find that, when Bayesian estimated, the models explain the short-run movements
of inflation as arising mostly from large and poorly identified shocks to inflation that connect the
underlying inflation predicted by the model to the inflation in the data. This is the Bayesian
view of our finding that the models contain too much of the Quantity Theory of Money in the
short-run. This same issue, that short-run inflation in a Bayesian estimation is mostly explained
by a shocks connecting the underlying inflation of the model to the inflation in the data, is also
found to be the case by King and Watson (2012) for the model of Smets and Wouters (2007).4
The model of Smets and Wouters (2007) represents the current gold-standard in terms of advanced
New-Keynesian models incorporating many business cycle frictions. That King and Watson (2012)
report a similar, Bayesian-version, of our finding that the the models contain too much of the
Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run, suggests to us that using such more advance models
would not resolve the issues that we illustrate for all three frameworks in this article, and would
simply obscure the underlying problem, that the frameworks contain too much of the Quantity
Theory of Money in the short-run. [Note: The Bayesian Appendix is currently under construction.
So for I have only finished Bayesian estimation of the Cash-in-Advance model. Given the likeness
between the results of the CIA model and those of King & Watson it seems likely that the New-
Keynesian model will give the same results, and this paragraph is based on that assumption, but
I have not completed the estimation of this model yet. The Bayesian estimation of these models
is part of the response to the referrees comments on the earlier version of this paper submitted as
part of my thesis.]
2Specifically, in Lagos and Wright (2005) model economy which does not include capital, monetary trades account
for 20.6% of real output on average. In contrast, when capital is added to a Search-Money model economy, as in
Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011), monetary-trades account for 1.6% of real output on average.
3Berentson, Menzio, and Wright (2011) also solve a stochastic extension of the original Search-Money model
described in Lagos and Wright (2005). Their extension differs slightly from ours in the timing of the money shock.
It also differs because they impose an AR(1) process on interest rates, which implies a Markov process on money,
while we impose an AR(1) process on (log) money, which implies a Markov process on interest rates.
4These shocks between underlying inflation predicted by the model, and the inflation observed in the data are
often referred to as ’price mark-up shocks’. The same conclusion, albeit made less comprehensively than in King
and Watson (2012) can be drawn from the variance decomposition of Inflation to be found in Figure 1 of Smets and
Wouters (2007).
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To ensure that the comparison of the three monetary frameworks is meaningful, we choose their
functional forms and parameters so that they are as similar as possible to each other. Moreover,
we make the stochastic processes on the monetary shocks identical in the three model economies,
and we simulate them using exactly the the same sequences of realizations of the shocks.
First, we plot Lucas’ illustrations and we find that the Cash-in-Advance, the New-Keynesian,
and the Search-Money frameworks all display the Quantity Theory of Money relationship in the
long-run and, therefore, that they replicate the long-run behavior of the United States. In all three
model economies the filtered points lie along the 45 degree line that goes through the grand mean
of the sample, exactly as the Quantity Theory of Money predicts (see Figure 4).
Next, we simulate 100 stochastic realizations of the equilibrium processes of the three model
economies and we find that Whiteman’s regression coefficient is close to one, and that the Cartesian
distances of the filtered points from the 45 degree line are close to zero. This confirms our qualitative
results. We conclude that the differences between the three frameworks are tiny, if any, and that
all three of them pass the long-run Quantity Theory of Money test with flying colors.5
In sharp contrast, the three monetary frameworks fail to replicate our finding that the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship does not hold in the United States in the short run. While in the
United States the graphs of the unfiltered data contain no suggestion of the Quantity Theory of
Money, our simulations of the three model economies produce data points that lie very close to the
45 degree line. This suggests that the three model economies display a short-run Quantity Theory
of Money relationship that is too tight, even though it is not exact.
Whiteman’s regression coefficients and the Cartesian distances of the data points from the 45
degree lines confirm our qualitative results. We conclude that prices respond too quickly to changes
in the rate of growth of money in the three frameworks that we study, and that the search for a
model economy in which the response of prices to monetary innovations replicates the sluggishness
found in the data still remains an important challenge for monetary economics.
0.1 Literature Review
The Quantity Theory of Money was first formulated by David Hume using a thought experiment
which he summarized in the following quote, Were all the gold in England annihilated at once, and
one and twenty shillings substituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful
or interest lower? No surely: We should only use silver instead of gold. (Hume, 1742, Of Interest).
Missing, at least explicitly, from Humes formulation is the role played by changes in real output.
When it was first explicitly developed is not clear, but it plays a prominent role in the works of
Fisher (1911) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). Writing on the Greenback period, 1867-1879,
Friedman & Schwartz observe that prices decreased slightly, despite an increase in the money supply
— attributing the difference as being substantially due to the large increase in real output that
occourred during this period.
5Sargent and Surico (2011) study the Quantity Theory of Money in the United States between 1900 and 2005
and they argue that it is not a stable relationship. They use the Lucas Illustrations approach, they find that the
slope of the Quantity Theory of Money relationship changes over time, and they attribute these changes to changes
in the monetary policy regime followed by the Federal Reserve —for example, around 1980 the Fed changed from
targeting monetary aggregates to targeting inflation rates. We discuss Sargent and Surico’s findings in Section 2 and
in Appendix B.
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MostevidenceinsupportoftheQuantityTheoryofMoneyatthatthetimecamefromcom-
paring,eg.,multi-decadeaveragesofmoneygrowthvs.pricegrowth. Plottingtheseforvarious
countriesonewouldgetaroughlyfourty-fivedegreeline. ThecontributionofLucas(1980)was
toprovideatime-seriesviewoftheQuantityTheoryofMoney,byassociatingthelong-runwith
low-frequencyandthenfilteringthetimeseriestoobtainthislong-runview. Morerecently,Benati
(2005,2009)hasextendedthisapproachforlongertimeperiods,fortheUK,andforalternative
filters.
1 TheQuantityTheoryof Money
Multiplythesupplyofmoneybymandpriceswilbecomemtimeslarger —thisisaroughbut
usefulcharacterizationoftheQuantityTheoryofMoney. Moreprecisely,theQuantityTheoryof
Moneyclaimsthattherateofgrowthofnominalpricesplustherateofgrowthofoutputisequal
totherateofgrowthofthemoneysupply.
TheformalexpressionoftheQuantityTheoryofMoneyisthefolowing
MV =PY (1)
whereM isthenominalmoneysupply,Visthevelocityofcirculationofmoney,Pistheprice
level,andYisrealoutput.Letgxbethegrowthrateofvariablex.Then,ifweassumethatVis
relativelyconstant,itfolowsthat
gM gP+gY (2)
Therefore,whentheQuantityTheoryofMoneyholds,ifwegraphgP+gYagainstgM
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
-5 0 5 10 15 
Beta=0.00 
An
nu
al 
Rat
e o
f 
CPI
 In
flat
io
n (
gp 
+ g
y)
Annual Rate of M Growth
,wewilgeta
45degreeline.And,whentheQuantityTheoryofMoneydoesnothold,wewilgetameaningless
bird-shotscatterplot.ThisisthecentralideainLucas(1980).
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
-5 0 5 10 15 
Beta=0.00 
An
nu
al 
Rat
e o
f C
PI I
nfl
ati
on 
(g
p +
 g
y)
Annual Rate of M Growth
A:M1intheUnitedStatesβ=0.0 B:M2intheUnitedStatesβ=0.0
∗Thecoordinatesofthecenterofthewhitecircleineachpanelarethegrandmeanoftheunfilteredsample.
Figure1:TheQuantityTheoryinUnitedStatesintheShortRun(1960:Q1–2009:Q4)
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2 The Quantity Theory of Money in the United States
In this section we discuss whether the Quantity Theory of Money relationship holds in the United
States both in the short run and in the long run.
2.1 The Quantity Theory of Money in the United States in the Short Run
In his 1980 article, Lucas plots the quarterly growth rate of money against the quarterly growth
rate of prices for the 1955–1975 period using M1 as the monetary aggregate and he obtains a bird-
shot scatter plot that shows that the Quantity Theory of Money does not hold in the short run in
the United States during that period.
Here we use Lucas’ idea but we make three changes: we start our sample period in 1960 and we
extend it to 2009, we use both M1 and M2 as our monetary aggregates, and, while Lucas plots the
rate of growth of prices against the rate of growth of money, we follow the text-book description of
the Quantity Theory of Money exactly and plot the rate of growth of prices plus the rate of growth
of output against the rate of growth of money. We implement these three changes, we plot the
resulting time series, and we obtain the bird-shot scatter plots that we represent in Figure 1. Our
scatter plots illustrate that the Quantity Theory of Money relationship did not hold in the United
States in the short run between 1960 and 2009 either for M1 or for M2, and they confirm Lucas
(1980)’s findings.6
2.2 The Quantity Theory of Money in the United States in the Long Run
To illustrate whether the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long run, Lucas (1980) associates
the short-run with the high-frequency fluctuations of the quantity theory time series expressed in
growth rates, and the long-run with the low-frequency fluctuations of those series. To remove the
high-frequency fluctuations and to obtain the low-frequency signal, Lucas transforms the original
series using the following two-sided, exponentially-weighted, moving-average filter
xt(β) = α
T∑
k=1
β|t−k|xk (3)
where
α =
(1− β)2
1− β2 − 2β(T+1)/2(1− β) 0 ≤ β < 1 (4)
and where T is the number of observations in the time series.7
6We have taken all the data from FRED2 (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). The time series that we have
used are GNPC96, M1SL, M2SL, and CPIAUCNS. Our results are robust to using three alternative measures for
inflation: CPIAUCSL, CPILFENS, CPILFESL. We measure the growth rates as the percentage changes on the same
quarter of the previous year.
7Parameter α guarantees that the means of the original and the filtered time series coincide. In fact, Lucas (1980)
uses a slightly different definition of this parameter. He makes α = (1 − β)/(1 + β). His definition guarantees that
the means coincide assuming that the lengths of the unfiltered series are infinite. Instead, we use Sargent and Surico
(2011)’s small-sample correction to the value of α. This correction preserves the means of the series, but assuming
that the lengths of the unfiltered series are finite.
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Avalueofβ=0.0returnstheoriginaltimeseries,andincreasinglyhighervaluesofβfilterout
thehigherfrequencyfluctuationsfromtheoriginaltimeseriesandleaveonlytheincreasinglylower
frequencyfluctuationsinthetransformedseries. Figure5ilustrateshowourversionofLucas’
filtertransformstheoriginalU.S.timeseriesasweincreasethevalueofparameterβ.8Thefilter
istwo-sidedbecausethebehaviorofhouseholdsislikelytobeaffectedbothbywhathappenedto
theminthepastandbytheirexpectationsofwhatmighthappentotheminthefuture.9
OneimportantadvantageofusingLucas’methodstofindoutwhethertheQuantityTheory
of Moneyholdsinthelongrunisthathisfilterisatheoretical. Thismeansthatitsresultsdo
notdependonanymodelingassumptions.Incontrast,othermethodsthataremoresophisti-
catedeconometricaly,suchasstructuralVARs,requireidentifyingassumptionsthataremodel-
dependent. Thosemethodsarelessusefultocomparemodeleconomiesthatarefundamentaly
different,likethosethatweconsiderinthisarticle.
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Highervaluesofβextractthehigherfrequencyfluctuationsfromtheoriginalseries.Therefore,
iftheQuantityTheoryof Moneyrelationshipholdsinthelong-run,asweincreasethevalueof
β,theplotsofthefilteredtimeseriesshouldlookincreasinglylikethe45degreelinethatruns
throughthegrandmeanoftheunfilteredseries. And,ifitdoesnothold,wehavenotheoryto
accountfortherelationshipbetweenthosevariablesandweexpectthefiltereddatatobecomea
blobaroundthegrandmeanoftheunfiltereddata.Infact,Lucas(1980)showsthatthisisprecisely
whathappenswhenheplotstheunemploymentrateagainsttherateofgrowthofmoney,forthe
1955–1975period.
InFigure2weplottheQuantityTheoryofMoneyrelationshipintheUnitedStatesinthelong-
runor,moreprecisely,whenβ=0.95.Inbothpanelsofthatfigureweseethat,whenwefilterout
thehigh-frequencyfluctuations,theoriginalbird-shotscattersdisplayedinFigure1disappearand
8Topreventclutter,inalourfigureswefolowLucas(1980)exactlyandplotonlythefourthquarterofevery
year. Topreventend-of-sampledistortions,wedropthefirsttwoandlasttwoyearsfromeachgraph,eventhough
weusetheminthefilter.
9Thechoiceoffilterisnotimportant. Forexample,Benati(2005,2009)reportssimilarconclusionsusinga
band-passfilter.
10SeeLucas(1980)foradiscussionofhisfilterandofitsfrequencyinterpretation,andseeWhiteman (1984)for
furtherdetailsonthisdiscussion.
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the observations approach the 45 degree line that runs through the grand mean of the unfiltered
sample. Therefore, the scatter plots displayed in Figure 2 illustrate that the Quantity Theory of
Money held in the United States in the long-run both for M1 and for M2 during the 1960–2009
period, and they confirm Lucas (1980)’s findings.
The long-run scatter plot for M1 is interesting from the perspective of the monetary history of
the United States. In Panel A of Figure 2 the observations start near the bottom left-hand-side
corner of the graph and they march roughly up the 45 degree line during the late 1960s and the
1970s. When they reach the top-right-hand corner of the graph, they suddenly drop down almost
vertically. This period of sharply falling average growth rates of prices represents the beginning
of the 1980s when the Federal Reserve, under Paul Volcker, started tightening monetary policy to
fight inflation—and eventually defeat it. Then, in the 1990s and 2000s the points return to the 45
degree line as the U.S. economy transitions to a new monetary regime with a lower inflation rate
and lower money growth rate.
2.3 Quantifying Lucas’ Illustrations
There are two relatively straight-forward methods to quantify Lucas’ illustrations. The first one
is to compute the average Cartesian distance of the points in the plots from the 45 degree line
that runs through the grand mean of the unfiltered observations.11 The other one is to compute
the slope of an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression of the growth rate of prices plus the
growth rate of real output on the growth rate of money. This second method was proposed by
Whiteman (1984).
The formal definition of the first statistic is the following
D45 =
1√
2T
∑
i
|xi − yi + (y¯ − x¯)| (5)
where yi is the value of the i-th observation of the growth rate of prices plus the growth rate of
output, either of the original or of the filtered time series; xi is the corresponding observation of
the growth rate of money and x¯ and y¯ are the average values of the unfiltered xi and yi. Obviously,
if the Quantity Theory of Money relationship holds, the value of the D45 statistic will be small
and, if it does not hold, it will be large.
In Whiteman (1984)’s regression, the value of the OLS coefficient will be close to unity when
the Quantity Theory of Money relationship holds, and it can take any value when it does not hold.
Obviously, chances are that it will be different from unity in this case.
In Table 1 we report the values of these two statistics for the United States both in the short
run, when β = 0.00, and in the long run, when β = 0.95, for M1 and for M2. Our numerical results
confirm what we learnt from Lucas’ Illustrations. The Quantity Theory of Money did not hold in
the short run in the United States, between 1960 and 2009, either for M1 or for M2, but it held in
the long run during the same period for both monetary aggregates. Moreover, according our two
statistics, the Quantity Theory of Money relationship was tighter for M2 than for M1, both in the
short run and in the long run. The distances from the 45 degree line were smaller for M2 than
for M1 in both instances, and the slopes of the linear regressions were higher for M2, also in both
instances (see Table 1).
11The Cartesian distance of a point, (xi, yi), from a line, ax+ by + c = 0, is d = |axi + byi + c|/
√
a2 + b2.
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Table 1: The Quantity Theory of Money Statistics in the United States
Short Run (β=0.0) Long Run (β=0.95)
M1 M2 M1 M2
Distance from 45 Degree Line (D45) 2.9850 2.5420 0.5003 0.3953
OLS Regression Coefficient 0.0189 0.0723 0.8179 0.9164
2.4 An Apparent Conflict with the Literature
Our finding that the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long run in the United States is
somewhat in conflict with those of Sargent and Surico (2011). They use M2 as the monetary
aggregate, they divide the 1900–2005 period into four subperiods, which they identify with different
monetary policy regimes, and they find that the long-run slopes of Lucas’ Illustrations differ in these
four regimes.
They use their results to argue that the 1984–2005 subperiod corresponds to an inflation target-
ing regime, and that this delivers a flatter slope. We contend that Sargent and Surico’s result is not
due to a breakdown in the long-run Quantity Theory of Money relationship. Instead, we think that
Sargent and Surico (2011)’s slopes vary for two reasons: first, because they follow Lucas (1980)
literally and leave out the growth rate of output from their calculations and, second, because of
the specific subperiods in which they choose to divide their sample.
Leaving out the growth rate of output, as Lucas (1980) did when he studied the 1950–1975
period, has little effect on his illustrations because the growth rate of output was small relative to
the growth rate of prices during that period—recall that in the 1970s there was a hump in the U.S.
inflation rate time series. Therefore, this omission affects Lucas’ original illustrations only slightly.
But this is not the case for the post-1984 period, when the inflation rate was moderate and output
growth was relatively high.12
The importance of the starting points of Sargent and Surico’s subperiods is highlighted by our
earlier comments that the inflation rate decreased around 1980 and that this reduction was followed
by a lower growth rate of money, but with a delay. As we have already mentioned, this is illustrated
by the temporary dip below the 45 degree line of the filtered points that correspond to the early
1980’s in Panel A of Figure 2, and the subsequent return to the 45 degree line during the 1990’s.
In Appendix B we provide an econometric test of our claim that the slopes of Lucas’ Illustrations
remained unchanged during the 1960–2009 period when we include output growth in the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship. This period runs across 1984, which is the year which Sargent
and Surico (2011) identify as the year when the monetary regime, and hence the slope of Lucas’
illustrations, supposedly changed.
To do this, we exploit the econometric interpretation of the Quantity Theory of Money as a
cointegration relationship between the logs of the price level, real output, and the money supply.
We test for a structural break at an unknown point in time in the cointegrating vector—which
would be the econometric interpretation of a change in the slope of Lucas’ Illustrations—and we
reject that such a break occurred for M2 at any time during the 1960–2009 period.
12The ratio of annual inflation to GDP growth fell from roughly 2 in the 1960–1983 period, to approximately half
that amount in the 1984–2009 period.
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3 The Quantity Theory of Money in the Model Economies
In this section we explore the extent to which the Quantity Theory of Money relationship holds in
three of the modelling frameworks most frequently used by economists to think about monetary
policy: the Cash-in-Advance framework, the New-Keynesian framework, and the Search-Money
framework. As we did for the United States, to answer this question we use two methods: Lucas’
illustrations of the Quantity Theory of Money relationship and the two statistics that we have used
in the previous section to quantify this relationship.
As we have already mentioned, for each one of these three frameworks we choose a representative
model economy: for the Cash-in-Advance framework, we use the model economy described in
Cooley and Hansen (1989); for the New-Keynesian framework, the model economy described in
Chapter 3 of Gal´ı (2008); and, for the Search-Money framework, a stochastic extension of the model
economy described in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011). Since these three model economies are
standard in the literature we relegate their detailed description to Appendix A of this article.
We also describe in detail our calibration procedure in that appendix. To make our comparisons
meaningful, we use the same functional forms and parameter values for the utility functions and
for the processes on the technology and the monetary shocks, whenever possible.13 We also use the
same methods to characterize the equilibrium processes of our three model economies and to find
their solutions.
In all three cases, we describe the equilibrium processes as systems of stochastic difference
equations and we solve these systems using the default perturbation methods of Dynare that
allow us to obtain quadratic laws-of-motion. Then we simulate the three model economies and
we obtain samples of 204 quarterly observations to replicate the number of observations in our
United States sample. To obtain these samples, we use the same seeds for the random number
generators. Consequently, the sequences of realizations of the random processes are identical in the
three model economies.
3.1 The Quantity Theory of Money in the Model Economies in the Short Run
Figure 3 represents Lucas’ Illustrations in the short run—that is for β = 0—for M2 in the United
States and for the monetary aggregates of our three model economies. We observe that the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship is much stronger in the three model economies than in the United
States. In the three model economies, the points lie close to the 45 degree line as predicted by
Quantity Theory of Money. And in the United States data it is hard discern any pattern.
We have only one United States time series from which to compute the Quantity Theory of
Money statistics, but we can simulate many stochastic realizations of the equilibrium processes of
our model economies. To reduce the size of the sampling error, we compute the D45 statistics and
the slopes of the Quantity Theory of Money OLS linear regressions using 100 independent random
samples. In Table 2 we report the sample means and the sample standard deviations of those
statistics. We also reproduce the results for M2 for the United States economy to facilitate the
comparisons.
13We repeated our calculations with the functional forms and the calibration targets used in the original articles,
and we found that this does not change our results qualitatively. This is partly due to the fact that the original
articles target similar data moments and study similar time periods.
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Figure3:Lucas’IlustrationsintheShortRun(β=0.00)
Table2:TheQuantityTheoryofMoneyStatisticsintheShortRun
US(M2) Cash-in-Advance New-Keynesian Search-Money
D45 2.5420 0.9338 1.5611 1.9278
(stddev) – (0.0890) (0.1185) (0.1408)
OLScoeff. 0.0723 1.0612 1.3366 1.4219
(stddev) – (0.0593) (0.0501) (0.0652)
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Both sets of statistics confirm what we found using Lucas’ Illustrations, and they establish that
our graphs are not the result of a sampling oddity. The D45 statistic for the United States is 2.54,
while in all three model economies it is below 2.0. This result arises from the fact that the points in
the graph for the United States form a shapeless cloud, while those in the graphs for the three model
economies form clouds which are closer to the 45 degree line. Thus, the D45 statistic confirms that
our three model economies display too much of the Quantity Theory of Money relationship in the
short run, when compared with the United States economy.
The slopes of the Quantity Theory of Money regressions tell pretty much the same story. They
are much closer to unity in the three model economies than in the United States, and the slope
of the Quantity Theory of Money regression line is closest to unity in the Cash-in-Advance model
economy. We interpret these results to mean that in our three model economies the rate of growth
of prices responds too quickly to changes in the rate of growth of money, relative to the United
States, or that our three model economies do not display enough short-run sluggishness in the
response of prices.
3.2 The Departures from the Quantity Theory of Money in the Short Run
In this subsection we describe how the three model economies depart from the Quantity Theory
of Money in the short run using only one equation for each one of them. Specifically, we provide
an expression for the equilibrium values of the term PY/M for each model economy.14 We provide
the derivation of these equations in Appendix A, together with the full descriptions of the model
economies. If the Quantity Theory of Money held exactly (M/P )/Y would be constant. Therefore,
these single equation expressions thus help to understand how each model economy departs from
the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run.
(a) The Cash-in-Advance Model Economy
In the Cash-in-Advance model economy we obtain that
PY
M
=
P (C +X)
M
= 1 +
PX
M
(6)
where C is consumption, and X is investment. So the Cash-in-Advance framework succeeds in
departing from the Quantity Theory of Money in as far as monetary policy distorts investment de-
cisions. These distortions take place on the cash-good (consumption) and credit-good (investment)
margin.
(b) The New-Keynesian Model Economy
In the New-Keynesian model economy when we rewrite PY/M in logs we obtain that
pt + yt −mt = ηit = ηrnt + ηEt{f(pit, pit+1, pit+2)} (7)
where it is the nominal interest rate, η is the elasticity of money demand, r
n
t is the natural real
interest rate, and f(pit, pit+1, pit+2) is a linear function of current and future inflation. It is evident
from expression (7) that the elasticity of money demand and the changing values of the nominal
14These expressions are also related to the issue of money demand as discussed in Lucas (2000). Lucas defines
money demand as the relationship between nominal interest rates and the ratio of real money holdings to real output,
or (M/P )/Y . This ratio is the inverse of the PY/M term which we consider here.
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interest rates play an important role in allowing the New-Keynesian model to get away from the
Quantity Theory of Money in the short run.
What role do sticky prices play in this? The natural real interest rate, rnt , is independent of
both monetary variables and the parameters that determine the degree of price stickiness. So, for
sticky prices to be part of the story, they must operate through the inflation rate which evolves
according to
pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1) (8)
where p∗t is the price level chosen by the firms that get to reset their prices, and (1− θ) is the share
of those firms. So sticky prices affect the rate of inflation and, therefore, the nominal interest rates
and they contribute to the short-run departure from the Quantity Theory of Money relationship.
In practice, however, this effect is small.15 This is because the nominal interest rate does not
change immediately as predicted by Fisher’s equation, i = r + pi, after a monetary shock because
these shocks generate a liquidity effect. But this liquidity effect is not very long-lasting and it all
but disappears, when we filter out the high frequency fluctuations of the nominal time series. We
conclude that the short-run behavior of the New-Keynesian model arises directly from the money
demand equation, and that the role played by the degree of price stickiness is small.
(c) The Search-Money Model Economy
In the Search-Money model economy we obtain that,
PY
M
=
1
z(q,K)
γY
FN (K,N)
(9)
where γ is a parameter that quantifies the disutility of labor. In the simulations of this model
economy total output, Y , the stock of capital, K, and the marginal product of labour, FN (K,N),
are almost constant. Consequently, they do not account for the departure from the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship in the short run. They are almost constant because most of the
trades are non-monetary, the centralized night market is much bigger than the decentralized day
market, and this market is almost unaffected by changes in the money supply. Almost all the
variability in expression (9) comes from changes in z(q,K), which represents the terms of trade in
monetary exchanges and, more specifically, from changes in q —the amount produced and traded
in the monetary exchanges that take place in the decentralized market. These changes in q are
caused by the unexpected changes in the amount of money and by changes in the inflation rate,
which is the cost of holding money.
In summary, the Search-Money framework succeeds in departing from the Quantity Theory of
Money relationship in the short run because of the effects of changes in the money supply on the
value of money. People want to hold money because it is useful for monetary trades. The value
of money is jointly determined by this demand for money and by the money supply. Since the
nominal price of consumption goods is the inverse of the cost of acquiring money, changes in the
value of money result in changes in the price level.16 Therefore, changes in the money supply affect
the value of money, and thereby the price level. Moreover, the resulting inflation also affects output
15We experimented with various parameter values, and we found that the Quantity Theory of Money relationship
was largely unaffected by the degree of price-stickiness, θ, but that it was very sensitive to the value of the elasticity
of money demand, η.
16The price of consumption goods is the number of units of money that agents exchange for one unit of the
consumption good. The cost of acquiring money is the number of units of the consumption good that agents give up
to obtain one unit of money.
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because of a holdup problem.17 This effect is magnified because monetary trades account only for
a small fraction of total exchanges and, therefore, changes in the supply of money are large relative
to the size of the total amount of monetary trades. Consequently, the effect of a given change
in money supply on the value of money and, hence, on prices in the Search-Money framework, is
larger than in the other two frameworks.
3.3 The Quantity Theory of Money in the Model Economies in the Long Run
Figure 4 represents Lucas’ Illustrations in the long run, that is, for β = 0.95, for M2 in the United
States and for the monetary aggregates of our three model economies. Given that the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship was clearly present in the three models economies in the short run,
it comes as no surprise that it also holds in all three of them in the long run. In fact, the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship is so tight in every model economy that we are hard put to say in
which one of them it is tightest. For that purpose, we must turn to the statistics that we report in
Table 3.
The D45 statistic shows that the Quantity Theory of Money relationship is tightest in the
New-Keynesian model economy, followed by the Search-Money model economy and by the Cash-
in-Advance model economy. But the differences between them are small. And in all three cases
the Quantity Theory of Money relationship is much tighter than in the United States. The values
of the slopes of the OLS linear regressions confirm these findings.
We interpret these results to mean that in the long run the Quantity Theory of Money relation-
ship is present both in the United States and in our three model economies. But, once again, it is
sizably tighter in the model economies.
Table 3: The Quantity Theory of Money Statistics in the Long Run
US (M2) Cash-in-Advance New-Keynesian Search-Money
D45 0.3953 0.0555 0.0149 0.0188
(std dev) – (0.0147) (0.0031) (0.0039)
OLS coeff. 0.9164 0.9922 1.0015 1.0015
(std dev) – (0.0690) (0.0116) (0.0126)
3.4 Who Wins?
We have shown that all three of our model frameworks display the Quantity Theory of Money
relationship in the long run and, therefore, succeed in replicating the long-run behavior of the
United States economy. But we have also shown that the Quantity Theory of Money relationship
is much tighter in all three model economies than in the United States in the short run. Given the
17In every Search-Money model inflation decreases output. Sellers in single-coincidence meetings know that they
can increase the price of the consumption good because the outside option of the buyer —to hold onto the money
until next period— is less attractive when the inflation rate is higher. These increased prices —known as the holdup
problem— decrease economic efficiency and output. See, eg., Lagos and Wright (2005) for a discussion of the holdup
problem.
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importance of departures from the Quantity Theory of Moneyfor the behavior of money, prices, and
hence monetary policy, we think that this is an important shortcoming for the model economies.
The difficulties in capturing the short-run departures from the Quantity Theory of Money have
been known to afflict the Cash-in-Advance framework since the work of Hodrick, Kocherlakota,
and Lucas (1991). While the New-Keynesian and Search-Money frameworks have cast light on a
number of other issues in monetary economics, they have not resolved these difficulties. Perhaps
further research within these frameworks will succeed in enabling them to depart from the Quantity
Theory of Money relationship in the short run.
Progress within the Cash-in-Advance framework in the attempt to slow down the response of
prices to monetary shocks —a problem closely related to departing from the Quantity Theory
of Money relationship in the short-run—appears to have stalled. Early attempts to solve this
problem use constructs such as portfolio-adjustment costs (see, for instance, Christiano, 1991, and
Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1995). But this line of research has trailed off since then, after being
only moderately successful. Perhaps a partial exception to this rule can be found in the recent
work of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2009) who allow for cash-in-advance contraints that last
for multiple periods.
Progress within the New-Keynesian framework seems to be more promising. For example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) develop a New-Keynesian model capable of reproducing
the slower reaction of the economy to monetary shocks observed in empirical studies that use
impulse-response functions. This suggests that these more advanced New-Keynesian models might
offer better hopes for departing from the Quantity Theory of Money relationship in the short run.
The Search-Money framework is a more recent construct, and bringing productive capital into
that framework is a very recent achievement. Therefore, future refinements within this framework
might enable it to depart from the Quantity Theory of Money relationship in the short run. Time
will tell.
4 Conclusion
In this article we show that the Quantity Theory of Money held in the long-run in the United
States between 1960 and 2009. And we also show that it failed to hold in the short-run during that
period. Given the prominence of the Quantity Theory of Money in monetary theory, we argue that
monetary model economies should replicate both the long-run success and short-run failure of the
Quantity Theory of Money observed in the United States, if we are to trust their prescriptions for
monetary policy.
Our analysis, based on the Lucas (1980) Illustrations, shows that every one of the three main
frameworks that are currently used to study monetary policy —the Cash-in-Advance framework,
the New-Keynesian framework, and the Search-Money framework— display the Quantity Theory of
Money relationship both in the long-run and in the short-run. This failure of all three frameworks
to depart from the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run casts some doubts on their usefulness
for the analysis of monetary policy —which most monetary theorists consider to be an inherently
short-run phenomenon.
To break away from the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run, the three monetary frame-
works that we study here need a more sluggish response of the growth rate of prices to changes in
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the growth rate of money. We are not sure about what causes this sluggish response of prices to
changes in money in the real world. But the generally accepted conjecture is that the way money
is introduced into the economy most probably makes a difference.
When money changes are universal and simultaneous —that is, when they affect every agent
at the same time— the rate of growth of prices responds immediately to changes in the rate of
growth on money. But, as we mentioned in the introduction, when money enters the economy at
a specific point, it has to spread around from there. The time it takes in this spreading around
probably creates the sluggishness. Like the Quantity Theory of Money itself, this idea can also be
traced back to David Hume; “[T]he money in its progress through the whole commonwealth...first
quicken[s] the diligence of every individual before it encrease the price of labour.” (Hume, 1742,
Of Money).
In representative agent model economies there is only one point at which money can enter the
economy. Once it reaches this agent, it has nowhere to spread around, and the sluggish response of
prices is very hard to achieve. In this type of model economies every change in the growth rate of
money is both universal and simultaneous by construction. This reasoning allows us to conjecture
that agent heterogeneity may very well turn out to be a necessary condition for model economies
to display the needed sluggishness.
Dı´az-Gime´nez, Prescott, Alvarez, and Fitzgerald (1992) model the role of money as an asset in
a heterogeneous household setup, and they give an early quantitative step in what could turn out
to be the correct direction. The findings of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2009), Telyukova and
Visschers (2013), and Williamson (2008), each of which includes a degree of agent heterogeneity,
suggest that agent heterogeneity may indeed be key in replicating the sluggishness observed in the
data. As far as the Quantity Theory of Money relationship is concerned, the explicit modeling of
agent heterogeneity is probably one of the best bets for future research.
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A The Monetary Model Economies
In this appendix we describe in detail each of the three model economies used as canonical examples
for the three monetary frameworks: Cooley and Hansen (1989) for the Cash-in-Advance framework;
Gal´ı (2008) Chapter 3 for the New-Keynesian framework; and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011)
for the Search-Money framework. We then describe the details of the calibration and computation
of all three models.
A.1 The Cash-in-Advance Model Economy
The cash-in-advance abstraction is an explicit way to model the transactions function of money
by requiring that at least some goods have to be purchased with cash. This abstraction was
first developed and analyzed in Lucas (1980), and more generally by Stokey and Lucas (1983,
1987), although the idea to model frictions in this way dates back to Clower (1967). Quantitative
explorations of the business cycle implications of this abstraction can be found in Cooley and
Hansen (1989, 1995). In this article, to represent the cash-in-advance abstraction, we use a minor
variation of the model economy described in Cooley and Hansen (1989), but in its actual description
we follow Nason and Cogley (1994).
In this model economy there are three goods: a consumption good, an investment good, and
leisure. We assume that only the consumption good must be bought with cash carried over from
the previous period, while the investment good and leisure can be purchased on credit. Model
economies with this type of cash-in-advance constraint attempt to account for the distortionary
effects of inflation on real activity. These distortions create an incentive for people to substitute
away from activities that require cash —from consumption, in our case— towards activities that
are exempt from this requirement —towards investment and leisure, in our case.
As shown by Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991), one of the shortcomings of the cash-in-
advance abstraction is that the model economies react too quickly to monetary shocks. Numerous
extensions have attempted to deal with this shortcoming by adding liquidity effects via portfolio
adjustment costs (see Lucas (1990); Fuerst (1992); Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992); and Chris-
tiano and Eichenbaum (1995), amongst others). But these extensions, while they have succeeded in
addressing the issue of the liquidity effects, have had very limited success in generating a sluggish
response of prices. See Christiano (1991) for an interesting discussion of the motivations, strengths,
and weaknesses of the cash-in-advance approach to modelling money.
A.1.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical households of measure one who order their
preferences over stochastic processes of consumption and labor according to the following utility
function:
maxE
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ − γ
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
(10)
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where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, Ct is consumption, and Nt is labor
18. Households in this
model economy are endowed with one unit of time which they can allocate to the supply of labour
services to the firm or to the enjoyment of leisure, that is Nt ∈ [0, 1] for all t. The households face
a budget constraint given by
PtCt + PtXt +Mt ≤ PtWtNt + PtRtKt +Mt−1 + Tt (11)
where Pt is the price level, Xt is investment in capital, Mt are money holdings, Wt is the real wage,
Rt is the real interest rate, Kt is capital holdings, and Tt is the lump-sum transfer of the cash
injections made by monetary authorities.
The stock of capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Xt (12)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate.
The innovation of the cash-in-advance abstraction that makes money necessary is to add a cash-
in-advance constraint. This constraint requires that the consumption good must be purchased with
money, in particular with money that must be ‘held in advance’. That is, with money holdings
that are chosen one period ahead plus the money injected into the economy in the current period.
This cash-in-advance constraint is
PtCt ≤Mt−1 + Tt (13)
The process on money defined later, following Cooley and Hansen (1989), will make the cash-in-
advance constraint always binding19.
Therefore, the problem of the representative household is to choose Ct, Nt, Mt, Xt and Kt in
order to maximize (10) subject to (11), (12), (13), and Nt ∈ [0, 1].
A.1.2 Firms
Firms in the economy operate in competitive factor and product markets and produce output
according to a constant returns-to-scale production function. These assumptions allow us to use a
representative firm with a production function that takes the following form
Yt = AtK
α
f,tN
1−α
f,t (14)
where Yt is output, Kf,t and Nf,t are the captial and labour inputs, and At is a technology shock.
Each period t the firms decision problem written in real terms is
max
Yt,Kf,t,Nf,t
Yt −WtNf,t −RtKf,t (15)
The technology shock follows an exogenous AR(1) process in logs, given by
at = ρaat−1 + ςt (16)
where at ≡ log(At), ςt is an identically and independently distributed process that follows a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ς .
18The utility function in Cooley and Hansen (1989) is log(Ct)− γNt, which is a subcase of ours.
19This assumption, that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, was shown to be unconsequential by Hodrick,
Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991), since when it is allowed to be occasionally binding it remains the case that for
quantitatively plausible calibrations it will bind almost all of the time anyway.
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A.1.3 Money
The monetary authority of this economy issues non-interest bearing currency, M s, according to the
following rule
M st+1 = e
νtM st (17)
where the stochastic money growth rate, νt, is revealed at the beginning of period t and evolves
according to
νt = (1− ρm)ν¯ + ρmνt−1 + ξt (18)
where 0 < ρm < 1 and where ξ is an identically and independently distributed process that follows
a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ξ .
Given the money supply rule, the government makes the required money injections to implement
it each period. These injections take the following form
Tt = M
s
t+1 −M st (19)
and are given as lump-sum payments to the households, adding directly to their money holdings.
A.1.4 Prices and Market Clearance
Prices in this model economy are completely flexible and they adjust instantaneously so that labor,
capital and money markets always clear. That is,
Nt = Nf,t
Kt = Kf,t
Mt = M
s
t (20)
A.1.5 Equilibrium
To solve the model it must first be made stationary. The first step to achieve this is to divide
equations (11) and (13) by the price level, Pt. The second step is to replace Mt and Pt in those
two equations with Mˆt = Mt/M
s
t and Pˆt = Pt/M
s
t , this allows us to remove the trending variables
Mt, Pt.
Once the problem is stationary, the equilibrium of the cash-in-advance model economy can be
characterized by the following system of equations that combines optimality conditions, budget and
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technology constraints, and market clearing conditions.
Kt+1 + Mˆt/Pˆt = WtNt + (Rt + 1− δ)Kt (21)
Ct =
Mˆt−1 + eνt − 1
eνtPˆt
(22)
Wt = (1− α)eatKαt N−αt (23)
Rt = αe
atKα−1t N
1−α
t (24)
Nϕt
Wt
= βE
{
Nϕt+1
Wt+1
(Rt+1 + 1− δ)
}
(25)
Wt
Nϕt
=
γ
β
E
{
Ct+1e
νt+1 Pˆt+1
Pˆt
}
(26)
Mˆt = 1 (27)
at = ρaat−1 + ςt (28)
νt = (1− ρm)ν¯ + ρmνt−1 + ξt (29)
A.1.6 The Quantity Theory of Money in a Single Equation
We now describe with a single equation the quantity theory of money in way way that makes it
easier to see how the Cash-in-Advance framework temporarily escapes from the quantity theory
of money. Specifically, we give an expression for the term PY/M . Were the Quantity Theory of
Money to hold exactly this term would be equal to a constant.
Using the cash-in-advance constraint, PtCt = Mt−1 +Tt, with the aggregate resource constraint,
Yt = Ct +Xt, we have
PtYt
Mt
=
Pt(Ct +Xt)
Mt
=
Mt−1 + Tt
Mt
+
PtXt
Mt
= 1 +
PtXt
Mt
(30)
So the Cash-in-Advance framework succeeds in breaking away from the Quantity Theory of Money
in-so-far as monetary policy distorts investment decisions (distorts the cash goods vs. credit goods
margin).
A.2 The New-Keynesian Model Economy
To represent New-Keynesian abstraction we use the model economy described in Chapter 3 of Gal´ı
(2008). If money were absent, both the cash-in-advance model economy described above and the
New-Keynesian model economy described below would simplify to similar versions of the standard
real business cycle model economy.
The main purpose of New-Keynesian model economies is to analyze monetary policy. These
model economies use sticky prices, which they justify with a mixture of theoretical justifications
like rational inattention with empirical evidence that prices change infrequently. Sticky prices allow
money to have short-run effects, while remaining long-run neutral. The New-Keynesian approach
is perhaps more interested in modelling the effects of monetary policy on the economy, than in the
modelling of money itself.
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In the subsections below we discuss a version of the text-book description of the basic New
Keynesian model economy which we have taken from Chapter 3 of Gal´ı (2008). Even though this
model economy can be characterized fully by a system of equations obtained by log-linearization
about the steady-state of an explicit model economy, we provide the details of the full model
economy to highlight its similarities with the cash-in-advance economy that we have just described.
This model economy has a representative household and it assumes that prices are sticky and
that they change according to a Calvo rule, (Calvo, 1983). From these micro-foundations we derive
the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the dynamic Investment-Savings equation. To close the
model we add a process on nominal interest rates and a money demand function that define the
monetary policy rule and the relationship between the money supply and the interest rate.
A.2.1 Households
The model has a representative household who chooses consumption, labor, and savings so as to
maximize an expected discounted utility function
maxE
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ − γ
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
(31)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, Ct is consumption, and Nt is labor. Note that this is
identical to the utility function in expression (10) for the cash-in-advance model.
However, in this model economy we assume that the household consumes a continuum of goods
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. These goods are transformed into a composite good according to the following
equation
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
−1
 di
] 
−1
(32)
In this model economy the maximization of expected discounted utility is subject to the following
series of budget constraints,∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di+ ItBt ≤ Bt−1 + PtWtNt + Tt (33)
where Bt are purchases of nominal one-period bonds which have gross rate of return It, Wt is the
wage, Tt is a lump-sum component of income, which may include dividends from firm ownership,
and Pt is the aggregate price level which is given by
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−di
] 1
1−
(34)
The representative household demands money according to a money demand function that depends
on the nominal interest rates. However it is more convenient to write this demand function in logs
and we provide it in expression (38) below.
A.2.2 Firms
Each differentiated consumption good is produced by a different firm. All firms have the same
production technology given by Yt(i) = AtNt(i)
1−α, where Yt(i) is the production of firm i, At is a
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common technology level, and Nt(i) is the labour used by firm i. The firms set prices a la Calvo,
that is, each period firms are allowed to change prices only with probability 1− θ. Firms set prices
to maximize their expected discounted future profits for the period in which that price is in place.
Thus, problem for firm setting price in period t is
max
P ∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt{It,t+k(P ∗t Yt+k|t −Ψt+k(Yt+k|t))} (35)
subject to a demand function
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−
Ct+k (36)
which comes from the first-order conditions of the representative agents problem. Where Yt =(∫ 1
0 Yt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
is production of the final (composite) good, P ∗t is the price being set, Ψt+k(·) is
the cost function, Yt+k|t is the production at time t+ k of a firm that last changed price in period
t, It,t+k is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs, and Pt = [
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)
1−di]
1
1− is the
aggregate price level.
The technology process, At, follows an AR(1) process in logs, at,
at = ρaat−1 + ςt (37)
where ρa ∈ [0, 1), ςt is iid N (0, σ2ς ).
A.2.3 Money
The money demand function in logs is
mt − pt = yt − ηit (38)
where mt is (log) money, and pt are (log) prices.
Monetary policy, in keeping with all of the models covered in this paper is given by an exogenous
AR(1) process,
νt = (1− ρm)ν¯ + ρmνt−1 + ξt (39)
where νt ≡ ∆mt, ρm ∈ [0, 1), ξt is white noise. Note that the process on money in the New
Keynesian model (equation (39)) in exactly the same one as was used the Cash-in-Advance model
(equations (17) & (18)), just that here we write the process with mt in logs.
A.2.4 Prices and Market Clearance
The evolution of the aggregate consumer price level is given by
Pt =
[
θP 1−t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−
] 1
1− (40)
Thus consumer price inflation is
Π1−t = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−
(41)
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where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the consumer price inflation rate.
The remaining component of the model is the requirement for market clearing. The market
clearing conditions are given by, ∀ t: that the markets for each consumption good clear, Ct(i) =
Yt(i), ∀ i ∈ [0, 1], and that the labour market clears, Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(i)di.
A.2.5 Equilibrium
The system of equations that constitute the reduced form of the basic New Keynesian model are
now given20. They are derived from the microfoundations listed previously. The difference in
notation, with lowercase letters replacing the uppercase letters, is that all of the variables listed
here are now in log-linear form rather than the levels represented by the uppercase letters, eg. yt
is log-deviation of output while Yt is output. The New Keynesian Phillips curve is given by
pit = βEt{pit+1}+ κy˜t (42)
where κ ≡ (σ+ ϕ+α1−α ) (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ Θ, and Θ ≡ 1−α1−α+α ≤ 1; pit is the inflation rate, and y˜t = yt− ynt is
the output gap, that is the difference between current output, yt, and the natural level of output
ynt which would occour if prices were flexible. The dynamic IS equation is
y˜t = − 1
σ
(it − Et{pit+1} − rnt ) + Et{y˜t+1} (43)
where it is the nominal interest rate, r
n
t is the natural interest rate (again, that which would result if
prices were flexible). Both of these two equations are derived from the models micro-foundations.21
Letting lt = mt − pt be real money holdings and rewritting the money market equilibrium
condition as y˜t−ηit = lt−ynt , we can substitute out for it and get the following system of equations
from the three above,
pit = βEt{pit+1}+ κy˜t (44)
(1 + ση)y˜t = σηEt{y˜t+1}+ lt + ηEt{pit+1}+ ηrˆnt − ynt (45)
lt−1 = lt + pit −∆mt (46)
where rˆnt is the deviation from steady-state of the natural rate of interest.
The two other formulae necessary to complete the model are those for the natural level of output
and the natural rate of interest expressed in terms of deviation from steady-state, both of which
depend on the technology level.
ynt = φ
n
yaat + ϑ
n
y (47)
rˆnt = −σφnya(1− ρa)at (48)
where ϑny = − (1−α)(µ−log(1−α))σ(1−α)+ϕ+α > 0 and ψnya = 1+ϕσ(1−α)+ϕ+α . The model is thus the system of
equations given by (44)-(48) together with the processes on the changes in the money supply (39)
and technology shocks (37).
20This system of equations already incorporates the parametrization of γ = 1, to which the models are later
calibrated.
21See Gal´ı (2008) for a step-by-step derivation.
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A.2.6 The Quantity Theory of Money in a Single Equation
We now describe with a single equation the Quantity Theory of Money in way way that makes it
easier to see how the New-Keynesian framework temporarily escape from the Quantity Theory of
Money. Specifically, we give an expression for the term PY/M . Since the New-Keynesian model is
log-linearized we will look at the log of this term, namely p+ y−m. Were the Quantity Theory of
Money to hold exactly this term would be equal to a constant.
First observe that simply rewriting the money demand equation, (38), we get
pt + yt −mt = ηit (49)
where it is the nominal interest rate and η is the elasticity of money demand. Combining the
New-Keynesian Phillips Curve, equation (44), with the dynamic IS, equation (43), we get that
it = r
n
t −
σ
κ
pit + (1 +
β
κ
− σ
κ
)Et{pit+1}+ β
κ
Et{pit+2} (50)
So the nominal interest rate depends on the natural real rate of interest rnt (which depends on the
current technology shock) and current and future expected inflation. Thus we have that
pt + yt −mt = ηrnt + ηEt{f(pit, pit+1, pit+2)} (51)
Now, rnt is independent of monetary factors and the parameters relating to sticky prices. So for
sticky prices to be part of the story they must be operating through inflation. From equation, (41),
we have inflation evolves as
pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1) (52)
where p∗t is the price level being chosen by those firms that get to reset their prices. So in principle,
sticky prices may affect the rate of inflation, and thus the nominal interest rates — helping to break
away from the Quantity Theory of Money. In practice however the effect quantitatively negligible.
A.3 The Search-Money Model Economy
The aim of Search-Money models is to provide structural reasons that justify the existence of money.
This abstraction focuses on money as a facilitator of exchange based on the idea that money exists
mainly to solve problems related to the presence of single-coincidence of wants. Search-Money
models go a step deeper than the other two abstractions that we consider here, in which money
exists simply because the modeler assumes that it does, rather than to solve an explicit problem;
like the absence of a double coincidence of wants in exchange. For this reason the model is the
only one of the three we consider that satisfies Wallace’s Dictum for monetary economics, that
“Money should not be a primitive in monetary theory — in the same way that firm should not be a
primitive in industrial organization theory or bond a primitive in finance theory” (Wallace, 1998).
Search-Money models have become more popular in recent years as they have begun to overcome
some teething problems that plagued them in their earlier days: for instance in Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) money holdings were restricted to being 0 or 1 units per agent. Lagos and Wright (2005)
overcame these issues by introducing the concept of a centralized (Arrow-Debreu) night-market
alongside the decentralized (Kiyotaki-Wright) day-market. The use of the night-market remains
integral to the latest generation of Search-Money models such as Head, Liu, Menzio, and Wright
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(2012) and Berentson, Menzio, and Wright (2011). To represent the Search-Money abstraction
we use a stochastic extension of the model economy described in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright
(2011) — the stochastic extension is necessary to allow us to use the same process on money
growth as in the other models22 The model of Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) uses the same
combination of decentralized day-market and competitive night-market as Lagos and Wright (2005)
and incorporates physical capital.
In this model economy there are continuum of agents, a decentralized day-market, and a cen-
tralized night-market. Money is essential in the day-market because meetings are anonymous, and
credit is precluded in a fraction of these meetings because there is no possibility of credibly promis-
ing to repay at a later date. As a result exchange must be quid pro quo and so without money
some trades would never take place — namely, those in which there was no double-coincidence of
wants. Capital investments are made during the competitive night-market, and capital is used in
production during both markets23. The model of Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) includes a
government sector, we eliminate this, which requires some recalibration of the model24,25.
A.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by i who live forever and whose measure we normalize
to 1. Time is discrete and households discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). Each period is divided
into two subperiods which are commonly referred to as “day” and “night”. Households consume
and supply labour in both subperiods, and their preferences over sequences of consumption and
labor are ordered according to the following period utility function
U(c, n, C,N) = u(c)− h(n) + U(C)−N (53)
where c and C denote consumption and n and N denote labour in the day and night subperiods.
Assume that u, h, and U are twice continuously differentiable with u′ > 0,h′ > 0,U ′ > 0,u′′ <
0,h′′ ≥ 0 and U ′′ ≤ 0. Also, u(0) = c(0) = 0, and suppose that there exists q∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that
u′(q∗) = h′(q∗) and C∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that U ′(C∗) = 1 with U(C∗) > C∗.
Aruoba et al. (2011) propose to use the following functional form to take the model to the data
U(c, n, C,N) =
{[
(c+ χ)(1−σ) − χ(1−σ)
]
/(1− σ)− γn
}
+ {Ξ log(C)−N} (54)
With the exception of the inclusion of parameter χ, u(c) = [(c + χ)(1−σ) − χ(1−σ)]/(1 − σ) is the
same constant elasticity of substitution utility of consumption as the ones we have used in the other
two models economies; the utility of consumption is U(C) = Ξ log(C) and the disutility of labor
22An earlier version of this paper used the model of Lagos and Wright (2005). This model failed to break away
from the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run, performing much worse than the other models presented here.
23The appearance of capital in both markets is important. Earlier work by Aruoba and Wright (2003) to introduce
capital, with capital appearing in only one market, led to the results that the day and night markets could be
solved for seperately, and thus money had no effect on consumption, investment, or anything else in the competitive
night-market.
24Our results are robust to leaving the government sector in the model of Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011).
25Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) actually present three models. Here we follow their model 2. Their model 1
is the same model, but with a slightly different calibration. Their model 3 uses ’competitive search’, setting prices in
the decentralized day market by price taking, rather than Nash bargaining. For robustness we tried out using their
model 3 and it makes no real difference to the results we found using their model 2.
31
is h(n) = γn in the day market. The assumption that utility is quasi-linear in labour is used by
Aruoba et al. (2011) and is necessary to keep the model analyticaly tractable26.
A.3.2 Production and Trade
The day-good, c, comes in many differentiated varieties indexed by i. Each household consumes
only a subset of these goods. Each household can transform its own labour into one of these
goods that the household itself does not consume by the production function F (Ki, Ni), namely
household i produces good i which it does not consume. The production function is given by a
standard Cobb-Douglas formulation F (K,N) = KαN1−α. Trade during the day is decentralized
and anonymous and households are matched randomly in a typical search setup.
For two households i and j drawn randomly, there are three possible trading situations. The
probability that one consumes what the other produces, but not vice-versa —and, therefore, there
is a single coincidence of wants is ω, and we assume that it is symmetric. Then, the probability
that neither one of them consumes what the other one produces is 1− 2ω. In a single-coincidence
meeting, if i wants the good that j produces we call i the buyer and j the seller. In a fraction $ of
single-coincidence meetings the buyer can only pay with money, in the remaining fraction, 1−$,
the buyer has access to credit, l. By assumption captial can not be used for transaction purposes.
The night good, C, comes in a single and homogeneous variety, which is consumed by every
household. Each household can transform its own labour into income at the market wage. Trade,
during, the night occurs in a centralized Walrasian market. Consequently, the night-good can be
purchased on credit. Since money is a good, it can be traded in the night market just like any
other good. Investments in capital are also made during the night market.
All the differentiated day-goods and the night-good are perfectly divisible and non-storable,
with the exceptions of money and capital which are storable.
A.3.3 Money
In this model economy there is an object called money that is perfectly divisible and storable in
any non-negative quantity. The total money stock at time t is Mt, and it evolves according to
Mt+1 = e
νt+1Mt (55)
The monetary injections, (eνt+1 − 1)Mt, are made after the night market closes and they are
distributed lump-sum and equally to every household. The rate of growth of money, ν, follows an
AR(1) process given by
νt = (1− ρm)ν¯ + ρmνt−1 + ξt (56)
where 0 < ρm < 1 and where ξ is an identical and independently distributed process with zero
mean and variance σ2ξ . Although for the equilibrium proofs below we only need to assume that the
26 Quasi linearity means that there are no wealth effects in the demand for money, so all agents in the centralized
night markets choose the same money holdings. As a robustness test we simulated both the New-Keynesian and
Cash-in-Advance models setting the parameters so that utility was quasi-linear in labour (ie. ϕ = 0, γ = 1; note
that γ = 1 is the value to which this parameter is calibrated in those models anyway.). The effect on the results was
negligible.
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rate of growth of money follows a first-order Markov process. So the process on money, as given
by equantions (55) and (56), is identical to that used in the New-Keynesian and Cash-in-Advance
models.
A.3.4 Prices and Market Clearance
Let 1/pt be the price of money in the centralized night-market, that is, pt is the nominal price of
night good C.
In the deterministic version of the model economy described in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright
(2011), the only uncertainty comes from the random matching. In the stochastic extension that
we use here, the rate of growth of the money supply, νt, is also uncertain. Consequently, in our
model economy the decisions of each household at each point in time depend on its current money
holdings, m, on it’s capital holdings k, during the centralized night market on it’s earlier borrowing
during the day l, and on the aggregate state which is the rate of growth of money, ν. Therefore,
the households’ choices at time t can be characterized with a value function that has m, k, and ν
as its arguments; as well as l in the centralized night-market.
Let V (m, k, ν) be the value function for a household when it enters the the decentralized day-
market, and W (m, k, l, ν) its value function when it enters the centralized night-market. Since
trade is bilateral in the day-market and the day-good is non-storable, the seller’s production, n,
must be equal to the buyer’s consumption, c.
Let m be money holdings. The the value of trading at the day-market is
Vt(m, k, ν) = ωV
b
t (m, kν) + ωV
s
t (m, k, ν) + (1− 2ω)Wt(m, k, 0, ν) (57)
where V bt (m, k, ν) and V
s
t (m, k, ν) denote the values to being a buyer and being a seller, as given
by
V bt (m, k, ν) = $[u(qb) +Wt(m− db, k, 0, ν)] + (1−$)[u(q˜b) +Wt(m, k, lb, ν)] (58)
V st (m, k, ν) = $[−c(qs, k) +Wt(m+ ds, k, 0, ν)] + (1−$)[−c(q˜s, k) +Wt(m, k,−ls, ν)](59)
In these expressions qb and db (qs and ds) denote the quantity of goods and money exchanged when
buying (selling) for money, while q˜b and lb (q˜s and −ls) denote the quantity and the value of the
loan for the buyer (seller) when trading on credit.
At the centralized night-market agents solve the following problem
Wt(m, k, l, ν) = max
C,N,m′,k′
[U(C)−N + βEt{Vt+1(m′ + (eν′ − 1)M,ν ′)|ν} (60)
subject to C = wN + (1 + r − δ)k − k′ + m−m′−lp , C ≥ 0, 0 ≤ N ≤ N¯ , and m′ ≥ 0, where N¯ is the
endowment of night-hours, w is the wage, and r is the interest rate on capital.27
It is assumed that the markets for captial and labour in the night-market are competitive, thus
w = FN (K,N) and r = FK(K,N).
27Notice that (eν
′ − 1)M is the transfer of money that is added lump-sum to the households’ holdings after they
exit the night-market.
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Now that we have defined the value functions, we consider the terms of trade in the decentralized
day-market. In single-coincidence meetings, we use the generalized Nash solution in which the buyer
has bargaining power ζ > 0 and threat points which are given by the continuation values. In the
fraction $ of meetings where money is used (q, d) is the consumption for money exchange pair that
maximizes the following problem
(q, d) = argmax {[u(q) +Wt(mb − d, kb, 0, ν)−Wt(mb, kb, 0, ν)]ζ
[−c(q, ks) +Wt(ms + d, ks, 0, ν)−Wt(ms, ks, 0, ν)]1−ζ} (61)
subject to d ≤ mb and q ≥ 0. In the remaining fraction, 1 − $, of meetings where credit is
available, (q˜, l) is determined just like (q, d), except that the Nash bargaining problem is no longer
any constraint on l, the way d ≤ mb had to hold in monetary trades.
As Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) observe, the solution to the bargaining problem in 61 will
involve d = mb. Substituting this into the bargaining problem and taking the first order condition
with respect to q we have
mb
p
=
z(q, ks)w
γ
(62)
where
z(q, k) ≡ ζc(q, k)u
′(q) + (1− ζ)u(q)cq(q, k)
ζu′(q) + (1− ζ)cq(q, k) (63)
reflects the terms of trade in the bargaining meetings.
Real output, Y = YD + YN , is the combination of real output in the decentralized day market,
YD = ω$M/p+ ω$ωl/p, and real output in the centralized night market F (K,N).
Following Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) we measure inflation in terms of the price level in
the centralized market pt
28.
A.3.5 Equilibrium
The system of equations that defines an equilibrium is now given. To make the model stationary
we define mˆt = mt/Mt and pˆt = pt/Mt; observe that in equilibrium it follows that mˆt = 1 for
all t. The derivation of this system of equations follows almost exactly as described in Aruoba,
Waller, and Wright (2011). The first three equations are related to the first-order conditions of the
household.
z(qt,Kt) = βE
{
z(qt+1,Kt+1)
exp(νt+1)
(
1− ωζ + ωζ u
′(qt+1)
z(qt+1,Kt+1)
)}
(64)
U ′(Ct) = βE{U ′(Ct+1)[1 + FK(Kt+1, Nt+1)− δ]
−ω[$Γ(qt+1,Kt+1) + (1−$)(1− ζ)ck(qˆt+1,Kt+1)]} (65)
U ′(Ct) =
1
FN (Kt, Nt)
(66)
28We also tried using a Laspeyres measure of inflation that included prices in the decentralized markets. But
since in the calibrated model the decentralized market accounts for only about 3% of total real output this made no
noticable difference.
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The fourth equation is aggregate resource constraint
Ct = F (Kt, Nt) + (1− δ)Kt −Kt+1 (67)
The next two equations determine the price level in the competive night market, and the real value
of the credit loans made in the decentralized day market (in the fraction $ of meetings where credit
is available)29.
pˆt =
γ
z(qt,Kt)FN (Kt, Nt)
(68)
lt/pt = FN (Kt, Nt)[(1− ζ)u(q˜ + ζc(q˜, K)] (69)
The next four equations are related to the terms of trade in the decentralized day market (z(q,K),
as defined in (63)), and some related derivatives and quantities.
(70)
z(qt,Kt) =
ζc(qt,Kt)u
′(qt) + (1− ζ)u(qt)cq(qt,Kt)
ζu′(qt) + (1− ζ)cq(qt,Kt)
(71)
zq(qt,Kt) =
u′(q)cq[ζu′(q) + (1− ζ)cq] + ζ(1− ζ)(u(qt)− c)(u′(qt)cqq − cqu′′(qt))
[ζu′(qt) + (1− ζ)cq]2
(72)
zK(qt,Kt) =
ζu′(qt)ck[ζu′(qt) + (1− ζ)cq] + ζ(1− ζ)(u(qt)− c)u′(qt)cqK
[ζu′(qt) + (1− ζ)cq]2
(73)
Γ(qt,Kt) = cK(qt,Kt)− cq(qt,Kt)zK(qt,Kt)
zq(qt,Kt)
where c is shorthand for c(qt,Kt), cq for cq(qt,Kt), cK for cK(qt,Kt), cqq for cqq(qt,Kt), and cqK
for cqK(qt,Kt). The next equation is simply the definition of real output,
Y = F (K,N) + ω$M/p+ ω$ωl/p (74)
The final equation is that defining the money growth rate,
νt = (1− ρm)ν¯ + ρmνt−1 + ξt (75)
The Search-Money model with capital is thus given by the system of stochastic difference equa-
tions, (64)-(75).
A.3.6 The Quantity Theory of Money in a Single Equation
We now describe with a single equation the Quantity Theory of Money in way way that makes
it easier to see how the Search-Money framework temporarily escapes from the Quantity Theory
of Money. Specifically, we give an expression for the term PY/M . Were the Quantity Theory of
Money to hold exactly this term would be equal to a constant.
29While neither lt nor pt are stationary, by treating lt/pt as a single variable the equation is stationary.
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In the Search-Money model, by equation (68), we have that
PY
M
=
1
z(q,K)
γY
FN (K,N)
(76)
In the simulation results total output (Y ), capital stock (K), and the marginal product of labour
(FN (K,N)) are almost constant, and thus not related to the ability of the Search-Money model
to get away from the Quantity Theory of Money. They are almost constant because most of the
economy is based on non-monetary trades, the centralized night market is much bigger than the
decentralized day market, and so unaffected by changes in the money supply. All of the movement
occours in the z(q,K) term, specifically from changes in q — the amount produced/traded in
the exchanges involving money in the decentralized market. The amount produced in monetary
exchanges varies with the amount of money and inflation (the cost of holding money).
A.4 Calibration and Computation
For our comparisons of the three model economies to be meaningful, we choose their functional
forms and parameters so that they are as similar as possible. This use of identical parameter values
wherever the models coincide, of identical exogenous processes, and of identical functional forms
for the utility of consumption, as well as the fact that we have solved the three model economies
using identical solution methods allows us to make a genuine comparison between them. Since we
have removed all other possible sources of variation, we can safely attribute any differences in their
outputs with respect to the Quantity Theory of Money relationship to the different ways in which
these three frameworks model money.
Parameter Choices
We have decided to use Gal´ı (2008) as our main reference for our parameter choices, with
the obvious exceptions of the parameters and functions of the Cash-in-Advance and Search-Money
model economies that do not exist in the New-Keynesian framework, such as the parameters related
to the search for trading partners in the Search-Money model economy.30
Since Gal´ı (2008) exploits the certainty equivalence principle in his solution method, he does
not define the shocks to either the technology or the money supply. Instead, we take the processes
for those shocks from Cooley and Hansen (1989). We report our chosen parameter values in Table
4.31 Our results are robust to using the original parameter calibrations of each model, that is those
parameter values given in the papers from which the models are taken. Importantly, the original
parameterizations of the models (in the papers from which they are taken) are all calibrated to
similar postwar periods. Since the frameworks are quite different using exactly the same calibration
targets for the different frameworks is not possible, although some common calibration targets, such
as interest rates and capital-output ratios were used by a number of the the original papers.
Simulation
30The calibrations reported in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) are annual and so had to be adjusted. This was
done using the same methodology and targets they report — some targets, such as the capital-output ratio, have to
be adjusted to quarterly values.
31Gal´ı (2008) pg. 52 says that p = 6, however this appears to be a typo. When we use this value, we fail
to replicate his results. Therefore, we use p = 6/5 instead following http://www.dynare.org/phpBB3/tviewtopic.
php?f=1andt=2978. In this case we replicated Gali’s results successfully.
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Table 4: Parameter Values
Cash-in-Advance New Keynesiana Search-Money
Preferences
Time Discount factor β 0.99 0.99 0.99
Curvature of Consumption σ 1 1 1
Weight on Labourb γ 1 1 2.1
Curvature of Labourc ϕ 1 1 0
Technology
Returns to Capitald,e α 0.33 n.a. 0.33
Depreciation Ratee δ 0.025 n.a. 0.025
Autocorrelation ρa 0.9 0.9 n.a.
Variance of Shock σς 0.007 0.007 n.a.
Money
Elasticity of Money Demand η n.a. 4 n.a.
Autocorrelation ρm 0.5 0.5 0.5
Variance of Shock σξ 0.009 0.009 0.009
Constant Term ν¯ 0.014 0.014 0.014
Dist. of Shock ξ log-normal log-normal log-normal
Price Setting
Market Power  n.a. 6/5 n.a.
Calvo Stickiness θ n.a. 0.66 n.a.
Search
Prob. of Single Coincidenceg ω n.a. n.a. 0.08
Bargaining Power ζ n.a. n.a. 0.92
Night weight on consumption Ξ n.a. n.a. 0.8
Make u(0) = 0 χ n.a. n.a. 0.001
Prob. of credit availability $ n.a. n.a. 0.85
aEvery other parameter that appears in the equations that characterize the equilibrium of the New-Keynesian
model economy can be derived from the parameters that we have identified in this table using the following
system of equations: M = /(1− ); µ = logM ρ = −logβ; Θ = (1− α)/(1− α+ α); λ = Θ(1− θ)(1− βθ)/θ;
κ = λ[σ+ (ϕ+ α)/(1− α)]; ϑny = {(1− α)[µ− log(1− α)]}/[σ(1− α) + ϕ+ α]; ψnya = (1 +ϕ)/[σ(1− α) + ϕ+ α].
bIn the Search-Money model this parameter is calibrated 2.1, as this is needed as part of the the calibration
procedure of Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) (setting this parameter to one in the Search-Money with
capital model, while messing up the calibration, does not affect the results).
cIn the Search-Money model the disutility of labor is linear in both the day-market and in the night-market.
dAbbreviation “n.a.” means “not applicable”.
eThere is no ’returns to capital’ or ’depreciation’ in the New-Keynesian economy as there is no capital.
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To simulate our model economies we have used identical seeds for the random number generator
so that the sequences of the realizations of the random shocks are identical in all three model
economies. To obtain the model economy time series we discard the first 200 periods of each
equilibrium realization to purge away the initial conditions, and then we draw a sample of 204
quarterly observations to replicate the number of observations in our United States time series.
Whenever we need to obtain multiple samples, we repeat this process as necessary.
Computation
The equilibria of the three models economies that we have described above can be reduced
to systems of stochastic equations. We have solved these systems using the default perturbation
methods of Dynare to calculate quadratic approximations to the decision rules.32
32We have run every code with Dynare Version 4.2.1-2 using Octave 3.2.4.
38
B Is the Quantity Theory of Money a Stable Relationship?
Using Lucas’ Illustrations, Sargent and Surico (2011) argue that the relationship between the
price level, real GDP, and the money supply (measured as M2) given by the Quantity Theory
of Money varies with the monetary regime. In this appendix we look at this issue using the
interpretation of the long-run Quantity Theory of Money as being a cointegration relationship.
Under this interpretation, a change in the Quantity Theory of Money would involve a change in
the cointegrating vector that defines the long-run relationship. Using a test for a structural break
in the cointegrating vector at an unknown time period developed by Seo (1998) we reject that such
a break has occoured in our 1960–2009 period. The Quantity Theory of Money appears to be a
stable relationship.
As we described in Section 2, Sargent and Surico (2011) look at the Quantity Theory of Money
during the period 1900–2005 using the Lucas Illustrations. They divide the period into four subpe-
riods, coinciding with different monetary policy regimes. They find that the long-run slopes of the
Lucas Illustrations differ in these four regimes, using M2 as the monetary aggregate. Of particular
relevance to us they identify 1984, a date in the middle of our sample, as corresponding to a change
to an inflation targeting regime which delivers a flatter long-run slope. Their findings imply that a
structural break in the cointegrating vector defining the Quantity Theory of Money occours around
1984 — it is this implication that we aim to test here.
The Quantity Theory of Money defines a relationship between the price level, real GDP, and the
money supply — all variables that are nonstationary. This relationship holds in the long-run, but
short lived departures from this relationship are common. In the language of modern econometrics
the Quantity Theory of Money defines a cointegration relationship. Cointegration theory thus
gives us an alternative method to the Lucas Illustrations by which to look at whether the Quantity
Theory of Money holds in the US economy in the long-run. However since the models we deal
with are stationary it is not appropriate for our main purpose of evaluating different approaches to
modelling money.
Here we look at whether the Quantity Theory of Money is a stable relationship — as opposed to
the argument of Sargent and Surico (2011) that it varies with the monetary regime. The stability
of the Quantity Theory of Money can be seen as a question about the stability of the cointegrating
vector. If the Quantity Theory of Money relationship changes between different monetary regimes
this would appear as a structural break in the cointegrating coefficients. For the Lucas Illustrations
the stability of the Quantity Theory of Money means that the slope of the Lucas Illustrations is
independent of the monetary regime. Thus the validity of our use of the Lucas Illustration to
analyze the period 1960–2009, which covers two different monetary regimes, requires that Quantity
Theory of Money be stable.
While cointegration theory has not been applied much to the Quantity Theory of Money it
has often been used to evaluate the related issue of money demand equations (Lucas, 1988; Stock
and Watson, 1993; Seo, 1998).33 The Johansen test suggests that the Quantity Theory of Money
represents a cointegrating relationship.
To look at the stability of the Quantity Theory of Money we use the test for a structural break
at an unknown date in the cointegrating vector developed by Seo (1998). We find that there has
33Lucas (1988) does not use any cointegration theory, but lays some theory and evidence on money demand
equations which the later two papers then extend and evaluate with cointegration theory.
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not been a break in the Quantity Theory of Money for M234, and we conclude that the relationship
is stable. That the Quantity Theory of Money is a stable relationship means that the slope of
Lucas’ Illustration has remained unchanged throughout the 1960–2009 period.
The log of the Quantity Theory of Money can be expressed in Vector Error Correction Model
representation as ∆ log Yt∆ logPt
∆ logMt
 = αβ′
 log Yt−1logPt−1
logMt−1
+ L−1∑
i=1
Γi
 ∆ log Yt−1∆ logPt−1
∆ logMt−1
+ ut (77)
where α is a 3×1 vector, β is a 3× 1 vector, ut is a 3× 1 vector of independently and identically
distributed shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ, L is the lag-operator, and Γi is the
matrix of ith-order autocorrelation coefficients.
Vector β represents the long-run relationship between the price level, real GDP, and the money
supply —the Quantity Theory of Money relationship. For the purpose of identification the first
element of β is normalized to 1. Vector α captures how the system adjusts to transitory departures
and returns back to the long-run relationship captured by β. We apply tests for a structural break
in one or both vectors α and β.
Seo (1998)’s test is based on the Maximum Likelihood Estimate of the cointegrating vectors from
the Vector Error Correction Model representation. For a structural break at a known date a simple
Lagrange Multiplier test could be applied —comparing the likelihood under the null hypothesis of
no break to the alternative hypothesis of a break at time t. Three different simple tests can be
constructed for a break in β, in α, or in both vectors. To test for a break at an unknown date we
calculate the test statistics for a break at each possible date, and the ‘largest’ of these individual
statistics becomes itself a test statistic for a break at an unknown date.35
We use three definitions to determine the value of the ’largest’ statistic: the average (Avg−LM),
the exponential average (Exp − LM), and the supremum (Sup − LM). Seo (1998) derives the
asymptotic properties of each of these metrics under the assumptions of (i) no drift, (ii) no trend
in the data generating process, and (iii) a trend in the data generating process and he provides
critical values for all these tests.
We apply the test for a structural break in the cointegrating vectors to our quarterly data for
the 1960–2009 period36. We use the tests based on a trend in the data generating process, because
real GDP, M2, and the price level all show clear upward trends. We use logs of all of these variables
to linearize the Quantity Theory of Money relationship.
The Akaike information criterion recommends to use as many lags as possible, Hannan-Quinn
suggests 13, the Bayesian information criterion suggests 3. We choose 8 because this represents 2
years of data, which keeps us in line with the literature that estimates money demand equations.
In particular, Stock and Watson (1993) use cointegration to test for a relationship between real
money holdings (money supply divided by the price index), real GDP, and the interest rate. Our
34That is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no break in the Quantity Theory of Money for M2.
35The unknown date is assumed to lie in the interval [0.15, 0.85]T , where T is the total number of periods. That
is, we assume that the break does not occur at the ends of the time period.
36All the data comes from FRED2 (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) and is described in full in Section 2. The
regression results shown here are those based on GNPC96, CPIAUCNS, and M2SL. Our results are robust to using
our other measures for inflation.
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results are robust to the use of 12 lags.37
As a robustness test, and to compare with the literature on money demand equations, we tried
adding the interest rate to our cointegration regressions: for quarterly data the presence of the
interest rate in the cointegrating relationship was consistently rejected38; both for 8 and for 12
lags, and using the interest rate on both 3-month and 10-year Treasury Bills (Stock and Watson
(1993) also use commercial paper rates, but this series was discontinued in 1997).
All the test results that we report below are based on a 5% level of significance. The Dicky-Fuller
tests confirm that all the variables contain unit roots. Johansen’s test for cointegration confirms
the presence of a single cointegrating relationship using both 8 and 12 lags. All the estimation and
test results described up to this point were found using Gretl Version 1.9.5. The structural break
test itself is performed using Gauss39, the following results are the estimation results.
We now summarize the estimation and testing results using real GDP, Consumer Price Index,
and M2 money supply, ∆ log Yt∆ logPt
∆ logMt
 =
 0.003(0.002)−0.003(0.002)
0.003(0.073)

 15.089(1.302)
−4.167(0.903)

′ log Yt−1logPt−1
logMt−1
+ ... (78)
LR(H0 : rank(Π) = 0) = 34.599∗
LR(H0 : rank(Π) = 1) = 17.349
LR(H0 : rank(Π) = 2) = 5.204
Avg − LMαn = 6.872∗, Exp− LMαn = 4.337∗, Sup− LMαn = 11.933
Avg − LMβn = 3.737, Exp− LMβn = 2.399, Sup− LMβn = 9.306
Avg − LMαβn = 10.609∗, Exp− LMαβn = 7.340∗, Sup− LMαβn = 20.845∗
where standard errors are in parentheses and * indicates signicance at the 5% level. Figure 7 shows
the evolution of the LM statistic over time. Using 12 lags, we further reject the possiblity of a
structural break in α (or αβ′).
To interpret these results first recall that our main interest is in the vector, β, representing the
cointegrating relationship. The tests also consider the adjustment vector, α, that represents how
the system reacts to deviations from the cointegrating relationship — how the economy goes about
returning to the cointegrating relationship given by the Quantity Theory of Money . For each of α
and β (as well as for a joint-test of α and β) we have three test statistics (Exp−LM , Avg −LM ,
Sup− LM).
37When we use 12 lags we have to restrict t to be in the interval [0.2, 0.8] because otherwise the αβ matrix was too
close to being singular. When we placed the same restriction on t with 8 lags, the results did not change.
38From a theoretical viewpoint whether the interest rate is a stationary or nonstationary variable is an open question
in econometrics. So theoretically it is unclear whether including interest rates in a cointegration relationship makes
sense. In any case our data rejected it’s presence in the cointegrating relationship. We note in passing that Stock
and Watson (1993) use annual data.
39Version 10. We thank Byeongseon Seo for a copy of his code implementing the tests.
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In the printed estimation outputs the first part reports the estimated values for the vectors α and
β, with the standard errors for the coefficients in parentheses. Then come the LR statistics of the
Johansen cointegration test, which in both cases reject the first null hypothesis of no cointegrating
relationship, and then accept the second null that there is a single cointegrating relationship. The
third part gives the results of the tests for a structural break in the cointegrating vectors α and β
(as well as for a joint-test of α and β). In the cases where these statistics are significant, indicated
by ∗, we reject the null of no structural break in that vector. The results suggest that there is no
structural break in β, while there is one in α.
The panels of Figure 7 show the evolution of the three statistics (Exp − LM , Avg − LM ,
Sup− LM) over time. The dotted horizontal lines show the critical values for the three statistics
(Exp− LM , Avg − LM , Sup− LM), while the value of the statistic is shown by the jagged line.
In the cases where we rejected the null of no structural break a sudden increase in the statistic at
time t to above the critical values (the horizontal lines) suggests that this is the point in time at
which it is most likely that the structural break occoured.
The results point towards the existence of a cointegrating relationship, β, which is stable over
the sample period. Therefore we conclude that change of monetary policy that took place around
1984 is not associated with a break in the cointegrating relationship. That is, we conclude that the
Quantity Theory of Money is stable over the period 1960–2009.
There is evidence of a change in the adjustment process for returning to the long-run relationship
(a break in α). Figure 7 shows that this appears to take around 1984 (when the test statistic for
α shoots up above the critical values (horizontal lines)). This might be understood as the effects
of the change in the monetary policy regime on the short-run effects of monetary policy, as in
Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000). That the estimated coefficients in the adjustment vector, α, are
insignificant is likely related to the evidence of a structural break in this vector. Note that this
does not represent a break in the cointegration relationship represented by the Quantity Theory of
Money in the long-run, just in how the economy goes about returning to the Quantity Theory of
Money when current events cause the economy to be away from the Quantity Theory of Money in
the short-run.
We conclude that we do not find evidence of a change in the long-run relationship embodied
by the Quantity Theory of Money, and this implies that the slope of the Lucas Illustration has
not changed. There is however evidence that the adjustment of the economy back to the Quantity
Theory of Money changes around 1984, when the monetary policy regime changes.
43
C A Bayesian View of the Quantity Theory of Money (In Progress)
We Bayesian estimate the models to target the three time-series of data that make up the Quan-
tity Theory of Money: growth of the money supply (M1SL), real output growth (GNPC96), and
inflation (CPIAUCSL). The models cannot simply be estimated as is: they contain two shocks
(money and technology) to target three time-series, so the likelihood would be minus infinity. An
extra shock is therefore needed. Following the standard modeling approach for Bayesian estima-
tion of Monetary DSGE model, eg. Smets and Wouters (2007), we include a shock between the
’fundamental’ inflation predicted by the model and the observed inflation in the data. That is,
piobservedt = pi
fundamental
t + 
p
t . This is commonly referred to as a ’price mark-up distrubance’. In
Smets and Wouters (2007), for example, this shock follows an ARMA(1,1) process. The addition
of these shocks between fundamental and observed inflation is the only modification of the models
relative to their description in Appendix A. We model these as pt = ¯
p + ˜pt , where ˜
p
t is i.i.d with
distribution N(0, σp).
Our models now have three shock processes — money supply, output, and prices — to explain
the three time-series — growth of the money supply, real output growth, and inflation. We are
ready to proceed with the Bayesian estimation. The first step in Bayesian estimation of the models
is to define the prior distributions of the parameters. The prior distributions are given in Table 5,
and are choosen to be centered around the baseline calibrated parameter values used in the body
of the paper.
Table 5: Prior and Posterior Distributions for the Cash-in-Advance Model
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Dist. Param1 Param2 Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95%
γ Normal 1 0.5 1.46 0.50 0.69 2.22
ρa Uniform 0.5 0.99 0.59 0.14 0.50 0.71
ρm Uniform 0.3 0.99 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.32
ν¯ Uniform 0 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.03
a¯ Uniform 0 0.1 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03
¯p Uniform -3 3 -1.02 1.73 -2.30 0.93
σ Uniform 0 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
σξ Uniform 0 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05
σp Uniform 0 3 2.99 0.87 2.98 3.00
For Uniform distributions, Param1 and Param2 are the maximum and minimum values,
U(Param1, Param2). For Normally distributed variables they are the mean and standard
deviation, N(Param1, Param2).
We can now see the same problem of the Cash-in-Advance framework displaying way to much
of the Quantity Theory of Money that we have seen with the Lucas Illustrations. From a Bayesian
viewpoint it must be possible for the model to reproduce the variance in short-run prices seen in
the data, otherwise the likelihood of the model would be minus infinity. However, for the Bayesian
estimate of the Cash-in-Advance framework to capture the short-run movements in inflations —
to capture the failure of the Quantity Theory of Money in the short-run — it requires very large
and poorly identified transitory shocks to inflation. The model itself is simply unable to explain
the short-run failure of the Quantity Theory of Money, and so it requires large transitory and
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unexplained shocks to inflation to be able to replicate the empirical fact that the Quantity Theory
of Money fails in the short-run.
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D The Quantity Theory of Money (In Progress)
We start with a simple accounting identity,
Money supply times Velocity = Price times Real Output
The Quantity Theory of Money is that Velocity is constant. Thus, the Quantity Theory of Money
tells us that the price level is fully determined once we know output and the money supply. The
Quantity Theory of Money first emerges in modern form in the work of David Hume (Of Money,
1753; Of Interest, 1753). 40 Hume characterizes it as,
Were all the gold in England annihilated at once, and one and twenty shillings
substituted in the place of every guinea, would money be more plentiful or interest lower?
No surely: We should only use silver instead of gold. Were gold rendered as common
as silver, and silver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or interest
lower? We may assuredly give the same answer. Our shillings would then be yellow,
and our halfpence white; and we should have no guineas. No other difference would ever
be observed; no alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or interest; unless
we imagine, that the colour of the metal is of any consequence.
Now, what is so visible in these greater variations of scarcity or abundance in the
precious metals, must hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying of gold and silver
fifteen times makes no difference, much less can the doubling or tripling them. All
augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labour and commodities;
and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progress towards these
changes, the augmentation may have some influence, by exciting industry; but after the
prices are settled, suitably to the new abundance of gold and silver, it has no manner
of influence.
[...] Money having chiefly a fictitious value, the greater or less plenty of it is of no
consequence, if we consider a nation within itself; and the quantity of specie, when once
fixed, though ever so large, has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a
greater number of those shining bits of metal, for clothes, furniture or equipage, without
encreasing any one convenience of life.
Here one already sees the two main empirical facts that characterize the Quantity Theory of
Money today. Namely that the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run, and equally
important that it fails in the short run.41
What is missing however from these early characterizations of the Quantity Theory of Money is
mention of the important role played by real output growth in the relationship between money and
prices.42 When this role was first explicitly noted we are not sure, but it is present in Fisher (1911)
and certainly well appreciated by the time of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartzs 1963 book A
Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Writing on the Greenback period, 1867-1879,
40The idea that the abundance of gold and silver was somehow related to the price level being already in existence.
Its roots are in observations from the Salamanca School of Economics in the 16th century in response to the influx
of precious metals from the Americas.
41We can also see the closely related idea that money is long-run neutral — that changes in the money supply
cannot affect living standards in the long-run. We describe the similarities and differences between these two concepts
later in this section.
42Whether in Hume’s work this is a sin of commission, or simply of omission, is open to interpretation.
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they observe that prices decreased slightly, despite an increase in the money supply — atributing
the difference as substantially due to the large increase in real output that occourred during this
period.
Most evidence on the Quantity Theory of Money holding in the long-run came, at this time
came, from plotting, say, four decade averages of money, price and output growth for a cross-
section of countries and observing that the point lay close to the fourty-five degree line predicted
by the Quantity Theory of Money. Lucas (1980) provided a time series view of this same issue.
Associating the long-run with low-frequency movements in the time series for money and inflation
he showed that the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run for the United States over the
period 1955-1975. More recently Benati (2005, 2009) has extended these results for longer time
periods, for the UK, and for other filters.
The Quantity Theory of Money has often been considered indirectly using two alternative ways
to look at the issue, namely the ’velocity of money’ (ie. PY/M), and the ’demand for money’ (the
size of money holdings measured as months of nominal income, ie. M/PY). The idea that the
Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run but fails and the short-run thus become that the
velocity of money changes in the short-run but is constant in the long-run; and similarly for the
demand for money.
The perspective of the demand for money was often used as the basis for microeconomic models.
Fisher (1911) presented an model in which people make payments and monitor the level of their
bank accounts. This model, as well as many other inventory-based models, of money holdings
implied that the velocity of money would be constant even in the short-run (Fisher was aware
that empirically velocity fluctuates in the short-run). This occoured as these models implied a
theory of money demand in which real money holdings are unit-elastic to changes in income. This
difficulty persisted for some time. Akerlof (1979), in an article entitled “Irving Fisher on His Head:
...”, showed that with a small change in assumptions — a change in the rule used to monitor
real money holdings — Fisher’s model would instead predict a (short-run) elasticity of real money
holding with respect to income of zero. Thus in the short-run all changes in money would appear
as fluctuations in velocity, and the Quantity Theory of Money will fail in the short-run.
Alongside attempts to model the demand for money there has been an empirical literature that
aims to estimate the demand for money. Lucas (1988) for instance presents some theory and
complementary estimations for money demand equations. This was extended to a cointegration
analysis by Stock and Watson (1993)43, and for the stability of the cointegration relationship by
Seo (1998).
Sargent & Surico
Teles and Zhou (2005) provide another approach to the Quantity Theory of Money. They
take a reverse-engineering view to the question of which is the correct monetary aggregate. Since
the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run, they suggest that the ’correct’ monetary
aggregate is the one with the most stable demand for money. Using US data to compare a number
of different monetary aggregates they conclude that MZM (money zero maturity) is the ’correct’
monetary aggregate.
43Recognizing that the variables in question are non-stationary, it follows that the estimation results of Lucas
(1988) are spurious and cointegration is the correct way to proceed. Of course, the concept of cointegration was
unknown until 1987.
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D.1 Relation to Other Monetary Theories
We now discuss the relation of the Quantity Theory of Money to two closely related, but funda-
mentally different, concepts: the long-run neutrality of money, and the fiscal theory of the price
level. We do this as the relationship between the three is subtle, and is often confused. We start
simply with the observation that the empirical fact established in this paper — that the Quantity
Theory of Money holds in the long-run, and fails in the short-run — is logically independent from
whether or not money is long-run neutral, and from whether or not fiscal factors determine the
price level (the fiscal theory of the price level). That said, our personal reading of the literature is
that money is long-run neutral, and that fiscal factors can be important in determining the price
level.
D.1.1 Long-Run Neutrality of Money
The long-run neutrality of money says that in the long-run, changes in the money supply will have
no effect on the level of real output. This is closely related to the Quantity Theory of Money on a
very intuitive level. Let’s assume that money is long-run neutral and pretend for a moment that
real output is constant, then if we double the money supply we might expect prices to double —
that is, we might expect the Quantity Theory of Money to hold.
However long-run neutrality of money and the Quantity Theory of Money are two different
concepts. To see the difference we now develop a toy model. In the model, money fails to be
long-run neutral but the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run. If the model seems
somewhat silly or forced this is simply because of the strongly intuitive link between the long-run
neutrality of money and the Quantity Theory of Money in realistic settings.
Model: Let t denote the current time period, starting the model from period 0. Let the growth rate
of output be zero percent if money growth is negative, and one percent if money growth is positive
— obviously money is not going to be long-run neutral. The money supply is exactly determined
by the government who decide how much money to print. Since the government knows about the
effect of money growth on the growth rate of output they decide to increase the money supply at
a rate of two percent per year (gM = 2). Then the growth rate of output is one percent (gY = 1).
If the growth rate of prices is one percent (gP = 1), then by the definition of velocity we have that
gV = gP + gY − gM = 1 + 1 − 2 = 0. That is, velocity is constant and the Quantity Theory of
Money holds in all periods. Thus we have a model in which the Quantity Theory of Money holds,
but money is not long-run neutral.
It is theoretically possible to create a model in which money is long-run neutral but the Quantity
Theory of Money fails to hold (in both the short-run and long-run).44 But to do this requires the
velocity of money to go to either infinity or zero in the long-run. If we imposed that the velocity
of money be bounded then there must exist some fixed time horizon — some sufficiently long-run
— over which the Quantity Theory of Money holds. Since both of these cases, velocity of inifinity
44Model: Let t denote the current time period, starting the model from period 0. Let real output be exogenous
and grow at a constant rate of one percent per year (gY = 1) — so money is long-run neutral. Now let let money
supply also be completely exogenous and assume that the government has perfect control of the printing press which
it uses to increase the money supply be t-percent per year (gM = t). Admitedly, not the most perfect use of it’s
perfect control. Now assume that the growth in prices is two-t-percent per year (gP = 2t). Then by the definition of
velocity we have that gV = gP + gY − gM = 2t + 1 − t = t + 1 — clearly velocity is not constant and the Quantity
Theory of Money fails to hold. But velocity is going to go to inifinity, and this seems fairly silly.
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or zero, seem completely implausible we conclude that it is fair to say that the long-run neutrality
of money implies that the Quantity Theory of Money holds over the long-run.
From this we conclude that long-run neutrality of money implies that the Quantity Theory of
Money holds in the long-run, but that the Quantity Theory of Money holding in the long-run does
not imply the long-run neutrality of money.
So since the empirical fact that the Quantity Theory of Money holds in the long-run, and
by extension the Lucas Illustrations, cannot be considered as evidence that money is long-run
neutral4546, how might we test whether money is long-run neutral? One approach is to test long-
run restrictions in Vector Autoregressions. For an explanation of how to do so, as well as evidence
from this test suggesting that money is long-run neutral, see King and Watson (1997).47
D.1.2 Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
As money is long-run neutral, then the level of real output is given, independent of changes in
money and prices. The Quantity Theory of Money can then be considered as prediciting what
will be the price level, given the money supply. So one could have a steady level of prices simply
by keeping the money supply stable. Why then do we see some countries printing lot’s of money,
with the resultant high inflation? Why would anyone want to do this? It is this question: What
determines the money supply, which the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level addresses. Countries will
print money if they need it to pay for spending (or pay off debt). Thus expectations about current
and future government budget deficits can be considered as equivalent to expectations about how
the money supply will change in the future, and thus about future prices. The fiscal behaviour
of the government determines the money supply, and so in the long-run also determines the price
level — this is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.
45It is merely the absence of evidence against long-run neutrality of money.
46In their original form of gP against gM it is doubly true that the Lucas Illustrations cannot be considered as
evidence regarding the long-run neutrality of money. Consider the following two examples, in both of which money
is long-run neutral.
Example 1: Let real output be exogenous and let it grow at one percent per year (gY = 1). Let money growth
be exogenously determined by the government as gM = 2. Let the Quantity Theory of Money hold (gV = 0),
then prices must grow at one percent (gP = 1). So a plot of gP against gM would give a slope of 26.6 degrees
(= tan−1(gP /gM ) = tan−1(1/2)). Thus we have both that money is long-run neutral and that the Quantity Theory
of Money holds, and yet a graph of gP against gM has a slope far from the fourty-five degree line.
Example 2: Let real output be exogenous and let it grow at zero percent per year (gY = 0). Let money growth
be exogenously determined by the government as gM = 2. Let the Quantity Theory of Money hold (gV = 0),
then prices must grow at one percent (gP = 2). So a plot of gP against gM would give a slope of 45 degrees
(= tan−1(gP /gM ) = tan−1(2/2)). Thus we have both that money is long-run neutral and that the Quantity Theory
of Money holds, and a graph of gP against gM has a slope of exactly fourty-five degrees.
What is going on here? For a graph of gP against gM to have a slope of exactly fourty-five degrees it must be
the case that gP = gM . Start from the accounting identity that PY = MV . Then it is tautalogically true that
gP + gY = gP + gV . Thus gP = gM is logically equivalent to saying that gY = gV . That gY = gV is patently untrue.
47Using the same methods they also provide a test for long-run super-neutrality of money (a.k.a. long-run neutrality
of inflation), and reject that money is long-run super-neutral.
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Abstract
In this article we quantify the aggregate and distributional consequences of investment ex-
pensing and progressivity in flat-tax reforms of the United States economy. We find that in-
vestment expensing as in the Hall and Rabushka type of reform brings about sizable output
gains and a non-trivial increase in after-tax income inequality. But we also find that it results
in large aggregate welfare gains in steady-state. Two additional flat-tax reforms with full in-
vestment expensing and varying degrees of progressivity reveal that the distributional role of
the tax-exemption in the labor income tax is limited.
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1 Introduction
The main arguments for the use of flat-taxes are that the positive effects on output and efficiency.
The main argument against flat-taxes is that they will increase inequality. We provide a quanti-
tative assessment for the United States of the effects of the flat-tax reform proposed by Hall and
Rabushka (1995) on output, efficiency, and inequality. We further evaluate the roles of two of the
main components of the reform; the tax-deductability of investment expenditures, and a tax-free
threshold.
Importantly, we start from a model that includes the details of the current US tax system —
the variety of different taxes and rates — and is able to replicate the facts relating to current
US output and inequality in income and wealth. Given the concentrations of wealth in the top
few percentiles (in 2007 the wealthiest one-percent owned 33.6 percent of all wealth), and the
importance reaction of aggregate capital in determining the effects of the flat-tax, an accurate
modeling of the concentration of wealth is quantitatively important. Accurate modelling of the
inequality of wealth is of the contributions of this paper relative to the previous effort to quantify
the effects of a flat-tax reform undertaken by Ventura (1999).
That modeling behavioural responses of taxpayers is important to understanding the distribu-
tional effects of tax-reform is not just a theoretical issue. Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder (1994)
find that accounting for behavioural responses changes findings on whether the tax rate on the
top one percent of income earners increased or decreased with the US Tax Reform Act of 1986.
In assessing a fundamental tax-reform such as that of Hall and Rabushka (1995) it is clear that
approaches modeling behavioural responses based on estimates of elasticities are inappropriate —
the elasticities are only locally valid and by their very nature fundamental tax reforms are defini-
tionaly not local. Thus structural modeling of the tax-reforms is necessary. The kind of approach
to quantifying the effects of taxes based on elasticities represented by, eg., Diamond and Saez (2011)
is simply not applicable.
One important question is whether fundamental tax reforms should tax a broad definition of
income, or whether they should tax exclusively consumption expenditures.1 The key distinction
between these two families of tax reforms is the tax treatment of investment expenditures. Income-
based taxes tax both consumption and investment. This yields a broader tax base, but it generates
distortions in capital accumulation. Consumption-based taxes do not tax investment expenditures
and they have a smaller tax base. But they do not distort the capital accumulation decision. The
classical optimality results of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), prescribe only consumption-based
taxes because in the long run the distortions in capital accumulation are more severe than the
distortions in the labor choices.2
Against this argument in favor of taxing consumption expenditures exclusively, there are other
arguments that defend taxing a broad definition of income. Aiyagari (1995) points out that when
labor income is uncertain and uninsurable the aggregate stock of capital may be too large, and some
capital income taxation may be needed in order to bring it back to the modified golden rule of the
textbook representative household growth model. Additionally, taxing capital income instead of
labor income is a way to insure households against idiosyncratic labor market risks. This is because
poor households own few assets and most of their income comes from labor sources, therefore a
1See for instance Hubbard (1997) or Lazear and Porterba (2005) for a discussion of this issue.
2Lucas (1990), for instance, uses a representative household model to measure the welfare gains associated to the
elimination of the current capital income taxation and he finds them to be large, of the order of a 5% equivalent
variation in consumption every period.
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shift of taxation from labor to capital makes sour times better for the poor. In a quantitative
exercise that supports this argument, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) show that the welfare losses
brought about by eliminating capital income taxes can be large. In their model economy, even
though eliminating capital income taxation increases output by 10 percent, it reduces aggregate
welfare by about 1.5 percent.
In addition, implementing a consumption tax as a sales tax or a value added tax raises concerns
about fairness because it is believed that it cannot be made a function of income. However this is not
entirely true, since there are ways to design fundamental tax reforms that are both consumption-
based and progressive. A famous example is the flat-tax reform originally suggested by Hall and
Rabushka (1995). These authors propose to abolish the personal income tax and the corporate
income tax and to substitute them with a unified flat tax on labor and business income. This tax
scheme is equivalent to a consumption tax because it makes investment expenditures deductible
from the business income tax base. The average tax rates on labor income are progressive because
a fixed amount of labor income is tax-exempt. Simulation results such as those reported by Ventura
(1999) or by Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001) find that a reform along these
lines generates large increases in the accumulation of productive capital, and non-trivial increases
in income and wealth inequality. However, other authors such as Gentry and Hubbard (1997) argue
that this type of tax reforms may not generate more inequality than similar reforms that tax all
income.
In this article we contribute to the debate on whether fundamental tax reforms should be income-
based or consumption-based, and we find that revenue-neutral consumption-based tax reforms
should be preferred because they result in larger welfare gains. We also study the role played by
the size of the labor income tax deductions in consumption-based reforms, and we find that the
welfare gains are increasing in the progressivity of the reforms.
To do so we calibrate a heterogeneous household, general equilibrium model economy to United
States data and we use it to compare the steady-state aggregate, distributional, and welfare conse-
quences of four fundamental tax reforms. Our model economy is an extension of the model economy
described in Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003). In essence it is a variation of the
neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous households and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk that
combines life-cycle and dynastic features.
We introduce the heterogeneity in labor market opportunities and wealth using an uninsurable
process on the endowment of efficiency labor units. We model the life-cycle features using stochastic
aging and retirement as in Gertler (1999). We model the dynastic links making households altruistic
towards their descendants. Once our model economy is properly calibrated, these features guarantee
that households in our model economy save for precautionary reasons, for life-cycle reasons, and
for altruistic reasons. This property is important because capital accumulation is one of the main
channels through which investment expensing and progressivity affect the economy.
Another important feature of our benchmark model economy is that our households choose
their work effort. This is important for two reasons. First, because it allows us to quantify the
direct effect of tax distortions on labor supply. Second, because as Pijoan-Mas (2006) shows, when
labor market opportunities are uncertain, the labor supply becomes a quantitatively important
self-insurance mechanism that allows households to reduce their precautionary savings.3 Given
that changes in the progressivity of the tax code will change the uncertainty of after tax income,
the interaction of labor and savings decisions can have sizable aggregate, distributional, and welfare
3Swanson (2012) provides complementary theoretical results on how labor supply affects measures of risk-aversion.
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consequences.
A final distinguishing feature of our model economy is that it replicates the United States
marginal distributions of labor earnings, income, and wealth in very much detail. And, in contrast
with the model economies that focus exclusively on life-cycle features, it does a particularly good
job in replicating the very top tails of those distributions. This feature is crucial for the quantitative
evaluation of tax reforms because the tax burdens and the incentives to work and save that a tax
code creates are very different at different points of the earnings and wealth distributions, and their
effects are largest on the very income-rich and wealthy. Moreover, as Mirrlees (1971) points out,
the distributional details are fundamental in measuring the trade-offs involved in choosing between
efficiency and equality of tax reforms, because both the aggregate and the welfare changes depend
critically on the number of households of each type that populate the economy.
In this article we start by evaluating the consumption-based flat-tax reform originally proposed
by Hall and Rabushka (1995). To do so, we substitute the current personal and corporate income
taxes with an integrated 19 percent flat tax on labor income and capital income —which we use
as a proxy for business income. We deduct investment expenditures from the capital income tax
base and we choose the personal deduction on the labor income tax to make the reform revenue
neutral. We find that aggregate output and labor productivity increase by 11.3 and 12.6 percent,
and that both after-tax income and wealth inequality increase substantially. Specifically the Gini
index of after-tax income increases from 0.51 to 0.55, and the Gini index of wealth increases from
0.82 to 0.84. These results are consistent with most findings in the literature.
To measure the quantitative importance of not taxing the capital accumulation decision at the
margin, we compare the allocations that obtain in the reformed economy with those that obtain
when we simulate an alternative income-based flat-tax reform where the tax rate remains at 19
percent, but where investment is not expendable, and where we adjust the deduction in the labor
income tax deduction to make the reform revenue neutral. We find that the aggregate gains brought
about by this reform are more modest —output increases by only 4 percent— and that the increases
in income and wealth inequality are also smaller —the steady state Gini index of after tax income
that obtains after the reform is 0.53.
Our second contribution to the fundamental tax reform debate is to measure the quantitative
importance of the labor income tax exemptions in consumption-based flat-tax reforms. To this
purpose, we compare the steady-state allocations that obtain in the 19 percent flat-tax reform with
the steady-state allocations of two other reformed economies which differ in the sizes of their flat-
tax rates and of their labor income tax exemptions. Specifically, we study a proportional flat-tax
reform in which all labor income is taxed at an integrated flat-tax rate of 15.3 percent, and a very
progressive flat-tax reform in which we double the labor income tax deduction and in which the
integrated flat-tax rate is 24.7 percent. In the model economy with the more progressive flat tax,
output, consumption, aggregate hours, and the capital stock are all smaller. These results were
to be expected. But more surprisingly, we also find that labor productivity is increasing in the
progressivity of the reform and that the inequality of income after-taxes is very similar across the
three consumption-based tax reforms.
These novel results are justified by a better allocation of household labor hours. It turns out
that in the more progressive reforms, household hours are more correlated with labor market
productivity. This is because the more progressive tax code provides more insurance against labor
market uncertainty, and this allows households to improve their inter-temporal allocation of labor,
and to make better use of their labor market opportunities —essentially the more progressive tax
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reforms allow the households to work less when the times are bad. Consequently, since more
progressive tax reforms increase the correlation of labor hours with the idiosyncratic labor shocks,
they make the distribution of labor earnings before taxes more unequal and the average productivity
per hour worked higher. This increased inequality in the distribution of before-tax earnings partly
offsets the increased redistribution brought about by the higher labor income tax exemption and
the higher flat-tax rate. And they result in similar concentrations of after-tax income.
2 The Model Economy
Our model economy is inhabited by a measure one continuum of heterogeneous dynastic households.
Households make decisions about consumption, savings, and hours worked.
2.1 Population and endowment dynamics
The households are endowed with ` units of disposable time each period, and they are either
workers or retirees. Workers face an uninsured idiosyncratic stochastic process that determines their
endowment of efficiency labor units. They also face an exogenous probability of retiring. Retirees
have zero labor efficiency units, so they do not work, and they face an exogenous probability of
dying. When a retiree dies, it is replaced by a working-age descendant who inherits the retiree’s
estate and, possibly, some of its earning abilities. We use the one-dimensional shock, s, to denote
the household’s random age and random endowment of efficiency labor units jointly.4
The process on s is independent and identical across households, and follows a finite state Markov
chain with conditional transition probabilities given by Γ = Γ(s′ | s) = Pr{st+1 = s′ | st = s},
where s and s′ ∈ S. We assume that s takes values in one of two possible J–dimensional sets, E
and R. Therefore the formal description of set S is S = E ∪R = {1, 2, . . . , J}∪{J+1, J+2, . . . , 2J}.
When a household draws shock s ∈ E , it is a worker and its endowment of efficiency labor units is
e(s) > 0. When a household draws shock s ∈ R it is a retiree. When a household’s shock changes
from s ∈ E to s′ ∈ R, we say that it has retired and when it changes from s ∈ R to s′ ∈ E , we say
that it has died and has been replaced by a working-age descendant. When a household dies, its
estate is liquidated, and its descendant inherits a fraction 1− τe(a˜) of the estate, where a˜ denotes
the value of the household’s stock of wealth at the end of the period, and τe(a˜) represents estate
taxes.
This specification of the joint age and endowment process implies that the transition probability
matrix, Γ, controls the demographics of the model economy, the life-cycle profile of earnings, and
their intergenerational persistence (in combination with hours worked choices). When we come to
calibrating this markov process it is done based on these issues; demographics, life-cycle profile of
earnings, and intergenerational persistence of earnings.
To specify the process on s (and the values for e(s)) we must choose the values of (2J)2 + J
parameters, of which (2J)2 are the conditional transition probabilities and the remaining J are the
values of the endowment of efficiency labor units. To reduce this large number of parameters, we
4 To ease interpretation, we use e(s) to denote the endowment of efficiency labour units, and simply have s take
integer values. In principle, s and e(s) could be combined to be one object. By seperating the efficiency labor units,
e(s), from the actual values taken by s, it is easier to see how earnings ability is transferred from one generation to
the next, the transitions of s, without being confused by the fact that e(s) = 0 in all of the retirement states.
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impose some additional restrictions on matrix Γ. To understand these restrictions better, it helps
to consider the following partition of matrix Γ:
Γ =
[
ΓEE ΓER
ΓRE ΓRR
]
Submatrix ΓEE contains the transition probabilities of working-age households that are still of
working-age one period later. Since we impose no restrictions on these transitions, to characterize
ΓEE we must choose the values of J2 parameters.
Submatrix ΓER describes the transitions from the working-age states into the retirement states.
The value of this submatrix is ΓER = pe%I, where pe% is the probability of retiring and I is the
identity matrix. This is because we assume that every working-age household faces the same
probability of retiring, and because we use only the last realization of the working-age shock to
keep track of the earnings ability of retirees. Consequently, to characterize ΓER we must choose
the value of only one parameter.
Submatrix ΓRE describes the transitions from the retirement states into the working-age states
that take place when a retiree exits the economy and is replaced by a working-age descendant.
The rows of this submatrix contain a two parameter transformation of the stationary distribution
of s ∈ E , which we denote by γ∗E . This transformation allows us to control both the life-cycle
profile of earnings and its intergenerational correlation. Intuitively, the transformation amounts to
shifting the probability mass from γ∗E towards both the first row of ΓRE and towards its diagonal.
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Consequently, to characterize ΓRE we must choose the value of the two shift parameters.
Finally, submatrix ΓRR contains the transition probabilities of retired households that are still
retired one period later. The value of this submatrix is ΓRR = p%%I, where (1 − p%%) is the
probability of exiting the economy. This is because the type of retired households never changes,
and because we assume that every retired household faces the same probability of exit. Therefore,
to identify this submatrix we must choose the value of only one parameter.
To keep the dimension of the process on s as small as possible while still being able to achieve
our calibration targets, we choose J = 4. Therefore, to characterize the process on s (and the
values of e(s)), we must choose the values of (J2 + 4) + J = 24 parameters.6
2.2 Preferences
We assume that households derive utility from consumption, ct ≥ 0, and from non-market uses of
their time, and that they care about the utility of their descendents as if it were their own utility.
Consequently, the households’ preferences can be described by the following standard expected
utility function:
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt u(ct, `− ht) | s0
}
,
where function u is continuous and strictly concave in both arguments; 0 < β < 1 is the time-
discount factor; ` is the endowment of productive time; and 0 ≤ ht ≤ ` is labor. Consequently,
5The exact definitions of the two shift parameters, φ1 and φ2, can be found in Appendix B.
6Notice that we have not yet imposed that Γ must be a Markov matrix. When we do this, the number of free
parameters is reduced to 20.
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`− ht is the amount of time that the households allocate to non-market activities. Our choice for
the households’ common utility function is
u(c, l) =
c1−σ1
1− σ1 + χ
(`− l)1−σ2
1− σ2
We make this choice because the households in our model economies face very large changes the
market value of their time. And if we had chosen the more standard non-separable specification
for preferences, these changes would have resulted in extremely large variations in hours worked.
2.3 Production
We assume that aggregate output, Yt, depends on aggregate capital, Kt, and on the aggregate labor
input, Lt, through a constant returns to scale aggregate production function, Yt = f (Kt, Lt). We
choose a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with capital share θ.7 Aggregate
capital is obtained aggregating the wealth of every household, and the aggregate labor input is
obtained aggregating the efficiency labor units supplied by every household. We assume that
capital depreciates geometrically at a constant rate, δ, and we use r and w to denote the prices of
capital and of the efficiency units of labor before all taxes.
2.4 The government sector
The government in our model economies taxes capital income, labor income, consumption, and
estates, and it uses the proceeds of taxation to make real transfers to retired households and to
finance an exogenous amount of government consumption.
Social security in our model economy takes the form of transfers to retired households, which we
denote by ω, and which are financed with a payroll tax. The inclusion of a social security system
has important implications for our research questions. First, it reduces the size of the steady-state
aggregate stock of capital.8 Second, it plays an important role in helping us to replicate the large
fraction of households who own very few or zero assets in the United States.9 Third, since public
pensions are paid as life-time annuities, it insures the households against the risk of living for too
long, and therefore it reduces their incentives to save.
Our calibration procedure allows us to match the size of the average public retirement pension
paid in the United States and it ensures that the motives for saving in our model economy are
quantitatively realistic. But pensions in our model economy are independent of contributions to
social security and this feature qualifies the precision of our analysis in two ways. First, the overall
amount of idiosyncratic risk in our model economy diminishes because the labor market history
does not condition the retirement benefits. Second, we abstract from a potentially important reason
7ie. Yt = K
θ
t L
1−θ
t . In the post-WWII U.S. real wages have grown, while factor income shares have displayed
no clear trend. To replicate this behavior, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of the aggregate
production function must be 1, as is the case in Cobb-Douglas functions. This is related to the ’Kaldor’s stylized
facts of growth’, often referred to in models as ’balanced growth’ — a nice discussion of the historical development
of this issue can be found in the introduction of Cooley and Prescott (1995).
8Samuelson (1975) proves this result in a pure overlapping generations model. Our model economy is a dynastic
model, so the pay-as-you-go social security system is isomorphic to a transfer system that reduces uncertainty in
income. Therefore, the social security system reduces aggregate capital by reducing the need for precautionary
savings.
9See Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995).
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to work, since in real world economies increasing the labor effort entitles the households to receive
larger pension benefits.10
The capital income taxes in the economy are described by the function:
τk(yk) = a1yk (1)
where yk denotes capital income. Of course, in the U.S. economy different types of capital are
taxed at different rates and receive different types of deductions. In order to simplify our model
economy we consider just one type of capital good.11
Labor income taxes are described by function τl(ya), where ya denotes the labor income tax
base. This tax is not used in the current United States tax system. But it is part of the flat-tax
reforms which we describe in Section 4.
Payroll taxes paid by firms are described by function τsf (yl), where yl denotes labor income,
and payroll taxes paid by households are described by function τsh(yl). Our choice for the payroll
tax function is
τsf (yl) = τsh(yl) =
{
a2yl for 0 ≤ yl ≤ a3
a2a3 otherwise
(2)
This function approximates the cap on U.S. payroll taxes.12 To replicate the U.S. Social Security
tax code, we assume that the payroll taxes paid by the model economy households and firms are
identical.
Household income taxes are described by the function:
τy(yb) = a4
[
yb − (y−a5b + a6)−1/a5
]
(3)
where the definition of the tax base is yb = yk+yl−τk−τsf . This is the function chosen by Gouveia
and Strauss (1994, 1999) to model the U.S. effective federal personal income taxes13. Notice that
both capital income taxes and payroll taxes paid by firms are excluded from the household income
tax base both in the United States personal income taxes and in our model economy household
income taxes.
We assume that consumption taxes are proportional and that they are described by the function:
τc(c) = a9c (4)
And finally, we assume that the estate tax function is
τe(a˜) =
{
0 for a˜ < a7
a8(a˜− a7) otherwise (5)
10We make this assumption for technical reasons. Namely, because discriminating between households according
to their past contributions to a social security system requires a second asset-type state variable and this would make
our computational costs unmanageable. See Appendix E for the details on our computational algorithm.
11To be consistent with this assumption, we calibrate the value of the tax rate on capital, a1, as the average tax
rate levied on all capital income. By doing this we are implicitly assuming that every household in the economy owns
varying amounts of shares of an identical portfolio of assets.
12In our model economy this cap on payroll taxes creates a non-convexity in the choice set of the households. We
discuss this non-convexity in Section B of the Appendix.
13Observe that with this functional form a4 defines the top (asymptotic) marginal tax rate, while a5 and a6 control
the curvature and initial steepness. In the notation of Gouveia and Strauss (1999) a4 = b, a5 = p, a6 = s.
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This function replicates the main features of the current effective estate taxes in the United States.14
Therefore, in our model economies, a government policy rule is a specification of {τk(yk), τl(ya),
τsf (yl), τsh(yl), τy(yb), τc(c), τe(a˜), ω} and of a process on government consumption, {Gt}. Since
we also assume that the government balances its budget every period, these policies must satisfy
the following restriction: Gt + Zt = Tt, where Zt and Tt denote aggregate transfers and aggregate
tax revenues.
2.5 Market arrangements
We assume that there are no insurance markets for the household-specific shock. Instead, to
buffer their streams of consumption against the shocks, the households in our model economy can
accumulate wealth in the form of real capital. We assume that these asset holdings, at, belong to a
compact set A. The lower bound of this set can be interpreted as a form of liquidity constraints, or
as a solvency requirement.15 The existence of an upper bound for the asset holdings is guaranteed
as long as the after-tax rate of return to savings is smaller than the households’ common rate of
time preference. This condition is always satisfied in equilibrium.16
We also assume that firms rent factors of production from households in competitive spot mar-
kets. This assumption implies that factor prices are given by the corresponding marginal produc-
tivities.
2.6 The households’ decision problem
The individual state variables are the realization of the household-specific shock, s, and the value of
the stock of assets, a.17 The Bellman equation of the household decision problem is the following:
V (a, s) = max
c ≥ 0
a˜ ∈ A
0 ≤ h ≤ `
u(c, `− h) + β
∑
s′∈S
Γss′ V [a
′(a˜), s′], (6)
s.t. c+ z = y − τ + a, (7)
y = a r + e(s)hw + ω, (8)
τ = τk(yk) + τl(ya) + τsf (yl) + τsh(yl) + τy(yb) + τc(c), (9)
a′(a˜) =
{
a˜− τe(a˜) if s ∈ R and s′ ∈ E ,
a˜ otherwise.
(10)
where function v is the households’ common value function. Notice that household income, which
we denote by y, includes three terms: capital income, yk = a r, labor income, yl = e(s)hw,
and retirement pensions, ω. Every household can earn capital income. Only workers can earn
labor income. And only retirees receive retirement pensions. The household policy that solves this
14See, eg., Aaron and Munnell (1992).
15Given that leisure is an argument in the households’ utility function, this borrowing constraint can be interpreted
as a solvency constraint that prevents the households from going bankrupt in every state of the world.
16Bewley (1983) and Huggett (1993) prove this proposition.
17In our model economy there are no aggregate state variables because we abstract from aggregate uncertainty and
we restrict our analysis to the steady states of the economies.
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problem is a set of functions that map the individual state into the optimal choices for consumption,
end-of-period savings, and labor hours. We denote this policy by {c(a, s), a˜(a, s), h(a, s)}.
2.7 Equilibrium
Each period the economy-wide state is a probability measure, µ, defined over the appropriate
σ-algebra on S × A that counts the households of each type, and that we denote by B. In the
steady-state this measure is time invariant, even though the individual state variables and the
decisions of the individual households change from one period to the next.18
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium for this economy is a household value function, V (a, s);
a household policy, {c(a, s), a˜(a, s), h(a, s)}; a government policy, {τk(yk), τl(ya), τsf (yl), τsh(yl),
τy(yb), τc(c),τe(a˜),ω,G}; a stationary probability measure of households, µ; factor prices, (r, w);
and macroeconomic aggregates, {K,L, T, Z}, such that:
(i) Given factor prices and the government policy, the household value function and the household
policy solve the households’ decision problem described in expressions (6)-(10).
(ii) Firms behave as competitive maximizers. That is, their decisions imply that factor prices are
factor marginal productivities r = f1 (K,L)− δ and w = f2 (K,L).
(iii) Factor inputs, tax revenues, and transfers are obtained aggregating over households:
K =
∫
a dµ
L =
∫
h(a, s) e(s) dµ
T =
∫
[τk(yk)+τl(ya)+τsf (yl)+τsh(yl)+τy(yb)+τc(c)]dµ+
∫
γsEI{s∈R}τe(a˜) a˜(a, s) dµ
Z =
∫
ωI{s∈R} dµ.
where I denotes the indicator function, the definition of parameter γsE is γsE ≡
∑
s′∈E Γss′
and, consequently, (γsEIs∈R) is the probability that a retiree of type s exits the economy (ie.
dies). And where every integral in the four definitions above is defined over the state space
S ×A.
(iv) The goods market clears:
∫
[ c(a, s) + a˜(a, s)] dx+G = f (K,L) + (1− δ)K.
(v) The government budget constraint is satisfied: G+ Z = T
(vi) The measure of households is stationary:
x(B) =
∫
B
{∫
S×A
[
Ia′=a˜(a,s) Is∈/R∨s′∈/E + Ia′=[1−τe(a˜)]a˜(a,s) Is∈R∧s′∈E
]
Γss′ dµ
}
da′ ds′
for all B ∈ B, where ∨ and ∧ are the logical operators “or” and “and”. This equation counts the
households, and the cumbersome indicator functions and logical operators are used to account for
estate taxation. We describe the procedure that we use to compute this equilibrium in Appendix E.
18See Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) and Huggett (1993).
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3 Calibration
Calibration of the model was based on the year 2007, with the main data sources being the 2007
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). Our model
economy is characterized by 43 parameters.19 Of these parameters, 5 describe the preferences of
the households, 2 the production technology, 11 the government policy, and 25 the joint process on
the age of the households and on the endowments of efficiency labor units (including the choice of
J itself). Six of the parameters are decided by normalization conditions, and the remaining 37 are
determined by statistics that describe relevant features of the United States economy. Eight of the
remaining parameters are directly identified by eight target statistics. To determine the values of
the remaining 29 parameters we use the Simulated Method of Moments, picking the 29 parameters
to minimize the weighted distance between 29 (simulated) moments of the model economy and the
corresponding 29 data moments of the United States economy for the year 2007. We here describe
the data moments of the United States economy used and discuss why they were chosen. Further
details on the calibration can be found in Appendix D, and on the computational steps involved in
Appendix E.
3.1 Model period
The U.S. tax code defines tax bases in annual terms. Since the income tax, the payroll tax and
the estate tax are not proportional taxes, the obvious choice for our model period is one year.
Moreover, the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is our main source of micro-data, is also yearly.
3.2 Normalization conditions
As discussed in 2.1 we set J = 4. The household endowment of disposable time is an arbitrary
constant and we choose it to be ` = 1. Finally, since matrix Γ is a Markov matrix, its rows must
add up to one. This property imposes four additional normalization conditions on the rows of
ΓEE .20
3.3 Macroeconomic and demographic targets
Ratios: We target a capital to output ratio, K/Y , of 4.67, a capital income share of 0.376, and
an investment to output ratio, I/Y , of 22.0 percent. We obtain our target value for the capital
output share dividing $555,400, which was average household wealth in the United States in 2007
according the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, by $118,953, which was per household Gross
Domestic Product for the United States in 2007.21 Our target for the capital income share is
the value that obtains when we use the methods described in Cooley and Prescott (1995) and we
1946 parameters if we were to include the three parameters that are needed to characterize the tax reform experi-
ments.
20Note that our assumptions about the structure of matrix Γ imply that once submatrix ΓEE has been appropriately
normalized, every row of Γ adds up to one without imposing any further restrictions.
21Calculated as nominal GDP (FRED: GDP) divided by number of households. Where number of households is
US population/2.56. US population is 295 million (FRED: POP), and 2.56 is average Household size according to
SCF, Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover, and R´ıos-Rull (2011).)
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exclude the public sector from the computations.22 To calculate the value of our target for I/Y ,
we define investment as the sum of gross private fixed domestic investment, change in business
inventories, and 75 percent of the private consumption expenditures in consumer durables using
data for 2007.23
Allocation of time and consumption: We target a value of H/` = 33 percent for the average
share of disposable time allocated to working in the market.24 For the curvature of consumption
we choose a value of σ1 = 1.5. This value falls within the range (1–3) that is standard in the
literature.25 We do not calibrate the curvature of leisure, σ2, but instead allow it to be determined
as part of the Simulated Methods of Moments estimation. Interestingly this delivers a value similar
to those in the literature. 26
The age structure of the population: We target the expected durations of working-lives and
retirement of the model economy households to be 45 and 18 years. These targets replicate the
average durations of working-lives and retirement in the United States.
The life-cycle profile of earnings: To replicate the life-cycle profile of earnings of the United
States in our model economy, we target the ratio of the average earnings of households aged 46
and 50 to the average earnings of households aged 26 and 30; these two age ranges are those least
affected by choices of whether or not to work. This ratio was 1.73 in 2007 according to the Survey
of Consumer Finances.27
The intergenerational transmission of earnings ability: To replicate the intergenerational
correlation of earnings of the United States in our model economy, we target the cross-sectional
correlation between the average life-time earnings of one generation of households and the average
life-time earnings of their immediate descendants. Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) measure
this statistic for fathers and sons in the United States, and they report that it is 0.4, approximately.
3.4 Government policy
In Table 1 we report the revenues obtained by the combined Federal, State, and Local Governments
in the United States in the 2007 fiscal year. To choose the parameter values of the tax functions in
our model economy we must first allocate the United States tax revenues to the tax instruments of
22See Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003) for details about this number.
23This definition of investment is approximately consistent with the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances definition
of household wealth, which includes the value of vehicles, but does not include the values of other consumer durables.
Data are from FRED: FPIA $2266.1 billion, PCEDG $1188.4 billion (annual average), and change in BUSINV $-18.9
billion (=74.5-93.3, annual averages). Thus we get total investment as $3138.5 billion. GDP was $14253.2 billion.
24See Juster and Stafford (1991) for details about this number.
25Recent calibration exercises find very similar values for σ1. For example, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2010) report a value of 1.44 and Pijoan-Mas (2006) reports a value of 1.46 for this parameter.
26R´ıos-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2012) contain a comprehensive dis-
cussion of this parameter, both from the perspective of calibration and from the perspective of bayesian estimation.
Since ` = 1, the Frish elasticity — the elasticity of hours worked with respect to wages — is given by Frisch
elasticity= 1
σ2
l−h
h
= 2/3
1/3
1
σ2
.
27Table 11 of Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover, and R´ıos-Rull (2011) provides the averages for these two age groups: $52,300
for ages 26-30, and $90,700 for ages 46-50.
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Table 1: Federal, State, and Local Government Receipts
Fiscal Year 2007
$Billion %GDP
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 13861.4 100.00
Total Federal, State and Local Gvt Receipts 4197.0 30.28
Individual Income Taxes 1468.4 10.59
Social Insurance and Retirement 869.6 6.27
Sales and Gross Receipts Taxes 449.9 3.25
Property Taxes 409.5 2.95
Corporate Profit Taxes 427.2 3.08
Excise Taxes 65.1 0.47
Estate and Gift Taxes 26.0 0.19
Custom Duties and Fees 26.0 0.19
Other Taxes 47.5 0.34
Source: Tables B78, B81, B82, and B86 of the Economic Report of the President 2013.
our benchmark model economy. We choose the parameters of the model economy household income
tax so that they collect the revenues levied by the U.S. personal income tax, the parameters of
the model economy capital income tax so that it collects the revenues levied by the U.S. corporate
income tax, and with the model economy payroll and estate taxes we do likewise. The remaining
sources of government revenues in the United States are sales and gross receipts taxes, property
taxes, excise taxes, custom duties and fees, and other taxes. Added together, these tax instruments
collected 7.2 percent of U.S. GDP in 2007. In our model economy we allocate these revenues to
the consumption tax.28
To choose the parameters of the expenditure side of the government budget, we do the following:
First, since the government of our model economy must balance its budget, we require that the
output shares of government consumption and government transfers —the two expenditure items
in our model economy— add up to 30.28 percent, which was the GDP share of total tax revenues
in the United States in 2007. Then we target a value for the transfers to output ratio in the model
economy of 5.53 percent. This value corresponds to the share GDP accounted for by Medicare and
by two thirds of Social Security transfers in the United States in 2007. We chose this target because
transfers in our model economies are lump-sum, and Social Security transfers in the U.S. economy
are mildly progressive. This choice leaves us with a residual share for government expenditures to
GDP of 24.75(= 30.28− 5.53) which is our target for the G/Y ratio in our model economy.29 We
discuss the details of our choices for the various model economy tax function parameters in the
paragraphs below.
Capital income taxes: We choose a1, the capital income tax rate of function (1), so that the
revenues collected by this tax in the benchmark model economy match the revenues collected by
the corporate profit tax in the U.S. economy as a fraction of GDP.
28Since we also target government transfers and government expenditures (see below), the model economy’s con-
sumption tax rate is determined residually to balance the government budget.
29The size of the government measured by expenditures as a percentage of GDP in this model is slightly smaller
than in the data. This is because we target the revenues as a measure of the size of government, 30.28 percent of GDP,
and then require the government to run a balanced budget. In 2007, government measured by Government Total
Expenditures was 32.95 percent of GDP (FRED: W068RC1A027NBEA). The Federal deficit alone, −1.11 percent of
GDP, accounts for most of the difference (FRED: FYFSGDA188S). Since our model does not contain government
debt we also miss interest payments on Federal government debt.
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Payroll taxes: To characterize the payroll tax function described in expression (2), we must
choose the values of parameters a2 and a3. In 2007 in the U.S. the payroll tax rate paid by both
households and firms was 7.65 percent each and it was levied only on the first $97,500 of gross
labor earnings. This value was approximately equal to 82 percent of the U.S. per household GDP.
To replicate these values, in our model economy we make a2 = 0.0785 and a3 = 0.82y¯, where y¯
denotes output per household. These choices imply that the payroll tax collections in our model
economy are endogenous, and that we can use them as an overidentification restriction.
Household income taxes: To characterize the income tax function described in expression (3),
we must choose the values of parameters a4, a5 and a6. Since a4 and a5 are unit-independent, we
use the values reported by Flynn (2009)30 for these parameters, namely, a4 = 0.296 and a5 = 0.596.
To determine the value of a6, we equate the tax rate levied on a value of income equal to average
output per household in our model economy to the effective tax rate on GDP per household levied
in the U.S. economy. Again, these choices imply that the household income tax collections in our
model economy are endogenous, and that we can use them as another overidentification restriction.
Estate taxes: To characterize the estate tax function described in expression (5), we must choose
the values of parameters a7 and a8. During 2007 in the United States the first $2,000,000 of the
value of estates were tax exempt. This value was approximately equal to 20 times the average value
of GDP per household.31 In our model economy we make a7 = 20y¯, to replicate this feature of
the United States estate tax code. Finally, we choose the value of a8 so that the estate tax in our
model economy collects the same revenues as the estate tax in the United States.
Consumption taxes: We choose the value of parameter a9 in the consumption tax function
described in expression (4) residually, so that the government in our model economy balances its
budget. Therefore, the consumption tax collections in our model economy are also endogenous,
and they can be interpreted as a third overidentification restriction.
3.5 The distributions of earnings and wealth
We use 18 targets relating to the distributions of earnings and wealth: the 2 Gini indexes and 16
additional points from the Lorenz curves of the United States distributions of earnings and wealth,
namely the shares of the various quintiles and of the top percentiles. We report these targets in
Table 4. The values are taken from Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover, and R´ıos-Rull (2011) who calculate
them based on the Survey of Consumer Finances.
30These are the values reported by Flynn (2009) for 2005, the closest year to our target of 2007. Flynn (2009)
presents estimates of the parameters for the effective tax function used by Gouveia and Strauss (1994, 1999) for the
years 1979 to 2005 based on the IRS Public Use File dataset. The estimates for the parameters are largely stable for
the period 2003-2005 (ie. post the tax reform of 2001) and it seems reasonable to assume that this would continue
through to 2007, since no further tax reforms occour inbetween.
31The estate tax thresholds for all years since 1934 can be found in footnote 5 of this website from the Tax Policy
Center.
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3.6 Calibration results
Our calibration procedure allow us to characterize the stochastic process on the endowment of
efficiency labor units. This process is not to be taken literally, since it is a black box that represents
everything that we do not know about our model economy. In particular, we cannot compare our
process with the panel data estimates of wage processes for prime-age males, such as those reported
in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), or in the more recent Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2010). This is because our process is a measure of household labor market opportunities and
not of individual labor market opportunities. In our model economy labor market opportunities
result in household labor supply decisions, which include participation decisions of the members of
the household.32 Also, panel data sets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), miss the upper tail of the wage distribution,
both because of top-coding and because they are not explicitly designed to measure the earnings
of the very rich. The upper tail of the earnings distribution is very important if we want our
model economy to be consistent with the upper tail of the wealth distribution of the Unites States
as reported by the Survey of Consumer Finances which does not have either one of these two
problems.
Table 2: The stochastic process for the endowment of efficiency labor units
ΓEE (%) From s To s′
e(s) γ∗s (%) s
′ = 1 s′ = 2 s′ = 3 s′ = 4
s = 1 0.40 54.82 98.02 1.01 0.96 0.01
s = 2 1.36 42.04 0.01 90.42 9.55 0.01
s = 3 6.77 3.09 7.67 8.89 83.43 0.01
s = 4 198.88 0.05 9.93 7.04 0.01 83.02
Note: e(s) denotes the relative endowments of efficiency labor units; γ∗s denotes the stationary distribution of working-
age households (note that this is not the stationary distribution of ΓEE , it is taken from the stationary distribution
of Γ and renormalized); ΓEE denotes the transition probabilities of the process on the endowment of efficiency labor
units for working-age households that are still workers one period later.
In the second column of Table 2 we report the relative endowments of efficiency labor units,
and in the third column the invariant measures of each type of working-age households. The
endowments of workers of s = 1, s = 2, s = 3, and s = 4 are, approximately, 0.4, 1.4, 6.8, and
199. This means that, in our model economy, the luckiest workers are 497.5 times as lucky as the
unluckiest ones. The stationary distribution shows that each period 97 percent of the workers are
unlucky and draw states s = 1 or s = 2, and that only one out of every 2,000 workers is extremely
lucky and draws state s = 4.
In the last four columns of Table 2 we also report the transition probabilities between the
working-age states. These probabilities are conditional on their not retiring; hence they sum to
one hundred percent. The states are of decreasing persistency. Conditional on not retiring their
expected durations are 34.3, 6.9, 3.8, and 3.7 years.33
As far as the transitions are concerned, we find that a worker whose current state is s = 1 is
more likely to move to state s = 2 than to any of the other states. Likewise, a worker whose current
32See Guner, Kaygusuv, and Ventura (2012) for an evaluation of tax reforms modeling two-member households
explicitly.
33Let pii be the probability of remaining in state i. The expected duration is the number of periods T such that
the probability of remaining in state i for T periods is equal to one half. Since pTii is the probability of remaining in
state i after T periods the expected duration is given by pTii = 0.5, or rewriting, T = ln(0.5)/ln(pii).
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state is either s = 2 or s = 3 is most likely to move back to state s = 1. Only very rarely workers
whose current state is either s = 1 or s = 2 will make a transition either to state s = 3 or to state
s = 4. Finally, when a worker draws state s = 4, it is most likely that she will draw either state
s = 2 or state s = 1 shortly afterwards.
Table 3: Parameter values for the benchmark model economy
Preferences
Time discount factor β 0.95
Curvature of consumption σ1 1.50
Curvature of leisure σ2 1.83
Relative share of consumption and leisure χ 0.81
Endowment of discretionary time ` 1.00
Technology
Capital income share θ 0.38
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.05
Age and endowment process
Probability of retiring pe% 0.02
Probability of dying 1− p%% 0.06
Life cycle earnings profile φ1 0.85
Intergenerational persistence of earnings φ2 0.86
Fiscal policy
Government consumption G 0.48
Retirement pensions ω 0.17
Capital income tax function a1 0.20
Payroll tax function a2 0.08
a3 0.71
Household income tax function a4 0.26
a5 0.77
a6 1.00
Estate tax function a7 18.28
a8 0.12
Consumption tax function a9 0.09
We report the values of every other parameter of our model economy in Table 3, and in Table 4
we report the statistics that describe the main aggregate and distributional features of the United
States and the benchmark model economies.34 These numbers confirm that overall our model
economy succeeds in replicating the most relevant features of the United States in very much
detail. We are particularly encouraged by our model economy’s ability to replicate the U.S. fiscal
policy ratios and the U.S. distributions of earnings, income and wealth, since these two sets of
targets are the main focus of this article. Recall that in our calibration exercise we have not
targeted either the payroll tax collections, the household income tax collections, the consumption
tax collections, or the statistics that describe the income distribution, and that all of these statistics
can be considered to be overidentification restrictions.
4 The Flat-Tax Reforms
We study the consumption-based flat tax reform originally proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995).
Among the key features of the Hall-Rabushka flat-tax are the tax-deductability of investment, and a
34For a listing of the values of targets used in the Simulated Method of Moments see Table 15 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: The Benchmark Model Economy (EB) and the United States
Macroeconomic Ratios
C/Y I/Y G/Y K/Y — —
U.S. 67.30 22.00 24.75 4.67 — —
EB 56.45 22.95 20.81 4.55 — —
Fiscal Policy Ratios
G/Y Z/Y T/Y Ty/Y Tl/Y Tk/Y Ts/Y Tc/Y Te/Y
U.S. 24.8 5.5 30.3 10.6 — 3.1 6.3 7.2 0.19
EB 20.8 5.1 25.9 12.0 — 3.0 5.5 5.2 0.21
The Distributions of Earnings
Gini Quintiles (%) Top groups (%)
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90–95 95–99 99–100
United States 0.640 0.0 4.2 11.7 20.8 63.5 11.7 16.6 18.7
EB 0.646 0.0 3.0 11.6 21.3 61.2 9.0 16.7 20.2
The Distributions of Income (before all taxes and after transfers)
United States 0.575 2.8 6.7 11.3 18.3 60.9 10.2 15.9 21.0
EB 0.528 4.3 7.6 8.8 21.8 54.7 7.4 17.1 17.4
The Distributions of Wealth
United States 0.820 0.0 1.1 4.5 11.2 83.4 11.1 26.7 33.6
EB 0.824 0.0 0.0 3.4 12.3 83.0 14.4 23.7 34.1
Note: Many of these statistics are targeted as part of the calibration and simulated moment estimation of the
model. Those that are not targeted are C/Y , T/Y , Ty/Y , Ts/Y , Tc/Y , and all those relating to the distribution of
income (the distributions of earnings and wealth are targeted). Consumption is measured as Personal Consumption
Expenditures (FRED: PCE). The data sources for all the other statistics are described in the text.
tax-free threshold. In this section we also consider an income-based flat-tax reform, which drops the
tax-deductability of investment. In the following section we consider varying the tax-free threshold.
The Hall-Rabushka flat-tax is only intended to replace the personal income tax and the corporate
income tax; the payroll taxes, estate tax, and state-level taxes are therefore left untouched. Hall
and Rabushka (1995) propose a marginal tax rate of 19 percent, which the tax-free threshold set to
ensure budget neutrality: that tax-revenues, government spending, and government transfers are
left untouched.35
To implement both the consumption-based flat tax reform of Hall and Rabushka (1995), and
the income-based flat-tax reform, we replace the household income tax with a flat tax on all labor
income above a tax-exempt level, and the calibrated capital income tax with an integrated flat tax
on capital income. The function that describes the labor income tax is
τl(ya) =
{
0 for ya < a10
a11(ya − a10) otherwise (11)
where the tax base is labor income net of social security taxes paid by firms, ya = yl − τsf (yl),
parameter a10 is the tax-exempt level of labor income, and parameter a11 is the flat-tax rate.
The capital income tax function in the reformed economies is the same as the capital income tax
function defined in Expression (1) above. The only difference is that in the consumption-based tax
35If the tax reforms cause GDP to increase (decrease) this will imply that tax-revenues as a percentage of GDP
decrease (increase).
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reforms investment expenditures are tax-exempt and, consequently, the capital income tax base is
capital net of depreciation income minus savings. Therefore, in these reforms yk = r a− (a′ − a).36
Since in every reform capital and labor income are taxed at the same marginal tax rate, we impose
that a1 = a11. Finally, every flat-tax reform is designed to be revenue neutral and none of them
changes the composition of public outlays. Therefore, in every flat-tax reform the values of T , G,
and Z remain unchanged, and they are equal to their values in the benchmark model economy.
4.1 Investment expensing in flat-tax reforms
In this section we compare the allocations that obtain in the steady-states of two flat-tax model
economies that differ only in the fiscal treatment of investment expenditures. In the consumption-
based flat-tax economy investment expenditures are fully deductible, and in the income-based flat
tax economy they are fully taxed.
The consumption-based flat-tax economy, which in this section we call EC , is the standard
flat-tax reform originally proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995). As these authors suggested,
its marginal tax rate on capital and labor income is 19 percent. And we choose the size of its
labor income tax deduction to make the reform revenue neutral. This requires a labor income
tax deduction a10 = 0.0489, which corresponds to 5.3% percent of output per household in the
benchmark model economy or $6,300, approximately.
In the income-based flat-tax economy, which we call EY , we keep the 19 percent marginal
integrated flat tax rate, but since investment expenditures are not deductible, we change the labor
income tax deduction to make the reform revenue neutral. In principle, the direction of this change
could go either way. Taxing investment increases the base of the capital income tax. In partial
equilibrium this would increase the capital income tax revenues and it would require a larger
deduction in the labor income tax to make the reform revenue neutral. But in general equilibrium
taxing investment reduces the capital stock. Therefore it also reduces aggregate output and the
bases of both the capital and the labor income flat taxes.
It turns out that this second effect dominates. And we find that the value of the labor income
tax deduction that makes this reform revenue neutral is a10 = 0, which trivially corresponds to $0.
This is because steady-state output in the income-based flat-tax reform only slightly larger than in
the baseline economy, while the marginal tax rate is lower: under the flat-tax reform the marginal
rate is 19%, while pre-reform the top marginal rate on capital was 20% and the top rate on income
was 26%.37
4.1.1 Macroeconomic aggregates and factor ratios
In Table 5 we report the main macroeconomic aggregates and factor ratios of our model economies.
We find that the steady-state aggregate changes brought about by the consumption-based flat tax
reform are substantial. Steady state output in model economy EC is 13 percent larger than in
the benchmark economy, EB. This increase in output is brought about by a very large increase
36Taxing capital income at the household level is equivalent to the proposed business income tax of Hall and
Rabushka (1995), which is applied to firms by taxing business income net of wages, depreciation expenses and net
investment.
37In fact, as can be seen in Table 7 even a zero threshold is not enough to acheive perfect revenue neutrality and
tax revenues are forced to fall 0.2% of baseline output as a result.
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in aggregate capital, of 37 percent. In contrast, the changes brought about in the aggregate labor
input are small. Both total labor hours and the total labor input almost unchanged. We also find
that the productivity of labor hours increases by approximately 12 percent, as a result of capital
deepening.
Table 5: Production, inputs and input ratios in the model economies
Y K L H/` K/L L/H Y/H K/Y
EB 0.92 4.19 0.37 33.10 11.34 1.12 2.78 4.55
EC/EB(%) 12.7 37.2 0.0 0.5 37.2 -0.4 12.1 21.8
EY /EB(%) 4.9 14.2 -0.3 -0.4 14.5 0.1 5.4 8.8
aVariable L denotes the aggregate labor input.
bVariable H denotes the share of the endowment of time allocated to the market.
There are two reasons that justify the increase in the capital stock. First, the consumption-based
flat tax reform eliminates the distortion in the intertemporal allocation of consumption, which
encourages the households to save and to accumulate capital. Second, as we discuss below, the
distribution of after tax income becomes more unequal. This increases the need for precautionary
savings and therefore it increases the size of the capital stock even further.
We find that the changes brought about by the income-based flat tax reform are much smaller. As
expected, taxing investment has large implications for the capital accumulation decision. Compared
to the benchmark model economy, in the income-based flat-tax reform aggregate capital increases
by 14 percent, which is only slightly more than one third of the increase that obtains in the
consumption-based reform. Still, the increase in the capital stock is not small.
There are two reasons for this increase. First, as in the consumption-based reform, there is an
increase in the precautionary motive for savings. Second, the income-based flat-tax reform reduces
the marginal capital income tax rates faced by the wealthy, and they increase the marginal capital
income tax rates faced by the wealth poor. This is because in our benchmark economy capital
income is taxed twice —once by the capital income tax and a second time by the household income
tax— and because the rates on capital income of the household income tax are progressive. The
aggregate effect of these changes is to increase capital accumulation because wealthy households
are more concerned with after tax returns and less concerned with precautionary motives than poor
households.
The income-based flat-tax reform also brings about changes in the aggregate labour input that
are very small. Consequently, aggregate output in this model economy is only 5 percent larger than
in the benchmark economy, while in the consumption-based flat-tax reform it is 13 percent larger.
These findings can be compared with those reported in Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters,
and Walliser (2001), albeit in a somewhat indirect way. Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and
Walliser (2001) study a sequence of reforms. First, they look at a purely proportional flat tax on
all income. Second, they allow for full expensing of new investment, which makes their income
tax equivalent to a consumption tax. And third, they add a labor income tax exemption.38 They
find that these three reforms increase aggregate output in the long run. A strictly proportional
income tax increases output by 5 percent. Allowing for the expensing of new investment increases
output by an additional 4 percent. And adding a fixed deduction to labor income requires a higher
marginal tax rate that brings the output increase back to 4.5 percent. Therefore, their results are
more modest than ours.
38They consider two additional reforms with different tax breaks for capital holders during the transition.
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This is partly because our model economy extends Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and
Walliser (2001) in several important dimensions. First, we consider uninsurable labor market
uncertainty. This brings into the analysis of flat-tax reforms the partial insurance role played by
the various tax codes, which is absent from Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser
(2001). Second, we allow for earnings and wealth mobility. This feature of our model economy
should reduce the welfare consequences of the reforms because our income process is mean reverting,
at least at the dynastic level. Third, earnings, income and wealth are more concentrated in our
model economy than in Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), and they match
their counterparts in the data. Finally, our households are altruistic towards their descendants and
our model economy displays some of the intergenerational correlation of earnings observed in the
United States. We think that this feature is important because the bequest motive is arguably
one of the main determinants of wealth accumulation (see Nardi (2004), for example). Meaningful
evaluations of the distributional consequences of tax reforms require realistic wealth distributions,
but this realism should be achieved through the appropriate margins.
4.1.2 Expenditure ratios
In Table 6 we report the key expenditure ratios in the benchmark model economy and in the two
reformed flat-tax model economies. Since the level of public expenditure, G, is the same in the
three model economies, the G/Y ratios fall whenever output increases. Since both reforms bring
about sizable increases in aggregate capital, the decreasing marginal returns to capital make the
investment to output ratios increase and the consumption to output ratios fall. However, even
though the C/Y ratios fall in both flat-tax reforms, it is important to highlight that in both of
them aggregate consumption increases (see Column 4 in Table 6). This increase is about 2 percent
larger in the consumption-based flat-tax reform than in the income-based flat-tax reform.
Table 6: Expenditure ratios in the model economies (%)
C/Y I/Y G/Y C/YB I/YB G/YB
EB 56.4 23.0 20.8 56.4 23.0 20.8
EC 53.8 28.0 18.5 60.6 31.6 20.8
EY 55.6 25.0 19.6 58.3 26.2 20.6
Note: Columns 1, 2 and 3 report aggregate consumption, investment and government expenditure as a fraction of
each economy’s output. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report these same magnitudes as a fraction of output in the benchmark
economy.
4.1.3 Fiscal policy ratios
In Table 7 we report the main fiscal policy ratios of the model economies. We have already
mentioned that in both reformed model economies the government expenditures to output ratios
are smaller than in the benchmark model economy. Moreover, the tax revenue to output ratios and
the transfers to output ratios of these model economies are reduced in the same proportion.
The bottom 2 rows of Table 7 display the tax ratios relative to the output in the benchmark
model economy. We observe that, contrary to what Hall and Rabushka (1995) had guessed, the
labor income tax in the consumption-based flat-tax reform collects much the same revenues as the
personal income tax of the benchmark model economy. This is also the case in the income-based
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Table 7: The Fiscal Policy Ratios in the Model Economies (%)
G/Y Z/Y T/Y Ty/Y Tl/Y Tk/Y Ts/Y Tc/Y Te/Y
EB 20.8 5.1 25.9 12.0 0.0 3.0 5.5 5.2 0.21
EC 18.5 4.5 23.0 0.0 10.8 1.8 5.2 4.9 0.31
EY 19.6 4.8 24.5 0.0 11.4 2.4 5.4 5.1 0.25
EC/YB 20.8 5.1 25.9 0.0 12.1 2.0 5.8 5.6 0.35
EY /YB 20.6 5.1 25.7 0.0 11.9 2.5 5.6 5.4 0.26
Note: Rows 1, 2 and 3 report aggregate magnitudes as a fraction of each economy’s output. Rows 4 and 5 report
these same magnitudes as a fraction of output in the benchmark economy. In interpreting this table recall that the
reforms are designed to generate the same total tax revenue as existed pre-reform; thus G/YB , Z/YB , and T/YB are
constant across the different tax systems.
flat-tax reform. The slight revenue losses of the capital income tax are compensated by the higher
revenues collected by all the other tax instruments.
4.1.4 Earnings, income, and wealth inequality
In Table 8 we report the Gini indexes and the Lorenz curves of earnings, after-tax income, and
wealth in the benchmark and in the reformed model economies. We find that the effects of the
flat tax reforms on earnings inequality are very small, but that both reforms bring about sizable
increases in after-tax income inequality and in wealth inequality. The first result is not surprising
since the three model economies have identical processes on the endowments of efficiency labor
units and changes in the distribution of hours worked are very small.
The higher inequality in wealth is easy to understand because the marginal taxes on capi-
tal income for the wealthy are lower after the flat-tax reforms. And this gives rich households
stronger incentives to accumulate capital. The inequality in after-tax income is larger in the flat-
tax economies because of the increase in the inequality in the wealth distribution and because of
the lower redistributive power of flat taxes.
Table 8: The Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth in the Model Economies
The Distribution of Earnings
Gini Quantiles (%) Top Groups (%)
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-50 95-99 99-100
EB 0.646 0.0 3.0 11.6 21.3 61.2 9.0 16.7 20.2
EC 0.643 0.0 3.1 11.5 21.6 60.9 8.9 16.7 20.0
EY 0.648 0.0 2.7 11.6 21.5 61.4 9.2 16.8 20.1
The Distribution of Incomes (before all taxes and after transfers)
EB 0.528 4.3 7.6 8.8 21.8 54.7 7.4 17.1 17.4
EC 0.535 4.0 7.3 9.4 21.2 55.2 7.6 16.9 17.4
EY 0.532 4.2 7.4 9.1 21.4 55.0 7.6 17.1 17.3
The Distribution of Wealth
EB 0.824 0.0 0.0 3.4 12.3 82.9 14.4 23.7 34.1
EC 0.834 0.0 0.0 2.9 12.0 83.8 13.6 24.5 36.1
EY 0.826 0.0 0.0 3.4 12.1 83.2 14.2 23.7 34.8
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4.2 Progressivity in consumption-based flat-tax reforms
In this section we compare the allocations that obtain in the steady-states of three consumption-
based flat-tax reforms. The first flat-tax reform is the least progressive of the three. In this model
economy all labor income is taxed. Therefore the value of the labor income tax deduction is zero
and a10 = 0.0. The integrated flat-tax rate that makes this reform revenue neutral is 18.1 percent.
To keep in mind that this reform allows no deduction we call this economy END.
The second consumption-based flat-tax reform is the standard flat-tax reform proposed by Hall
and Rabushka (1995) which we have discussed in the previous section. Its marginal tax rate on
capital and labor income is 19 percent, and the labor income tax deduction that makes this reform
revenue neutral is a10 = 0.0489, which corresponds to 5.3 percent of output per household in the
benchmark model economy or $6,300, approximately. We continue to refer to this model economy
as EC .
The third consumption-based flat-tax reform is the most progressive of the three. In this model
economy, we double the labor income tax deduction of model economy EC . Therefore, in this model
economy a10 = 0.0978, which corresponds to approximately $12,600. The value of the integrated
flat-tax rate that makes this reform revenue neutral is 19.8 percent, and we call this model economy
with double the deduction EDD.
4.2.1 Macroeconomic aggregates and factor ratios
In Table 9 we report the main macroeconomic aggregates and factor ratios of our three consumption-
based flat-tax reforms. Relative to the benchmark model economy, we find that the three flat-tax
reforms are expansionary. We also find that reforms generate large increases in the stock of capital
—between 33 and 38 percent— and that the three reforms generate small changes in the labor
decision. But while in model economies END and EC both aggregate hours and the aggregate
labor input increase, in model economy EDD, these two variables decrease.
Table 9: Production, inputs and input ratios in the model economies
Y K L H/` K/L L/H Y/H K/Y
EB 0.92 4.19 0.37 33.10 11.34 1.12 2.78 4.55
END/EB(%) 11.6 33.5 0.2 0.6 33.2 -0.4 11.0 19.6
EC/EB(%) 12.7 37.2 0.0 0.5 37.2 -0.4 12.1 21.8
EDD/EB(%) 11.3 34.2 -0.7 -1.2 35.1 0.6 12.6 20.7
aVariable L denotes the aggregate labor input.
bVariable H denotes the share of the endowment of time allocated to the market.
But we find that the increases in the productivity of labor hours are larger in the reformed
economies with higher flat-tax rates: 11.0 percent in model economy END, 12.1 percent in model
economy EC , and 12.6 percent in model economy EDD. These increases in labor productivity are
due to increases both in the labor to hours ratios, L/H, and in the capital to labor ratios, K/L
—see the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth columns of Table 9.
By definition, the increases in the L/H ratios are the result of household hours being more
correlated with the endowment of efficiency labor units. This tells us that as we move towards a
more progressive flat-tax system households need to provide less self-insurance. Consequently, they
accumulate less precautionary savings —and hence the stock of capital is lower— and they use
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less precautionary hours —and hence people work less, but labor hours become more correlated
with productivity. This makes the allocations more similar to the ones that would obtain under
complete markets.39
The increases in the K/L ratios are ultimately due to the same reason: the reduction in hours
reduces the aggregate labor input and, therefore, capital per efficiency unit of labor increases.
These results lead us to conclude that the fixed deduction in labor income makes labor hours more
productive, and that it improves the allocation of the work effort. In economies with higher flat-tax
rates, people end up working less on average, but they work more when they are more productive.
4.2.2 Expenditure ratios
In Table 10 we report the key expenditure ratios in the benchmark model economy and in the
three reformed flat-tax model economies. Since the flat tax reforms are expansionary and the
levels of government expenditures do not change, the G/Y ratios in the flat-tax model economies
are smaller than in the benchmark model economy. The lower G/Y shares are compensated with
large increases in the investment to output ratios, because the consumption to output ratios also
decrease. These results are consistent with the large increases in the capital stock which we have
discussed in Section 4.2.1 above.
Table 10: Expenditure Ratios in the Model Economies (%)
C/Y I/Y G/Y C/YB I/YB G/YB
EB 56.4 23.0 20.8 56.4 23.0 20.8
END 54.5 27.5 18.3 60.9 30.7 20.4
EC 53.8 28.0 18.5 60.6 31.6 20.8
EDD 54.3 27.8 18.2 60.5 30.9 20.3
Note: Columns 1, 2 and 3 report aggregate consumption, investment and government expenditure as a fraction of
each economy’s output. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report these same magnitudes as a fraction of output in the benchmark
economy.
We also find that aggregate consumption increases in the three consumption-based flat-tax
reforms. We find that the differences in consumption and investment —and in their ratios to
output— brought about by differences in the progressivity of the flat-tax reforms are small.
4.2.3 Fiscal policy ratios
In Table 11 we report the main fiscal policy ratios in the benchmark model economy and in the three
reformed flat-tax model economies. In the three reforms total government revenues, T , government
consumption, G, and total transfers, Z, do not change, and hence their ratios to output fall.
When we compare the changes in the composition of government revenues, we confirm that in
every consumption-based flat-tax reform the labor income tax and collects less revenues than the
personal income tax of the benchmark model economy (see bottom 3 rows in Table 11). Likewise,
capital income taxes collect less revenues in the three flat-tax model economies. In contrast, payroll
and consumption taxes collect more revenues in the three flat-tax model economies,
39See Pijoan-Mas (2006) for an analysis of the interaction of work effort and savings as self-insurance mechanisms,
and for a comparison of capital and labor allocations in complete and incomplete-market economies.
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Table 11: The Fiscal Policy Ratios in the Model Economies (%)
G/Y Z/Y T/Y Ty/Y Tl/Y Tk/Y Ts/Y Tc/Y Te/Y
EB 20.8 5.1 25.9 12.0 0.0 3.0 5.5 5.2 0.21
END 18.3 4.6 22.8 0.0 10.9 1.4 5.2 5.0 0.30
EC 18.5 4.5 23.0 0.0 10.8 1.8 5.2 4.9 0.31
EDD 18.2 4.6 22.8 0.0 10.6 1.7 5.2 5.0 0.30
END/YB 20.4 5.1 25.5 0.0 12.2 1.6 5.8 5.6 0.33
EC/YB 20.8 5.1 25.9 0.0 12.1 2.0 5.8 5.6 0.35
EDD/YB 20.3 5.1 25.3 0.0 11.8 1.9 5.7 5.5 0.34
Note: Rows 1 to 4 report aggregate magnitudes as a fraction of each economy’s output. Rows 5 to 7 report these
same magnitudes as a fraction of output in the benchmark economy.
Revenues from the consumption tax decrease with the progressivity of the reform because the
consumption tax rate remains unchanged and aggregate consumption —which is the tax base—
decreases as the flat-tax rates increase (see Table 10). The same is true for the payroll tax: the
tax rate does not change, and the tax base, which is essentially aggregate labor income, decreases
with the flat-tax rate.40
The capital income tax raises less revenue in all three of the flat-tax reforms. The substantial
increase in the capital stock is not enough to compensate for the lower tax rates and the investment-
expenditures deduction.
4.2.4 Earnings, income, and wealth inequality
In Table 12 we report the Gini indexes and the Lorenz curves of earnings, income, and wealth of
the benchmark model economy and of the consumption-based flat-tax reforms. The Gini index of
earnings falls under all three flat-tax reforms. By contrast the Gini indexes of wealth and income rise
under all three flat-tax reforms. Interestingly the Gini indexes for earnings, income, and wealth
are all increasing in the progressivity of the reforms — their direct effects on progressivity are
outweighed by a decreased use of precautionary labor and savings. We conclude that the flat-tax
reforms bring about increases in inequality and that, overall, the distributional role played by the
progressivity of consumption-based flat taxes is small.
Earnings inequality increases as the flat tax reform becomes more progressive because higher
flat-tax rates and higher deductions increase the correlation between wages and work effort (see the
discussion in Section 4.2.1). Since this implies that labor income becomes more volatile, households
transfer income between periods using larger buffer stocks of precautionary savings to smooth their
consumption profiles. This implies that wealth inequality also increases.
5 Concluding Comments
Hall and Rabushka (1995) claimed that revenue-neutral consumption-based flat-tax reforms would
be expansionary and that the tax exemption in their proposed labor income tax could be used to
40Indeed, the tax base of the payroll tax is not exactly the aggregate labor income as labor income above the
threshold a3 is exempt and changes in the distribution of labor earnings make the exact fraction of untaxed labor
income different in different economies.
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Table 12: The Gini Indexes and the Lorenz Curves in the Model Economies
The Distribution of Earnings
Gini Quantiles (%) Top Groups (%)
Economy 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-50 95-99 99-100
EB 0.646 0.0 3.0 11.6 21.3 61.2 9.0 16.7 20.2
END 0.644 0.0 3.1 11.5 21.5 61.0 9.0 16.7 20.1
EC 0.643 0.0 3.1 11.5 21.6 60.9 8.9 16.7 20.0
EDD 0.646 0.0 3.2 11.2 21.5 61.2 8.9 16.8 20.2
The Distribution of Incomes (before all taxes and after transfers)
EB 0.528 4.3 7.6 8.8 21.8 54.7 7.4 17.1 17.4
END 0.535 4.0 7.3 9.4 21.1 55.3 7.7 16.8 17.5
EC 0.535 4.0 7.3 9.4 21.2 55.2 7.6 16.9 17.4
EDD 0.537 4.1 7.3 9.1 21.2 55.5 7.6 17.0 17.5
The Distribution of Wealth
EB 0.824 0.0 0.0 3.4 12.3 82.9 14.4 23.7 34.1
END 0.833 0.0 0.0 3.0 12.0 83.8 13.7 24.5 35.7
EC 0.834 0.0 0.0 2.9 12.0 83.8 13.6 24.5 36.1
EDD 0.835 0.0 0.0 2.9 11.9 83.9 13.6 24.5 36.1
achieve certain distributional targets. Our results confirm that consumption-based flat-tax reforms
can indeed generate large gains in output, but that they do so at the expense of increases in the
inequality of after-tax income and wealth. These findings are consistent with those reported in the
flat-tax literature.
We find that the differences in the allocations that obtain in consumption-based and in income-
based flat-tax reforms can be large. This tells us that the role played by the expensing of investment
is important. Indeed, we show that it accounts for two thirds of the output increases brought about
by the reforms, and that it would increase the Gini index of the after-tax income distribution well
beyond the value that would obtain in a purely income-based flat-tax reform.
Work is currently underway on this project to calculate the transition paths between steady-
states and use to perform welfare analysis of the winners and losers from flat-tax reforms.
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A Hall and Rabushka
The flat-tax reform modeled in this paper is based on that laid out by Hall and Rabushka (1995).
Here we describe the main differences between their reform and the one modelled here. We also
describe a number of issues they address that we do not cover here. The flat-tax proposal of Hall
& Rabushka is fully detailed in their book, including a discussion of the issues of efficiency and
fairness, and with an appendix detailing a full legislative proposal for the flat-tax. We recommend
anyone interested in more detail on how such a reform would work and further discussion of the
issues — economic, fairness, and legal — to read Hall and Rabushka (1995) The Flat-Tax Reform.
The flat-tax reform of Hall and Rabushka (1995) is only intended to replace the personal income
tax and the corporate income tax. Thus, in modelling the tax reform we leave unchanged the (social
security and medicare) payroll tax, the estate tax, various excise taxes, and state-level consumption
taxes. We observe that, (i) the state-level consumption taxes are similar to the flat-tax with which
they are being replaced41, and (ii) other than the payroll tax, the others (estate and excise taxes),
are a tiny fraction of total tax revenue.
Hall and Rabushka (1995) also discuss a number of other advantages to introducing a flat-tax
that, for various reasons, are not addressed in our analysis. Let’s quickly describe some of them,
again the interested reader can find more in their book.
• First, it is estimated that the Americans spend well over 1 billion hours per year on tax
compliance, at a cost of over $100 billion; the flat-tax involves a one-page tax return and is
likely to save almost all of this time and money.42
• Second, we consider neither tax evasion (illegal) nor tax avoidance (legal). Tax evasion is
thought to cost over $100 billion, mostly due to people not declaring income, and leads to
the Internal Revenue Service spending over $10 billion per year on detecting and prosecuting
tax evasion. Hall & Rabushka claim that by reducing tax rates the flat-tax reform would
reduce (illegal) tax evasion. Tax avoidance is mostly about claiming tax deductions, the cost
to taxpayers is also known as tax expenditures. The main tax expenditures are for home-
ownership (the mortgage interest deduction), charitable donations, and state-and-local taxes;
others include the tax-exemptions given to employer-provided health insurance, medicare
income, accelerated depreciation of investments, and the imputed rent homeowners receive
from living in their own home. The total cost of tax-expenses is over $2 trillion.43 By
eliminating all tax deductions the flat-tax reform abolishes tax avoidance, and removing this
distortion will result in a more efficient economy; we do not model this aspect.
• Third, under the flat-tax reform there is horizontal equity of taxation — two people in exactly
the same situation will have to pay exactly the same amount in taxes. This is not the case
under the current US tax system in which the amount of tax paid depends on things like
which tax deductions are claimed, and, eg., whether it is possible to disguise some labor
income as capital income. In our model there is perfect horizontal equity both before and
after the flat-tax reform.
41They differ in the tax rate, in not having a tax-exempt threshold, and in not having investment-expensing.
42These numbers are based on studies that pre-date the use of software to file tax returns, how much difference
that makes is not known.
43An up-to-date introduction to tax-expenditures is provided by this newpaper article by Bruce Barlett, and in a
related series of articles on some of the largest tax-expenditures.
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• It would no longer be possible to disguise income sources; eg. to get paid in stock options
(taxed as capital) instead of being paid a wage (taxed as income). The same applies for
shifting the year in which income is declared.
In short, the adoption of a flat-tax reform may lead to benefits relating to being, (i) easier for tax-
payers to comply with and tax authorities to administer, (ii) reducing tax-evasion, (iii) improve
economic efficiency by eliminating distortions related to tax-avoidance, (iv) improve the horizonal
equity of taxation. None of these advantages appear in our analysis.
Some other issues
One thought on Hall & Rabushka’s flat-tax reform that they do not address in their book: it
appears to bias towards investing physical capital, rather than in human- or intangible-capital.
Dealing with existing capital depreciation deductions during the transition? Hall & Rabushka
suggest that existing deductions may be allowed for during the transition, we do not consider this
issue. They suggest something similar with regard to the home mortgage interest deduction.
Variants of the Flat-Tax (different threshold-rate combinations, different amounts of investment
expensing): Hall and Rabushka (1995), locations 1059-57.
”Capital gains on owner-occupied houses are not taxed under our proposal“ (as far as I can tell
owner imputed rent is not either)
”Because it is high-income taxpayers who have the biggest incentive and the best opportunity to
use special tricks to exploit tax rate differentials, applying the same tax rate to these taxpayers for
all their income in all years is the most important goal of flat-rate taxation.“
”A total of $1,709 billion in business income was earned in the United States in 1991, but only
$791 billion in business income was reported on individual returns that year. The chance that a
dollar of business income would actually be reported was less than half.“ Under the flat-tax it would
all be taxed. We do not capture this in the model.
Hall & Rabushka on the basic idea of the flat-tax:
”Here is the logic of our system, stripped to basics: We want to tax consumption. The public
does one of two things with its income — spends it or invests it. We can measure consumption
as income minus investment. A really simple tax would just have each firm pay tax on the total
amount of income generated by the firm less that firm’s investment in plant and equipment. The
value-added tax works just that way. But a value-added tax is unfair because it is not progressive.
That’s why we break the tax it two. The firm pays tax on all the income generated at the firm except
the income paid to its workers. The workers pay tax on what they earn, and the tax they pay is
progressive.
To measure the total amount of income generated at a business, the best approach is to take the
total receipts of the firm over the year and subtract the payments the firm has made to its workers
and suppliers. This approach guarantees a comprehensive tax base. The successful value-added
taxes in Europe work this way. The base for the business tax is the following:
Total revenue from sales of goods and services less purchases of inputs from other firms less
wages salaries, and pendions paid to workers less purchases of plant and equipment
The other piece is the wage tax. Each family pays 19 percent of its wage, salary, and pension
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income over a family allowance (the allowance makes the system progressive). The base for the
consumption tax is total wages, salaries, and retirement benefits less the total amount of family
allowances.“
B The Transition Matrix on Exogenous Shocks
This appendix explains the definition of parameters φ1 and φ2, and how they affect the transition
matrix. Let pij denote the transition probability from i ∈ R to j ∈ E , let γ∗i be the invariant
measure of households that receive shock i ∈ E , and let φ1 and φ2 be the two parameters that shift
the probability mass towards the diagonal and towards the first column of submatrix ΓEE44, then
the recursive procedure that we use to compute the pij is the following:
• Step 1: First, we use parameter φ1 to shift the probability mass from a matrix with vector
γ∗E = (γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
3 , γ
∗
4) in every row towards its diagonal, as follows:
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∗
2 + φ
2
1γ
∗
3 + φ
3
1γ
∗
4
p52 = (1− φ1)[γ∗2 + φ1γ∗3 + φ21γ∗4 ]
p53 = (1− φ1)[γ∗3 + φ1γ∗4 ]
p54 = (1− φ1)γ∗4
p61 = (1− φ1)γ∗1
p62 = φ1γ
∗
1 + γ
∗
2 + φ1γ
∗
3 + φ
2
1γ
∗
4
p63 = (1− φ1)[γ∗3 + φ1γ∗4 ]
p64 = (1− φ1)γ∗4
p71 = (1− φ1)γ∗1
p72 = (1− φ1)[φ1γ∗1 + γ∗2 ]
p73 = φ
2
1γ
∗
1 + φ1γ
∗
2 + γ
∗
3 + φ1γ
∗
4
p74 = (1− φ1)γ∗4
p81 = (1− φ1)γ∗1
p82 = (1− φ1)[φ1γ∗1 + γ∗2 ]
p83 = (1− φ1)[φ21γ∗1 + φ1γ∗2 + γ∗3 ]
p84 = φ
3
1γ
∗
1 + φ
2
1γ
∗
2 + φ1γ
∗
3 + γ
∗
4
44A detailed description of this probability mass shifting procedure can be found in Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and
R´ıos-Rull (2003).
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• Step 2: Then for i = 5, 6, 7, 8 we use parameter φ2 to shift the resulting probability mass towards
the first column as follows:
pi1 = pi1 + φ2pi2 + φ
2
2pi3 + φ
3
2pi4
pi2 = (1− φ2)[pi2 + φ2pi3 + φ22pi4]
pi3 = (1− φ2)[pi3 + φ2pi4]
pi4 = (1− φ2)pi4
C Non-convexities
Due to the upper cap in payroll taxes, the marginal tax on labor income has a discontinuity at
the income level where the cap is reached. This creates a serious problem when we try to find
the optimal household policy. Specifically, for a given value of the choice of end-of-period period
assets, z, the budget set of the contemporaneous labor decision becomes non-convex. In Figure 1 we
illustrate this point. Consider pair of individual state variables (a, s) and a choice of end-of-period
assets, z. Then, equations (7), (8) and (9) and the boundary constraints on c and h define the
consumption possibilities set for c and `− h. In Figure 1 we plot an example of this set for a = 0.
When the household chooses not to work and to enjoy ` units of leisure, its consumption is zero. As
the household starts to work, its consumption increases albeit at a decreasing rate. This is because
of the progressivity of the personal income tax, τy, which reduces the after-tax wage of every extra
hour of work. Let h¯ be the hours of work such that e(s)h¯w = a3. For h > h¯ the marginal payroll
tax is zero. Therefore the slope of the consumption possibilities set increases discretely at h = h¯
and from that point onwards it decreases monotonically as we increase h, again because of the
progressivity of τy.
Figure 1: Non-convex constraints
Figure 2: Non-convex constraints
C Computation
As we have mentioned in Section 3, to calibrate our model economy we must solve a system of
29 non-linear equations in 29 unknowns. Actually, we solve a smaller system of 25 non-linear
equations in 25 unknowns because the value of government expenditures, G, is determined
residually from the government budget, and because three of the tax parameters are functions
of our guess for aggregate output. This non-linear system is only the outer loop of our
computational procedure because we must also find the stationary equilibrium values of the
capital labor ratio, K/L, and of aggregate output, Y , for each vector of unknowns. The
details of our computational procedure are the following:
• Step 1: We choose a vector of weights, one for each of the 25 non-linear equations. These
weights measure the relative importance that we attach to each one of our targets.
• Step 2: We guess a value for the 25 unknowns
• Step 3: We guess an initial value for aggregate output, Y0 (which determines the values
of the three tax parameters mentioned above).
• Step 4: We guess an initial value for the capital labor ratio (K/L)0
• Step 5: We compute the decision rules, the stationary distribution of households and the
new value of the capital labor ratio, (K/L)1
• Step 6: We iterate on K/L until convergence
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This lack of convexity is twice unfortunate. First, because it implies that the first order necessary
conditions are no longer sufficient for optimality and, therefore, they do not identify the optimal
solution uniquely. In fact there are two points that potentially satisfy the first order conditions,
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one above and one below the threshold h¯, and only one of these points is the optimal solution.
Second, as we change the choice of end-of-period assets, z, the optimal choice of hours becomes
discontinuous exactly when we move from a solution on one side of h¯ to a solution on the other
side of h¯. This is much more troublesome for our computational procedure. And it forces us to
solve the household decision problem using discrete value function iterations which are much more
computationally intensive, than the Euler equation iterations which can only be used when the
choice sets are convex.
D Calibration
The model has 43 parameters (actually, there are 46 if we include the three parameters that are
needed to perform the tax-reform experiments, but these ’extra’ three parameters are not relevant
to the calibration). A full description of the parameters and how they are calibrated/estimated is
contained in the body of the paper. For convenience we here provide a complete list of parameters
and then list which ones are normalizations/calibrated/estimated.
A full list of the parameters:
5 parameters to describe the preferences of the houshold
β, σ1, σ2, χ, `
2 parameters for production technology
θ, δ
11 parameters for the government policy
G, ω
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9
Following 3 are ”spare” parameters on gov. policy (spare in the sense they are only relevant for
the tax reform policy experiment and so not part of the calibration)
a10, a11, investmentexpenditures taxexempt
25 parameters the joint process on age & efficiency labour units
J
peg, pgg
φ1, φ2
5 so far, 20 more
e=[e1, e2 , e3, e4, 0,0,0,0];
(4 here: e1, e2, e3 ,e4)
Γee = [γ11, γ12, γ13, γ14; γ21, γ22, γ23, γ24; γ31, γ32, γ33, γ34; γ41, γ42, γ43, γ44];
(and 16 here)
Normalizations, 6 Parameters: J=4, `=1, and four normalizations on the rows of Γee (so that
each row adds to one).
Directly Identified, 8 Parameters: σ1, a2, a4, a5, peg, pgg, θ, δ.
Estimated by Simulated Method of Moments, 29 Parameters:
Those for preferences, government, and taxation:
β, χ, σ2
G, ω
a1, a3, a6, a7, a8, a9
And 17 parameters for the joint process on age & efficiency labour units:
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φ1, φ2
e=[e1, e2 , e3, e4, 0,0,0,0] (4 here)
Γee = [γ11, γ12, γ13, γ14; γ21, γ22, γ23, γ24; γ31, γ32, γ33, γ34; γ41, γ42, γ43, γ44];
(and 12 here, as we have to do the four normalizations, one for each row, in codes the twelve
are all the non-diagonal elements)
Remark: The choice to use the diagonals of Γee as the elements to be normalized has an important
advantage in the computation. Since the non-diagonals are smaller by having the diagonals given
by whatever was leftover to make the row sum up to one we avoided the problem that they may
end up being negative — something that occoured in an earlier version of the codes where we used
the last element of each row for the normalization.
E Computation
This appendix describes the computation, first of the calibration, and then how we calculate the
transition paths.
All simulation exercises involved a burn-in of 1000 points (typically starting from the ’mid-point’
of the relevant distribution).
E.1 Value Functions and Stationary Distribution
To calculate the decision rules, we discretize the state space and perform Value function iteration
using Howard’s improvement algorithm.
The size of our state space is nk × ns = 681 × 8 = 5, 448 points. The size of our control space is
nk × nn = 681× 51 = 34, 731 points. Since the numbers of working-age and retirement states are
nw = nr = 4, the total number of search points is [(nk × (nw + nr)) × (nk × nn)] = 189, 214, 488
points.
We approximate the stationary distribution with a discritization of the associated distribution
function. The grid for this approximation is the same as that used for the to solve the value
function. The stationary distribution is calculated by iterating on the whole distribution, using
the optimal policy functions and the transition matrix of the idiosyncratic shocks. This is done
until it converges, as measured by a distance criterion based directly on the monotone mixing
condition underlying the theory that ensures that a stationary distribution exists (see Hopenhayn
and Prescott (1992)).45 This process is more demanding computationally than those typically used
for calculating the stationary distribution, but that is important here since the model moments
relating to the top percentiles, eg. the asset share of the top 1% of asset holders, otherwise varied
substantially between different simulations (much smaller simulations were fine for giving stable
results for first moments, such as the capital stock, but the top percentile moments can be quite
volatile).
45To speed up the convergence we start this process of iterating on the stationary distribution from an initial distri-
bution created by a 1, 000, 000 point simulation. Actually, to take advantage of parallelization this was implemented
as ncore simulations of 1, 000, 000/ncore points each, where ncore = 12 was the number of cores in the computer we
had access to.
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E.2 Model Moments/Statistics
The model economy’s distributional and aggregate statistics can almost all be computed directly
as integrals with respect to the stationary distribution. Since the distribution is approximated
as a weight for each point on a grid this just involves taking weighted sums. The exceptions are
those that measure the earnings life cycle and the intergenerational correlation of earnings the
computations of which we now describe.
Life-cycle profile of earnings: The life-cycle profile of earnings is measured as the ratio of ’average
earnings of households aged 46 to 50’ to ’average earnings of households aged 26 to 30’. To
calculate this statistic we first draw a random ’newborn’ from the distribution of newborns.46 We
then simulate this individual for 30 periods (ie. until age 50) recording their productivity in each
year and recording both their ’average earnings of households aged 46 to 50’ to ’average earnings
of households aged 26 to 30’. We do this for 30,000 individuals, drop all of those households which
retired before reaching age 50, and then calculate the average ratio across the remaining individuals.
We use 30,000 as this ensured that we always ended up with well in excess of 10,000 individuals
after dropping all of those individuals who retired; this was enough to ensure that the statistic was
stable from one sample to the next.47
Intergenerational Correlation of Earnings: The Intergenerational Correlation of Earnings is mea-
sured as the correlation between the average annual earnings of two consecutive generations of the
same dynasty/household. To calculate this statistic we first draw a random ’newborn’ from the
distribution of newborns (see footnote 46). We then simulate this household, recording it’s annual
earnings, until it ’dies’ twice. From this we calculate the average annual earnings for the first and
second generations of this household. This is done for 10,000 households and we then calculate the
correlation between average annual earnings of the first and second generations. 10,000 households
was enough to ensure stability of this statistic.48
E.3 General Equilibrium
The calculation of general equilibrium in this class of models involves finding an interest rate which
induces individual behaviour which generates aggregate variables (eg. output and capital) than in
turn leads back to the original interest rate; see eg. Aiyagari (1994). The only noteworthy difference
in our algorithms is that rather than use a search algorithm on K/Y to find the general equilibrium
— the standard approach — we instead discretize the state space for r and use this to find the
equilibrium value — the one for which r induces individual behaviour, which generates aggregate
variables, that in turn imply the original r. Using a grid allows us to be certain of convergence,
and to know if the model were to have multiple solutions — both theoretically uncertain issues
with this class of models.49
46In practice this is implemented as drawing a random retired household, forcibly killing them, and then determining
where they would end up as a newborn. Since the probability of death is equal for all retired households this
is equivalent to drawing randomly from the distribution of newborns, but saves having to actually calculate the
distribution of newborns.
47In implementing the code we parallelized across the 30,000 individuals.
48In implementing the code we parallelized across the 10,000 individuals.
49Many of the optimization algorithms normally applied for this step rely on differentiability, and concavity for
convergence, neither of which is known to hold. They also assume that the solution found is a global, rather than
simply local, solution.
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E.4 Calibration
As we have mentioned in Section 3 the model has 43 parameters. Of these 6 are normalizations,
and another 8 are directly identified. This leaves 29 parameters. We estimate these remaining 29
parameters using the Simulated Method of Moments; we find values for the 29 parameters that
minimize the distance between 29 moments of the model and the same 29 moments for the US
economy. We now describe the implemention of the Simulated Method of Moments for the 29
parameters.
The model is a general equilibrium set-up. Note that since aggregate production is given by a
Cobb-Douglas production function, and because the assumption of perfect competition implies that
the interest rate equals the marginal product of capital, it is possible to identify the interest rate in
terms of K/Y , θ, and δ.50 Thus, given our target for K/Y , and since θ and δ are directly identified,
we can calculate what the value of the interest rate must be in equilibrium. We exploit this in
our calibration process: taking the interest rate as an input, the target value of K/Y becomes
in effect the general equilibrium condition. By putting a large weight on the K/Y moment we
thus, in effect, insist on the general equilibrium condition. This avoids the need to loop over the
calculation of the general equilibrium condition during the calibration process. After the calibration
process is completed we then calculate the general equilibrium given the calibrated parameters; this
is important as our calculation of the transition paths is about the movement from one general
equilibrium to another.
• Step 1: We choose a vector of weights, one for each of the 29 moments. These weights measure
the relative importance that we attach to each one of our targets. These weights are reported in
Table 15
• Step 2: We guess an initial value for the 29 unknowns (in implementing this step most of our
initial values were based on the calibration results of Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull
(2003)). These initial values are reported in Tables 13 & 14.
• Step 3: We compute the optimal policy function and the stationary distribution of households
(given the interest rate and parameter values).
• Step 4: We compute the values of the 29 moments of the model (given the interest rate and
parameter values).
• Step 5: Roughly speaking, if the weighted distance of the moments of the model from the
moments of the data is small enough our calibration is complete. If not then we choose new values
for the parameters and return to Step 3. (More precisely, we use the CMA-ES algorithm, see
below.)
• Step 6: Having estimated the parameters, we calculate the general equilibrium of the model.
The loop to calibrate the parameters by matching the moments of the model to the moments of
the data is implemented using the CMA-ES algorithm (Covariance-Matrix Adaptation – Evolution-
ary Strategy; see Andreasen (2010) who also provides a Matlab implemention of the algorithm).
The use of this algorithm was key; many inbuilt Matlab optimization functions (fgoalattain, fmin-
50Specifically, r = θKθ−1L1−θ − δ = θ 1
K/Y
− δ.
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search, fminunc, & fmincon; based on, eg., Nelder-Mead simplex, quasi-newton, and trust-region
algorithms) simply failed to converge.51
We now provide a brief description of the CMA-ES algorithm, see Andreasen (2010) for details:
the CMA-ES algorithm works by starting out considering the entire parameter space. Parameter
vectors are drawn at random (based on the covariance-matrix and a focal-point) and evaluated,
based on these evaluations the covariance-matrix and focal-point are updated. As the algorithm
progresses the average distance between the parameter vectors drawn and the focal-point is pro-
gressively reduced. Once certain convergence criterion are met the focal-point is returned as the
estimated value of the true parameter vector.
E.4.1 Calibration Weights
A brief discussion of our choices for the calibration weights is in order. As a default we put a
weigh of one on each moment, the exceptions to this are as follows. A large weight is put on the
capital-output ratio, this is important as this represents our ’general equilibrium target’. We put
smaller weights on life-cycle profile of earnings and the intergenerational correlation of earnings as
there are not such clean mappings from model to data in terms of this moments (the first due to our
use of stochastic aging, the second since in the data it is just measured as father-son correlation).
We put a smaller weight on the ratio of government spending to output since it is the ’leftover’
difference between the transfer to output ratio and the tax revenue to output ratio, both of which
are closely related to other targets. We also put reduced weights on the moments relating to the
earnings and wealth distributions on the grounds that these already account for around half of the
moments.
E.5 General Equilibrium for a Revenue Neutral Reform
As when trying to find the general equilibrium for the baseline model we we discretize the state
space for r and use this to find the equilibrium value — the one for which r induces individual
behaviour, which generates aggregate variables, that in turn imply the original r. The only added
complication is that we now require the reform to be revenue neutral, thus for each value of r we
find the tax rate (or tax exemption level) that makes the reform revenue neutral. This is done using
Nelder-Mead simplex methods to minimize the square of the difference between actual tax revenue
and target tax revenue (the later being the tax revenue in the baseline model); this is implemented
using Matlab’s fminsearch.
E.6 Transition Paths
We now describe the computation of the transition paths. Note that these transition paths are fully
general equilibrium. There are two main aspects to this process. The first is to ensure that they
are general equilibrium; that the prices are causing individual behaviour, which in turn determines
51In unpublished work we compared the performance of all these algorithms in performing simulated moment
estimation of the model of Pijoan-Mas (2006) (a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic
but no aggregate uncertainty; 6 parameters and 6 moments, simple enough that calibration can be used to get the
exact values for all the parameters). All of the algorithms (inbuilt Matlab and the CMA-ES) performed fine when the
initial guesses for the parameters were close to the true values. But only the CMA-ES was able to reliably converge
to the true parameters when the initial guesses where some distance from the true values.
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Table 13: Parameter values for the benchmark model economy and their initial values
Calibrated Value Initial Value
Preferences
Time discount factor β 0.95 0.94
Curvature of consumption σ1 1.50 n.a.
Curvature of leisure σ2 1.83 1.50
Relative share of consumption and leisure χ 0.81 1.00
Endowment of discretionary time ` 1.00 n.a.
Technology
Capital income share θ 0.38 n.a.
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.05 n.a.
Age and endowment process
Probability of retiring pe% 0.02 n.a.
Probability of dying 1− p%% 0.06 n.a.
Life cycle earnings profile φ1 0.85 0.90
Intergenerational persistence of earnings φ2 0.86 0.90
Fiscal policy
Government consumption G 0.48 0.40
Retirement pensions ω 0.17 0.20
Capital income tax function a1 0.20 0.25
Payroll tax function a2 0.08 n.a
a3 0.71 0.80
Household income tax function a4 0.26 n.a
a5 0.77 n.a
a6 1.00 0.80
Estate tax function a7 18.28 20.00
a8 0.12 0.10
Consumption tax function a9 0.09 0.10
Note: Those parameters whose value was determined by normalization or direct parameterization obviously do not
have initial values, we thus report their initial value as n.a.
the aggregates, which lead back to the same prices. The second is to ensure that the government
balances revenue and spending over the transition.
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Table 14: The stochastic process for the endowment of efficiency labor units
Estimated Values
ΓEE (%) From s To s′
e(s) γ∗s (%) s
′ = 1 s′ = 2 s′ = 3 s′ = 4
s = 1 0.40 54.82 98.02 1.01 0.96 0.01
s = 2 1.36 42.04 0.01 90.42 9.55 0.01
s = 3 6.77 3.09 7.67 8.89 83.43 0.01
s = 4 198.88 0.05 9.93 7.04 0.01 83.02
Initial Values
ΓEE (%) From s To s′
e(s) γ∗s (%) s
′ = 1 s′ = 2 s′ = 3 s′ = 4
s = 1 0.40 38.62 93.87 2.04 2.04 2.04
s = 2 1.20 20.89 2.04 93.87 2.04 2.04
s = 3 4.00 20.47 2.04 2.04 93.87 2.04
s = 4 200.00 20.02 2.04 2.04 2.04 93.87
Note: e(s) denotes the relative endowments of efficiency labor units; γ∗s denotes the stationary distribution of working-
age households (note that this is not the stationary distribution of ΓEE , it is taken from the stationary distribution
of Γ and renormalized); ΓEE denotes the transition probabilities of the process on the endowment of efficiency labor
units for working-age households that are still workers one period later.
40
Table 15: The Target Moments used in the Simulated Method of Moments estimation and their val-
ues in the U.S. data, after calibration/estimation, in general equilibrium, and the weights assigned
to the moments estimation.
Target U.S. Calib. Gen. Eqm. Weight
Macroeconomic & Demographic Trends
Capital/Output Ratio K/Y 4.67 4.51 4.55 20.0
Avg. share time allocated to work H/` (%) 33.00 32.66 33.10 1.0
Life-cycle profile of earnings 1.30 1.18 1.21 0.2
Intergen. Trans. of Earnings Ability 1.30 0.65 0.15 0.2
Government Policy
Government Expenditures
Gov. Expenditure/GDP G/Y (%) 24.75 20.72 20.81 0.5
Gov. Transfers/GDP Z/Y (%) 5.53 5.13 5.08 1.0
Government Revenue
Capital Income Tax Revenue/GDP τk/Y 3.08 2.76 2.96 1.0
Estate Tax Revenue/GDP τe/Y 0.19 0.21 0.21 1.0
Payroll Tax a3/y¯ 0.82 0.78 0.77 1.0
Personal Income Tax Effective Rate a6/y¯ 10.95 9.42 9.38 1.0
Estate Tax Exemption a7/y¯ 20.00 20.04 19.86 1.0
The Distribution of Earnings
Gini for Earnings 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.8
Earnings Lorenz Curve (%): Quintiles
1-20: 1st Quintile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.8
21-40: 2nd Quintile 4.20 3.09 3.01 0.8
41-60: 3rd Quintile 11.70 11.20 11.55 0.8
61-280: 4th Quintile 20.80 21.37 21.34 0.8
81-100: 5th Quintile 63.50 61.46 61.23 0.8
Earnings Lorenz Curve (%): Top Percentiles
90-95 11.70 9.08 9.03 0.8
96-99 16.60 16.81 16.74 0.8
99-100 18.70 20.26 20.23 0.8
The Distribution of Wealth
Gini for Wealth 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.6
Wealth Lorenz Curve (%): Quintiles
1-20: 1st Quintile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.6
21-40: 2nd Quintile 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.6
41-60: 3rd Quintile 4.50 3.29 3.43 0.6
61-80: 4th Quintile 11.20 12.27 12.26 0.6
81-100: 5th Quintile 83.40 83.11 82.95 0.6
Wealth Lorenz Curve (%): Top Percentiles
90-95 11.10 14.20 14.44 0.6
96-99 26.70 23.89 23.71 0.6
99-100 33.60 34.65 34.15 0.6
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Abstract
I provide some theoretical results relating to the estimation of Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
models; general equilibrium heterogeneous agent models with idiosyncratic but no aggregate
uncertainty. Estimation methods include Simulated Moments Estimation and Simulated Like-
lihood Estimation. The Simulated Method of Moments Estimator presented here is based on
targeting moments of the steady-state of the model. The Simulated Likelihood Estimator is
based on a two-stage process: in the first stage the micro-parameters are estimated from panel
data by simulated maximum likelihood, in the second stage the macro-parameters are then cho-
sen to be consistent both with macro aggregates, and with the prices estimated in the first step.
I show that numerical errors in the computation and simulation of the model will disappear
asymptotically. I also provide evidence, based on simulations, about which algorithms work
best in implementing such estimators.
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3
1 Introduction
I propose two estimators for the structural estimation of models of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
class; models with heterogeneous agents, incomplete markets, and a competitive general equilib-
rium, in which there is idiosyncratic but no aggregate uncertainty. In such models analytical
solutions are not available, and so simulated estimation methods must be used. The first estima-
tor, a simulated moments estimator (SME), is based on the steady-state of the model. The second
estimator, a two-stage simulated likelihood estimator (SLE), is based on estimating the micro-
parameters from panel data in the first-stage, and then the macro-parameters in the second-stage.
Theoretical results on the consistency of these estimators are provided; with those for the SME
estimator being based on assumptions that it can be proven apply to the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari
class of models. Further theory is provided showing that numerical errors occurring during the
computation of the optimal policy and the steady-state moments will not affect, in the limit, the
consistency of the SME. An example implementation of these estimators is then given, based on
the model of Pijoan-Mas (2006). I provide evidence on which algorithms work in implementing the
estimators, and on their reliability in correctly estimating the true parameters of the model.
The Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class of models has its beginnings in Bewley (1983) with early
quantitative explorations being Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). Heterogeneous agent models
of this class have been used to give quantitative answers to questions on topics as varied as:
progressive taxation (Conesa and Krueger, 2006), capital taxation (Domeij and Heathcote, 2004;
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger, 2009), inequality (Castaneda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull, 2003),
entrepreneurship (Quadrini, 2000), and working longer hours (Pijoan-Mas, 2006). For more on the
applications of heterogeneous agent models, both of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class and other
more-complicated classes, see R´ıos-Rull (1995, 2001); Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009).
Structural estimation by simulation methods is well-understood for certain dynamic models.
Early contributions on simulated estimation in dynamic environments such as Lee and Ingram
(1991) and Duffie and Singleton (1993) were based on assumptions about the data-generating
Markov process — to be understood here as the solution of a dynamic optimization (eg. value
function) problem. These results suffered from the issue that it was not clear that the assumptions
made about the data-generating Markov-process would necessarily be satisfied by the solution to
the value function problems of models like the standard neoclassical growth model. Fernandez-
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Santos (2006) overcome this issue providing conditions on the
data-generating Markov process that can be be proven to hold from the fundamentals of the value
function problem to be solved. Their approach is based on the Feller property, and the related
concept of stochastic contractions, which it can be proven are satisfied by a number of standard
dynamic models including the neoclassical growth model; this theory underpins much of the growing
field of likelihood-based DSGE estimation, whether by classical or Bayesian likelihood methods.1
1Although Ackerberg, Geweke, and Hahn (2009) provide a counterexample to Proposition 2 of Fernandez-
1
The other issue afflicting the earlier work on structural estimation is that the simulations themselves
are typically made using a computational approximation to the solution to the value function
problem. So numerical errors that occur while computing the solution to the value function may
cause problems with the convergence of the simulations themselves. This issue was addressed in
Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005). A partial summary of these literatures, concentrating mainly on
the later on numerical errors, can be found in Peralta-Alva and Santos (2014).
Heterogeneous agent models of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class are not based on the Feller
property, but instead on the monotone mixing condition. This paper provides results for simulation
estimation based on the monotone mixing conditions, and so it can be proven from fundamentals
that they apply to models of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class. Existing results on bounding
numerical errors arising from the value function problem and simulations are also not applicable
to these models — due, eg., to non-interior optimal policies, non-convex choice sets, and the
dependence on the monotone mixing conditions. Another contribution of this paper is thus to
extend and adapt existing results to cover these cases.2
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) provide a comprehensive recent summary on the structural
estimation of dynamic models. They briefly cover competitive-equilibrium models — including the
Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class of models addressed here — but their main concentration is on the
estimation of single-agent models and dynamic games. They focus on the methods used to estimate
these various kinds of models, as well as giving examples of their empirical application.
Many standard issues relating to panel-data estimation, such as unobserved heterogeneity, initial
observations, self-selection bias, censoring, and attrition bias, may occour when applying the Two-
State SLE estimator. For a discussion of these and other related issues in the context of structural
estimation see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) and Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011).
Note that the choice of using moment estimation in the SME likelihood estimation in the SLE is
itself arbitrary, the difference between the estimators comes what kind of data they use. One could
estimate based on the steady-state using likelihood methods, or estimate the microfoundations
from panel data using moment-based methods. The real difference between the two estimators is
about the choice between targeting the steady-state (moments) versus a two-stage approach using
microeconomic panel data. The decision to use moments-based methods for the first case, and
likelihood for the second case simply reflects the (arbitrary) judgement of the author on which
estimator is the most suitable in each case.
Both estimators could be trivially extended to allow some of the parameters to be pre-calibrated
directly, and then the estimation performed on the remaining parameters; see Peralta-Alva and
Santos (2014) for further discussion of this concept in the context Simulated Moment Estimation
of a different class of model. In practice this is very often done.
Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Santos (2006).
2This paper contains two estimators, the SME and the SLE, the results I have proven so far only cover the SME.
2
Section 2 provides a general description of the model. Section 3 provides theory addressing
numerical errors that occur during the computational solution and simulation of the model. Section
4 describes the Simulated Moments Estimation of this class of models — based on moments of the
steady-state. Section 5 describes the Two-Stage Simulated Likelihood Estimation of this class of
models — based on first estimating the microfoundations.
Macroeconometrics, Heterogeneity and Estimation: Before we get into the paper itself,
a comment on the importance of structure, heterogeneity, and estimation in Macroeconomics is in
order.
This is a paper about Macroeconometric estimation. Perhaps not in the modern sense of the
word, but certainly in the sense in which the term econometrics was coined by Ragnar Frisch,
co-recipient of the first Nobel Prize in Economics.
[Frisch] was the first to propose the use of the term econometrics to describe a
research program that consisted in (1) mathematical formulations of economic theo-
ries and (2) systematic tests of the theories using the methods of mathematical statis-
tics...Statistical analysis of economic relationships was in his opinion meaningless unless
it was based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, that is, on a mathematically formulated
theoretical model (Sandmo, 2011; Chpt 16, pg 376).3,4
Paragraph on importance of structure/mathematical models/microfoundations.
That heterogeneity is important to macroeconomics seems almost self-evident, none-the-less I
now make the case. For questions relating to inequality and distributional issues hetergeneity is
a prerequisite for creating relevant models — if everyone is the same the concept of inequality is
meaningless. But the usefulness of heterogeneity and microfoundations extends well beyond its
necessity in addressing such questions. It is also useful for the understanding of aggregate macroe-
conomic variables such as GDP and the employment rate. The observation is often made that
evaluating macroeconomic models is difficult as one often has only fifty years of good quality quar-
terly data, not nearly enough to differentiate between the many alternative explanations. Adding
heterogeneity tackles this problem head on, opening up a vast seam of cross-sectional and panel
data that can be used to compare different models. One criticism commonly made is that by mod-
eling individuals we lose sight of the macroeconomy: can we really understand the wealth of nations
3Frisch considered the pairing of statistics with mathematical models to be especially important to the problem
of identification, an issue which remains controversial today. See Keane (2010) for a recent statement of this view,
to be understood in contrast to the view that identification can be done solely using an experimentalist approach, as
embodied in the approach of Angrist and Pischke (2009).
4Or as expressed at the beginning of the abstract of a conversation between Frisch, Schumpeter, and Haberler in
1928 about the possibility of forming what is now the Econometric Society (Frisch 1969; pg 13),
The terms econometric and econometrics are interpreted as including both pure economics and the
statistical verification of the laws of pure economics. In essential distinction to the purely empirical
manipulation of statistical data on economic phenomena.
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by looking at the actions of butchers, brewers, and bakers? Fortunately for macroeconomics this
criticism is of little relevance: it is a tautology that if we can model the incomes of each individual
then we can model GDP, and that if we can model the work choices of individuals then we can
model the employment rate — these are the very definitions of GDP and the employment rate!
None of this is to suggest that doing so is easy, the modelling of individual choices is difficult, not
to mention how they interact. But explicit modeling of heterogeneity does provide us with a path
to follow, and access to enough data to decide which turns to take.
So heterogeneity is important, but why estimate the models? One major advantage of estimating
heterogeneous agent models is that it solves the problems of synthesis — arbitrarily taking different
parameters from different sources. Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) describe the problems
of synthesizing as follows:
Synthesizing evidence across micro studies is not a straightforward task. Different
microeconomic studies make different assumptions, often implicit, about the economic
environments in which agents make their decisions. They condition on different variables
and produce parameters with different economic interpretations. A parameter that is
valid for a model in one economic environment cannot be uncritically applied to a model
embedded in a different economic environment. Different general equilibrium models
make different assumptions and require different parameters, many of which have never
been estimated in the micro literature.5
2 The Model
In this section I give a formal description of the class of models being considered here; namely
general equilibrium heterogeneous agent models with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic, but no
aggregate, uncertainty.
2.1 Bewley-Huggett-Aiygari Models
In this subsection I provide a formal description of the class of heterogeneous agent models being
considered. Notation is loosely based on Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, henceforth SLP);
loosely as SLP do not treat heterogeneous agent models of this type.
The models are those which can be expressed as follows: Let X ⊆ Rl be the endogenous state
variable, Y = Y1 × Y2 ⊆ X × Rc be the choice variable, and Z ⊆ Rk be the exogenous state
variable. Let Θ = Θ1 × Θ2 ⊆ Rq1 × Rq2 be a parameter space; θ1 ∈ Θ1 is a vector of parameters
5For an interesting take on how the results of calibration and estimation methods compare in practice see R´ıos-Rull,
Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Kryshko, and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2012).
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that enter into the value function problem, while θ2 ∈ Θ2 is a vector of parameters that only affect
macroeconomic aggregates.6 The state of a agent is then a pair (x, z). A value function maps
Vθ1,p : X × Z → R. A policy function maps gθ1 : X × Z → Y . Let S = X × Z, and let S be
it’s Borel σ-field. The measure of agents µθ1,p is a probability distribution over (S,S). The return
function maps Fθ1,p : X × Y × Z → R, and the discount factor is 0 < β < 1.
Aggregate variables are A ∈ A ⊆ Ra. A price vector is p ∈ P ⊆ Rp. The exogenous shock follows
a Markov-chain with transition function Qθ1 mapping from Z to Z. The aggregation function maps
A : M(S,S) → Ra, where M(S,S) is the space of probability measures on (S,S). The market
clearance function maps λθ2 : Ra × Rp → R.
Definition 1. A Competitive Equilibrium is an agents value function V(θ1,p); agents policy function
g(θ1,p); vector of prices p; measure of agents µ(θ1,p); such that
1. Given prices p, the agents value function V(θ1,p) and policy function g(θ1,p) solve the agents
problem
V(θ1,p)(x, z) = max
y=(y1,y2)∈Y
{
F(θ1,p)(x, y, z) + β
∫
V(θ1,p)(y
′
1, z
′)Qθ1(z, dz
′)
}
(1)
2. Aggregates are determined by individual actions: A(θ1,p) = A(µ(θ1,p)).
3. Markets clear (in terms of prices): λθ2(A(θ1,p), p) = 0.
4. The measure of agents is invariant:
µ(θ1,p)(x, z) =
∫ ∫ [∫
1x=g(θ1,p)(xˆ,z)
µ(θ1,p)(xˆ, z)Qθ1(z, dz
′)
]
dxˆdz (2)
Models fitting this definition include Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994), as well as numerous
extensions endogenizing labour supply, introducing taxation, and modeling dynasties. The aggre-
gates in point two generally correspond to the household variables (such as aggregate capital) but
in some models may also be aggregates of functions thereof (such as tax revenue). The third point,
that prices clear markets, involves rewritting market clearance equations in terms of prices, rather
than quantities.
So for example in Aiyagari (1994) the requirement that aggregates are determined by individual
actions is that aggregate capital is the sum of individuals capital holdings, K =
∫
k′(x, z)dµ. While
the market clearance conditions is that the interest rate is equal to the marginal product of capital,
λ(α,δ)(K, r) = r − αK1−α − δ = 0, where K depends on individual behaivour, and thus on (θ1, p).
6This differentiation between θ1 and θ2 is important for the Two-Stage estimation producure.
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3 Computational Solution and Simulation of the Model
In this section we address the issue of numerical errors that might arise during the solution and
simulation of the model. Given the prominent role played by simulation in both the SME and SLE
estimators it is good to know that the simulation will not cause problems for the convergence of
the estimators. Results are provided, firstly to show that numerical errors in the value function
and optimal policy function are bounded, and that they will go to zero as the distance between
points on the grids used to approximate the value function and optimal policy function go to zero.
It is then shown that if, as was shown, the numerical errors in the optimal policy function are
bounded, then numerical errors in the steady-state distribution will also be bounded. It follows
almost trivially that numerical errors in the moments of the steady-state distribution are bounded.
Furthermore, as numerical errors in the optimal policy function go to zero, so will those in the
steady-state distribution and it’s moments. Together these results ensure that the any role played
by numerical errors in the estimation of the SME will go to zero as the distance between points on
the grid used in the approximation go to zero. Proving this for the SLE would require results on
the numerical errors in finite-length time-series simulations and is not done here.
In what follows we consider in turn: computation of the value function and optimal policy
function; simulation of the steady state distribution; computation of moments of the steady state
distribution. At every stage emphasis is placed on deriving numerical error bounds that are based
on the algorithms that are actually used to implement the estimators.
3.1 Computing the Value Function and Optimal Policy Function
The first step in solving these models is to compute the (value function and the) optimal policy fn.
The existence of periodically binding constraints, and non-concave feasible choice sets, are common
in this class of models, and so methods based on Euler Equations, and other first order condition
based methods, are not applicable. The standard approach is thus value function iteration. Theory
on bounding the numerical errors in value function iteration does exist: for example Santos and
Vigo-Aguiar (1998) provide results based on partial discretization, while Stachurski (2008) provides
results for a variety of fitted value function iteration mehtods. Here I provide a new result on
bounding numerical errors in the value function and more importantly in the optimal policy function
based on discretized value function iteration.7 The proofs of this result, as well as a discussion of
how it differs from existing results, can be found in Appendix A.
Our results are based on the Case 1 value function problem,
V (x, z) = sup
y=(y1,y2)∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(3)
7Previous results depend on assumptions like the interiority of solutions, or differentiability of the value function,
that are often not applicable to the kinds of models considered here.
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Our intention is to bound the difference between the solution to the this problem, V , and the
numerical solution to the discretized problem, V GN , the later is the solution after N iterations (once
a standard convergence criterion is met) of value function iteration on the discrete grid (hence the
G).
We assume that the spaces for the endogenous state X, the control variables Y , and the exoge-
nous state Z are all compact, that the return function F is continuous and bounded8, the discount
factor β is less than one, and that the transition function Q has the Feller property.
Then we have the following result,
Corollary 1. For the value function defined in 3. Let X, Y , Z be compact, the return function F
be continuous, monotone, and bounded, the discount factor β be less than one, and the transition
function Q have the Feller property. Let V GN be the numerical solution to the discretized value
function problem (discretizing X, Y and Z, using Tauchen method to discretize Q). Then, the
numerical errors in the value function, ||V − V GN ||, and in the optimal policy function, ||g − gGN ||,
converge to zero as the distance between grid points in the dimensions being discretized go to zero.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This result is based on discretized value function iteration; both a common solution method for
models of this kind and the exactly the method that is used to implement the estimators when
generating the simulation results in this paper.
3.2 Simulating the Steady-State
Our error bounds are based on discretizing the state space and iterating on the entire agent distri-
bution until it converges. Iterating on the entire agent distribution is needed to get exact bounds
on the numerical errors.
In the results closest to those presented here Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) provide bounds
on the numerical errors in invariant distributions and the simulation methods commonly used to
generate them. However none of these results is applicable to incomplete market heterogeneous
agent models. The reason is two-fold; firstly the bounds on value and policy function errors are all
dependent on the interiority of the optimal policy, but in heterogeneous agent models we often have
binding borrowing constraints. Secondly, the bounds on invariant distribution errors are dependent
on the Feller property, while heterogeneous agent models generally depend on the monotone mixing
condition (Hopenhayn and Prescott, 1992).
The following Theorem 1 is taken from Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) and introduces the
monotone mixing condition (MMC). Based on the MMC it proves that for any given interest rate
8Since F is a continous function defined on a compact space, it will therefore also be bounded.
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there is a unique invariant distribution.
Theorem 1. Suppose P is increasing, S contains a lower bound (which we will denote by a) and
an upper bound (which we will denote by b) and the following condition is satisfied: Monotone
Mixing Condition (MMC): there exists s∗ ∈ S,m ∈ Z, βP > 0 such that Pm(b, [a, s∗]) ≥ 1−βP and
Pm(a, [s∗, b]) ≥ 1 − βP . Then there is a unique stationary distribution µ∗ for process P , and for
any initial measure µ0, µn ≡ T ∗nµ0 =
∫
Pn(s, ·)µ0(ds) converges to µ∗.
The main result that is needed for the results of this section is,
Theorem 2. Let {gj} be a sequence of policy functions that converge to g. Let {µ∗j} be a sequence
of probabilities on S such that µ∗j = T ∗j µ∗j for each j. Under assumptions 9 and 10, if µ∗ is a weak
limit point of µ∗j , then µ
∗ = T ∗µ∗.
it appears, with proof, as Theorem Theorem 15 in Appendix B. Have discovered that proof
contains an error; it mixes metrics)
Based on the monotone mixing condition we are able to derive the following bound on the
numerical errors in the steady-state distribution.
Corollary 2. Let f be a Lipshitz function with constant L. Let ||g − gˆ|| ≤ δg for some δg > 0.
Assume that T ∗m is a contraction mapping of modulus βP . Then, under assumptions 9 & 10,
|
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)| ≤ Lmδg
1− βP
and furthermore
||µ∗ − µˆ∗|| ≤ mδg
1− βP
Proof: See Appendix B.
The interpretation of Corollary 2 is that due to the nature of the discretization of the optimal
policy and the transition matrix for the exogenous shocks, and in particular due to considering the
optimal policy function as a piecewise constant extension on the discretization grid, the discretiza-
tion of the steady state distribution introduces no new errors. Thus the only errors in the steady
state distribution are those which we have already bounded in terms of errors in the optimal policy
function, and those coming from stopping after a finite number of iterations. The intuition for why
the discretization of the steady state distribution does not create any further errors comes from
noting that the approximate transition function PG = gˆ ·QG is piecewise constant on the partition
imposed by discretization; a property it inherits via gˆ and QG.
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3.2.1 Computing the Moments of the Steady-State
Since the moments of the steady-state can be expressed as the integral of a function with respect
to the steady-state, as long as the functions definining the moments are Lipschitz we have in fact
already addressed this issue in Corollary 2
4 The Simulated Moments Estimator
This section introduce a Simulated Moments Estimator for Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models. In
implementing the estimator a necessary condition to be avoid having to calculate the general
equilibrium during the estimation is that the observed macroeconomic aggregates, together with
the parameters, must be sufficient to directly identify the price vector. This necessary condition is
satisfied in almost all applications.9 However, it is not necessary for the properties of the estimator
— the theory developed here relating to the estimator depends on the monotone mixing condition,
not on the general equilibrium itself. Based on the theory given in Section 3 it is established that
the SME is a consistent estimator (as the distance between the grid points used in the simulation
go to zero, the simulated moments estimator converges to a standard moments estimator, which is
in turn consistent).
Suppose that we have a set AD of n data observations that correspond to moments of the
steady-state distribution of the model.10 For a given parameter vector θ, the model produces a
set of n corresponding moments AM (θ). Since we cannot solve the model exactly, we will have to
use computational solution and simulation of the model to generate the set of simulated moments
AMs(θ). Our aim is to find the true parameter vector θ∗ for which the moments of the model
AM (θ) are equal to those of the data AD.11 Thus, θ∗ is defined as the solution to,
θ∗ ≡ arg min
θ
d(AD, AM (θ)) (4)
where d : Rn×Rn → R is a distance function, and is assumed to be continuous. It is assumed that
θ∗ is the unique solution to this problem. We will use the distance function given by
d(AD, AM (θ)) =
∑
i
wi(A
D
i −AMi )2/var(ADi ) (5)
This distance function is chosen for a number of reasons: (i) it uses the square of the distance
which is standard, simple, and intuitive, (ii) by dividing by variance of the data moments we put
more weight on the better ’measured’ moments and brings us closer to a standard GMM-estimation
9It is satisfied as long as the n observable macroeconomic aggregates, AD, include as a subset the a moments of
the steady-state, A, that enter into the market clearing equation Mθ2(A, p).
10These n moments need to include the a moments used in the definition of the general equilibrium of the model.
In practice they will almost always also include further moments.
11By asking the moments to be equal I am implicitly assuming here that the model is exactly identified, and not
overidentified. If the model is overidentified the moments would simply need to be ’as close as possible’.
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approach, (iii) via the wi, the researcher can put more weight on moments that are more important
or better identified12, and (iv) it appears to perform well in practice. Note that from the point
of view of the model theoretically the aggregate data moments have zero variance and so variance
in those moments is to be understood as due to measurement error, which is assumed to be iid
Normally distributed.
To implement the estimator we will of course have to use empirical estimates of var(ADi ), so
define θ˜ as
θ˜ ≡ arg min
θ
∑
i
wi(A
D
i −AMi )2/v̂ar(ADi ) (6)
where v̂ar(ADi ) is just the standard consistent estimator of sample variance for an iid normally
distributed variable, namely 1T−1
∑T
t=1(A
D
i,t − ¯Ai,D)2 (the notation here is based on the idea that,
eg., the moment is the captial/output ratio and is observed annually).
One alternative would be to use a standard GMM-style distance measure in which we take the
squares of the distances between moments (which we do with (ADi − AMi )2) and then sum them
using as a weighting matrix the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix (instead of a diagonal
matrix of wi/A
D
i terms). I avoid this since in practice, estimation of the aggregate moments is
likely to be based on different data sources, and thus trying to estimate their covariances is not an
easy problem.13
Note that there is, in principle, no uncertainty in the moments of the steady-state distribution
of the model. Thus the statistical concept of uncertainty does not make sense unless, as mentioned
previously, we assume there is measurement error in the data observations of these moments. For
the estimator described in 6 to be consistent for θ∗ we then require that:
1. (i) the estimators of the weights, v̂ar(ADi ) are consistent,
2. (ii) θ∗ is the unique solution to d(AD, AM (θ)) = 0 (so it will also solve equation 4),
3. (iii) the distance function d(AD, AM (θ)) is continuous in θ (this follows immediately from the
result of Theorem 2 and continuity of A function),
4. (iv) the set of possible parameters Θ is compact,
5. (v) supθ∈Θ |d(AD, AM (θ))| <∞.
These are the standard assumptions needed for consistency of GMM estimators, adapted to the
current estimator. Implictly, we also assume that the parameter space Θ is such that the assump-
tions on the microfoundations, that we used to prove that the monotone mixing condition, hold.
12In practice, this might include putting more weight on those moments related to the general equilibrium, market
clearing, requirements
13In practice, models of this class often target data moments, some of which come from aggregate national accounts
data, while others come from cross-sectional data sources.
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Eg., that the parameters relating to the utility function are such that it is increasing in the state
variables.
We cannot solve the model exactly, as we do not have the theoretical model moments AM (θ).
Instead we must use the corresponding simulated moments AMs(θ). Let θˆ be the SME estimate of
θ∗ defined by,
θ∗ ≡ arg min
θ
d(AD, AMs(θ)) (7)
From the results in Section 3, specifically by the trivial combination of Corollary 2, which shows
that the numerical errors in moments of the steady-state distribution are uniformly bounded in
terms of the errors in the optimal policy function, and Corollary 1, showing that the errors in the
optimal policy function converge uniformly to zero as the distance between grid points goes to zero,
we have that AMs converges uniformly to AM as the distance between grid points goes to zero. It
therefore follows that the SME estimate, θˆ, converges uniformly to θ˜ as the distance between grid
points goes to zero. So under the conditions described above for the consistency of θ˜ it follows that
the SME estimator is consistent.
In practice, or when the model is overidentified, the SME estimate of θ∗ will often not exactly
satisfy d(AD, AM (θ∗)) = 0. For this reason it is important, using the estimated parameter vector
θˆ, to compute the general equilibrium of the model before using it for any other purpose. In this
case it can be a good idea to put large weights on the moments that correspond to the general
equilibrium conditions (the a moments in A), so as to ensure that the final general equilibrium still
closely replicates the target moments.
5 The Two-Stage Simulated Likelihood Estimator
I first show how reformulate the model into the setup used to derive the qualities of the estimator.
The estimator itself is then presented and some of it’s properties are discussed. Consistency of the
SLE is not shown; it would require a result like that of Corollary 2, but for finite-sample time-series.
14
5.1 Some Notation
Define the stochastic process P(θ1,p) : S → S by P ≡ g(θ1,p) · Qθ1 . P(θ1,p) is a (first-order) Markov
process, and is fully parameterized by (θ1, p) (SLP, Theorem 9.13). So P(θ1,p) takes values in the
state-space of the model, and it’s motion is governed by the solution to the agents problem.
14Results of this style do exist, but not based on the monotone mixing condition. Eg. Theorem 7 of Santos and
Peralta-Alva (2005) provide such a result based on stochastic contractions (stochastic contractions are loosely related
to the Feller property).
11
Models of the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class satisfy the monotone mixing condition (MMC) of
Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992). Huggett (1993) proves that his model satisfies this condition;
Appendices D and C provide proofs that the models of Aiyagari (1994) and Pijoan-Mas (2006)
also satisfy this condition. It follows that P(θ1,p) has a stable asymptotic distribution, µ, and that
this distribution is parameterized by (θ1, p). [Appendix B contains a proof that µ is (upper-semi-)
continuous in (θ1, p).]
The market clearance equation, Mθ2(A, p), needs no reformulation. The key point for our
estimator is that A can be observed directly from macroeconomic data, and that we will get
estimates of p from our first stage. Thus we do not have to solve the usual fixed-point problem of
finding p so that the simulated A satisfies the market clearance conditions. We can instead directly
observe A, we can estimate p by SLE from the observed panel data, {di,t}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 , and then as a
second-stage we can use the two of these together to get θ2 from the market clearing conditions.
5.2 The Estimator
I now describe the SLE introduced by this paper. At time t an individuals state current state (both
the endogenous and exogenous states) is determined by the vector st. This state vector st evolves
according to the stochastic process P(θ1,p) an (first-order) Markov-process which is determined
by the vector (θ1, p), where θ1 are (individual-level) micro-parameters and p are prices affecting
behaviour; we refer to (θ1, p) as the augmented-micro-parameter vector.
Let θ∗ be the true parameter values, and (θ∗1, p∗) be the true values of the augmented-micro-
parameters, where p∗, the true prices, are understood to be the general equilibrium prices that
correspond to the true parameter values.The observable panel data {di,t}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 from which we
wish to perform the estimation is generated by the Markov-process, f(P(θ1∗,p∗), (θ
∗
1, p
∗)); note that
all of our agents are ex-ante identical, hence we do not diferentiate different i subscripts for the
process generating each different individuals data. Since P(θ∗1 ,p∗) is itself fully determined by (θ
∗
1, p
∗)
we will denote this data-generating Markov process as f(θ∗1 ,p∗). We also have observations of some
macroeconomic aggregates, A(θ∗1 ,p∗).
15 Prices and macroeconomic aggregates are known to be
related to each other by markets (eg. interest rates are the marginal product of aggregate capital).
This can be thought of as a restriction that M(θ∗2 (A(θ∗1 ,p∗), p∗) = 0; that aggregates A(θ∗1 ,p∗) and
prices p∗ satisfy a market clearance condition Mθ∗2 (·) that depends on parameter vector θ∗2.
For any augmented-micro-parameter vector (θ1, p) we can solve the model for the optimal policy
function and, combining this with the transition function on the exogenous shocks, get a Markov-
process P(θ1,p) : S → S. We also have f(,˙, (θ1, p)); note that f may also depend on the solution
to the model as it might be related to some of the control variables and therefore depend on the
15In theory these macroeconomic aggregates are generated as the integrals of functions on the steady-state distri-
bution of this same Markov-process. But importantly we do not need to simulate them, we can just observe them
directly from the data.
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optimal policy function. Using P(θ1,p) we can generate panel data, which combined with f(,˙, (θ1, p))
gives us the simulated panel data {di,t(θ1, p)}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 .
The Simulated Likelihood Estimator is now defined. In the first stage of the nested estimator
the augmented-parameter vector (θ1, p) is chosen so as to maximize the simulated likelihood of
the observed panel data, {di,t}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 . For individual i, create a simulated time-series of length
T , {dji,t(θ1, p)}, evaluate the (individual-i-simulation-j-specific) likelihood of individual i’s observed
data under this simulation, j. Repeat for j = 1, ...J simulations, and then take the sum across these
J simulations to get the (individual-i-specific) likelihood of individual i’s observed data under the J
simulations. Doing this for each individual, i = 1, ..., N and then summing across them we get the
simulated likelihood of the observed panel {di,t}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 . In effect we are using simulated likelihood
to measure the (inverse of) distance between the observed panel data {di,t}t=T,i=Nt=1,i=1 , assumed to
have been generated by (θ∗1, p∗), and the simulated panel data {dji,t(θ1, p)}t=T,i=N,j=Jt=1,i=1,j=1 generated by
(θ1, p). So by maximizing the simulated likelihood we will minimize the distance between (θ1, p)
and the true augmented-micro-parameter vector (θ∗1, p∗).
In the second stage the macroeconomic parameters relating to market clearance, θ2, are then
estimated from the market clearance condition using observed macroeconomic aggregate data and
our first-stage estimates of p.16
Under our theoretical models the macroeconomic aggregates are constant, which would in turn
lead the likelihood of our model to be minus infinity (due to stochastic singularities). To avoid
this we assume measurement error in the observation of macroeconomic aggregates. This way of
dealing with stochastic singularities follows the standard approach in the literature on structural
estimation (Keane, Todd, and Wolpin, 2011), and is easily rationalized on empirical grounds; eg.
that we do not measure gross domestic product or aggregate capital stock with perfect accuracy.
While discussing the SME we considered the issue that the simulations would not be created
using the exact solution to the value function interation problem, but instead would use an approx-
imate computational solution. I will ignore this issue for the SLE, simply because I do not have
any results relating to it.
5.3 Remarks
One thing not pursued here is to add observable individual fixed-effects (observable agent types).
There is nothing in the way the SLE estimator is set-up that would prevent the macroeconomic
aggregates, A, from also depending on θ2 (say, letting θ2 parameterize the functions which we
16Note that during the first-stage we do not need to simulate the macroeconomic aggregates and ensure that when
combined with our estimated prices they will satisfy market clearance. This is very important as it avoids solving a
fixed-point problem, common to the computation of Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models, that otherwise substantially
increases the computation involved in estimating these models.
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integrate w.r.t. the steady-state distribution to calculate the macroeconomic aggregates, A)
Using SLE, an interesting idea would be to use further macro aggregates, eg. the invest-
ment/output ratio, as over-identifying restrictions for θ2. This would allow us to test different
market clearance set-ups (say, Cobb-Douglas+perf. competition versus CES+perf. competition)
based on their performance in stage 2 of the estimator. Obviously these tests would be conditional
on the ’truth’ of the structural model used in our stage 1 estimates.
6 Implementing the Estimators
In this section I discuss the implementation of these estimators. Our interests here are two-fold.
First, what kinds of numerical optimization algorithms work best in implementing these estima-
tors. Second, how reliable and accurate are these estimators — do they have robust convergence
properties — and in the case of the SLE, how much panel data is needed get accurate estimates.
I describe simulation results about which algorithms work in implementing the estimators. These
results are based on the model of Pijoan-Mas (2006); essentially Aiyagari (1994) with endogenous
labour. The model contains nine parameters which Pijoan-Mas (2006) is able to directly calibrate
to exactly reproduce certain data moments. This is advantageous as it means we know the ’solution’
to a standard and ’realistic’ estimation problem.
6.1 Model of Pijoan-Mas (2006)
A description of the model of Pijoan-Mas (2006) is now given. The model contains a continuum of
inifinitely-lived that make consumption-savings and consumption-leisure choices. Aggregate captial
stock and labour supply are determined by aggregating across the individual households. Output
is produced by constant-returns-to-scale firms in perfectly competitive markets. That this model
satisfies the monotone mixing condition is proved in Appendix C.
Households: Households are inifinitely-lived and make consumption-savings and consumption-
leisure choices. They face a borrowing constraint, namely that assets must be greater than zero.
Their labour productivity follows an AR(1) process. The households value function problem is
given by
V (a, z) = max
c,l,a′
{
c1−σ1
1− σ1 + χ
(`− l)1−σ2
1− σ2 + βE[V (a
′, z′)]
}
s.t. c+ a′ = wz(1− l) + (1 + r)a
c ≥ 0, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1, and a′ ≥ 0
where c is consumption, a assets, and l leisure; w is the wage per efficiency unit of labour, and r
the interest rate on assets; z is the households labour efficiency units. Notice that the problem can
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be simplified to only choosing l and a′. The idiosyncratic AR(1) process on labour productivity
(labour efficiency units) is given by,
zt = ρzt−1 + t
where t ∼ N(0, σ2 ).
Production: The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas, Y = F (K,H) = K1−αHα.
Markets: The markets for labour and capital are perfectly competitive.
Definition 2. A Competitive Equilibrium is a household value function V ; a set of household policy
functions {ga′ , gl}; a pair prices {w, r}; and a measure of households µ(a, z); such that
1. Given prices {w, r}, the household’s value fn V and policy functions {ga′ , gl} solve the house-
holds optimization problem.
2. Aggregates are determined by aggregating over households actions, H =
∫
z(1 − l)dµ, and
K =
∫
adµ.
3. Markets clear, so prices are given by marginal productivities; r = FK(K,H) − δ, w =
FH(K,H).
4. The measure of households is invariant:
µ(a, z) =
∫ ∫ [∫
1a=g(aˆ,z)µ(aˆ, z)Q(z, dz
′)
]
daˆdz
By Walras’ Law, the aggregate resource constraint will be automatically satisfied, C + K ′ =
F (K,H) + (1− δ)K.
’True’ parameter values: We take the true parameter values of the model to be those found by
Pijoan-Mas (2006) who calibrated them based on various data targets. These are given in Table 1,
with exception of ` which is normalized to one, and so plays no further role in the calibration or
estimation.17
6.2 Implementation of the Estimators
Let’s start with a summary of how the model maps into our estimation frameworks.
The Parameters to be Estimated: The model has nine parameters, {β, σ1, σ2, χ, δ, α, `, ρ, σ}.
The time endowment, `, has to be normalized: I set it to `=1. There are eight remaining eight
parameters. The ’micro’ parameters are {β, σ1, σ2, χ, ρ, σ} — θ1 in the notation of our estimators.
17For robustness purposes, Pijoan-Mas (2006) compares two different parameterizations of ρ and σ, we follow the
first of his two parameterizations.
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Table 1: The true parameters and moments for the model of Pijoan-Mas (2006)
True Parameters
β σ1 σ2 χ δ α ρ σ
0.945 1.458 2.833 0.856 0.083 0.64 0.92 0.21
Target Moments
K/Y I/Y Labour Share Avg. Hrs Worked c.v.(l) corr(l, )
3 0.25 0.64 1/3 0.22 0.02
’Labour share’ is the labour share of total income, wL/Y . ’Avg. Hrs Worked’ is the average hours worked
as a fraction of time available E(l)/`. c.v.(l) is the coefficient of variance of hours worked.
While the ’macro’ parameters are {α, δ} — θ2 in the notation of our estimators. In implementing
the SME the parameters ρ and σ that determine the AR(1) process on labour productivity will
also be pre-calibrated, in imitation of the approach of Pijoan-Mas (2006) who calibrates them based
on estimates of wage processes from panel data, rather than from aggregate moments.
The Target Moments: To be able to apply the SME to this model we must define which data
moments we are targeting. We have six parameters to estimate. In choosing which data moments
it is important to think about how these moments will help to identify the parameters of the
model. In this example the moments to be targeted are the capital-output ratio, investment-
output ratio, labour share of income, average hours worked, co-efficient of variation of hours, and
the correlation between hours worked and the hourly wage. Since our focus here is methodological,
for the important discussion of how this particular choice of moments helps to identify the model
parameters the reader is referred to Pijoan-Mas (2006). These target moments are given in Table
1.
The Likelihood Function: To be able to apply the SLE to this model we first need to define
the likelihood function of the model. In the first step of the SLE we will be estimating the micro
parameters from panel data on labour income (wages), labour supply (hours worked), and asset
holdings. Following the standard approach to creating the likelihood function in situations of this
kind we assume that all three variables (hours, wages and assets) are observed with measurement
error.18
Suppose that for period t the true wage wt = wzt, labour supply ht, and assets at, are all observed
with measurement error. Denote by (ξW,t, ξh,t, ξa,t) the vector of measurement errors in observed
labour income, labour supply, and assets, repectively. Assume that labour income measurement
error is log-normally distributed with mean 1. That is,
WDt = WtξW,t, ln(ξW,t) ∼ N(−
1
2
σ2ξ,W , σξ,W )
18Often, to better approach the data, one would also want to include preference shocks in the value function
problem itself. Our model unrealistically predicts that everyone in the economy with the same hourly wage and same
assets would choose to work exactly the same number of hours, preference shocks help break this direct-link. Since
we use simulated data this concern is not relevant here. See, eg., Imai and Keane (2004) for a structural estimation
from panel data on hours, wages, and assets in a life-cycle model.
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where Wt is the true labour income at period t (which equals wtlt = wztlt) and W
D
t is the observed
labour income in the data.
Assume that the labour supply measurement error is normally distributed. That is,
lDt = lt + ξl,t, ξl,t ∼ N(0, σξ,l)
where lt is the true labour supply at period t and h
D
t is the observed labour supply in the data.
Assume that the asset holdings measurement error is normally distributed. That is,
aDt = at + ξa,t, ξa,t ∼ N(0, σξ,a)
where at is the true asset holdings at period t and a
D
t is the observed asset holdings in the data.
In the model we are not really interested in labour income itself, so much as the wage (per unit
of time). Since labour income is just the wage times the labour supply we can get the wage by
dividing labour income by labour supply, that is
wt =
Wt
lt
and analagously for the observed variables. We thus get the following relationship between the
observed wage and the true wage,
wDt = wt
lt
lDt
ξW,t
Finally, for the initial period wage we assume the following measurement error,
wDt0 = wt0ξw,t0 , ln(ξw,t0) ∼ N(−
1
2
σ2ξ,w0, σξ,w0)
Simulated Likelihood is employed to evaluate the likelihood of the model. Denote by {zmt , lmt , amt }
the sequence of true wage, true labour supply, and true asset holdings at the mth simulation draw.
For each simulation we evaluate the likelihood. We repeat the simulation M times (for each
individual in the panel) and evaluate the likelihood. The exact steps involved in this simulation
and the likelihood are given in Appendix E.
6.3 Results
In implementing the estimators the value function and optimal policy function are calculated by
discrete value function iteration. This involves discretizing not just this periods state, but also
the control variables, and next periods state (using the Tauchen method to do the numerical in-
tegration). To compute the steady-state distribution and for the SME, the agent’s distribution is
itself discretized and the iterated upon; this is not standard practice but is important to being able
to apply our results on bounding numerical errors to the estimator. To evaluate the likelihood in
the SLE, simulations are created using the discretized optimal policy function and the discretized
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transition matrix of the exogenous state (both created when solving the discretized value function
iteration), with linear interpolation used to accomodate off-grid points caused by both the mea-
surement errors and the fact that empirical data does not fit exactly on our grids (the later is not
an issue in the simulations used here, but the first is).
In implementing the SME I have not used the weights given when it was defined earlier. I have
instead used d(ADi , A
Ms
i ) ≡ ((ADi − AMsi )2)/ADi ). That is, I have divided by the actual values of
the data moments rather than their variances (and with wi = 1 for all i).
19 This will not effect the
consistency of the estimator, only it’s efficiency. Given that in this model the estimator appears to
converge perfectly to the true values anyway the loss of efficiency is not an issue.
The second issue is what algorithm to use to minimize the objective function. I first discuss this
issue for the SME. With the SME I tried using a large number of different algorithms, namely active-
set, interior-point, SQP, Nelder-Mead simplex direct search, and CMA-ES. When the estimation
began using the true parameter vector as the initial parameter vector, all the algorithms were able to
recognize this as the solution. However, when the estimation began from the initial parameter vector
(β = 0.9, σ1 = 1.2, σ2 = 2, χ = 0.7, δ = 0.05, α = 0.5) only the CMA-ES algorithm succeeded in
converging to the true solution.20 Thus, the Covariance-Matrix Adaptation–Evolutionary Strategy
(CMA-ES) algorthhm appears to be the only contender for implementing the SME estimator. Going
forward I intend to test the ability of the CMA-ES algorithm based on starting from a variety of
different initial parameter vectors so as to see just how reliable it is, but I have not yet done this.
I have not yet had the opportunity to test which algorithms work best to minimize the objective
function (maximize the likelihoood) for the SLE.21
7 Conclusion
How about actually applying these estimators? In “Flat-tax reform paper” (Diaz-Gimenez, Pijoan-
Mas, & Kirkby; see my website) we implement a version of the Simulated Moments Estimator
described in this article. The model does not exactly fit the theoretical framework used here — the
return function has a non-concavity (due to the ’ceiling’ on payroll taxes) and you cannot directly
choose next periods assets, due to the estate tax — but it gives good idea of how the estimator can
be used in practice. Further, two of the target moments are based on finite time-series simulations
and not on the steady-state distribution. It includes a discussion of how to approach choosing the
weights for the SME for an example application.
19This was done since Pijoan-Mas (2006) does not report the sample variances of the target moments, since he has
no use for them.
20The active-set, interior-point, and SQP algorithms were implemented using Matlab’s inbuilt fmincon function for
constrained function minimization. The Nelder-Mead simplex direct search algorithm was implemented using Mat-
lab’s inbuilt fminsearch function for unconstrained function minimization. The CMA-ES algorithm was performed
using the Matlab implementation provided by Andreasen (2010).
21A test using the CMA-ES algorithm is currently running.
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Estimations of the general ’style’ (heterogeneous agents in a competitive general equilbrium)
described here are also implemented in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998), Lee (2005), and Lee
and Wolpin (2006) (their estimations are based on models that also include aggregate uncertainty).
There are two main alternative ways in which to estimate these models.
The first alternative are constrained (aka. restricted) estimators. Instead of putting a large
weight on the general equilibrium condition (as in the SME), or simply relying on asymptotic
properties being a good approximation (as in 2-Stage SLE), we could impose the general equilib-
rium condition as a constraint. We would then run the same kind of estimation, only performing
constrained optimization, rather than the unconstrained optimization performed here. This line
of approach is not considered, mainly because attempts to implement such estimators run into
problems when trying to use any of matlab’s inbuilt constrained optimization algorithms. A con-
strained version of the CMA-ES algorithm which worked well for the unconstrained models does
exist, called (1+1)-CMA-ES, but there does not yet appear to be any existing matlab implemen-
tation of this algorithm. One advantage of this approach would be that the general equilibrium
conditions could then be tested using standard Likelihood-Ratio and Lagrange-Multiplier tests for
testing restrictions.
The second alternative estimator not discussed here is to consider the general equilibrium con-
dition as an extra loop. Applied to the estimators the general equilibrium condition would involve
an inner-loop to find the general equilbrium for any given vector of parameters, with the problem
of minimizing the objective function (the distance between the model and data moments) being
an outer-loop. This approach involves a substantial increase in the computational difficulty of the
estimators, and for this reason we do not consider it here. Asymptotically both estimators are con-
sistent. One would like to compare simulation results for these estimators to those presented here.
Does the substantial increased computational burden of adding an extra loop provide a substantial
improvement in the small sample properties of the estimators?
Note that both of these alternatives are simply different ways of dealing with the general equilib-
rium condition. It is a question for future research how these alternatives would compete/compare
with the methods described in this article.
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A Numerical Errors in the Value Function and Optimal Policy
Function
This appendix derives numerical error bounds, both for the value function and the optimal policy
function that depend only on monotonicity of the return function. These bounds are applicable to
the kinds of models in which other numerical methods cannot be used and value function iteration
becomes the method of choice. For example, models of incomplete markets often involve periodically
binding borrowing constraints; this leads to a situation in which existing bounds for numerical errors
cannot be applied, but those derived here can. The numerical error bounds derived are too loose to
be useful in practice.22 However, since the bounds go to zero as the distance between the grid points
goes to zero these bounds can be used to prove that numerical errors will go to zero asymptotically.
It is to exactly this purpose of proving that numerical errors go to zero asymptotically that these
bounds are used in the body of this article. The first few pages of this appendix provide a discussion
of the numerical error bounds derived, the conditions they are valid under, a comparison to other
results in the literature, and a summary of the main results. The rest of the appendix consists of
the derivation of these results.
While slower than other numerical methods value function iteration has certain advantages. One
is widespread applicability: many other numerical methods are based on the first-order conditions
(FOCs) and so are valid only under certain conditions (eg. the FOCs are a sufficient condition if
the return function is continuous, differentiable, and concave; and the choice set is a convex set).
Existing theory bounding the numerical errors from value function iteration assume properties
— such as interiority, differentiability, strongly concave return functions, and convex choice sets
— that make the FOCs are necessary and sufficient so other numerical methods are likely to be
used. The bounds for numerical errors arising from value function iteration derived here allow for
situations in which the FOCs are not necessary and sufficient conditions, and so most other solution
methods are invalid and value function iteration becomes a standard choice.
The numerical bounds here are derived based on discretized value function iteration. They
exactly mimic the discretized value function iteration algorithm as it it commonly implemented.
Namely by discretizing the state variables, discretizing the control variables (and hence the maxi-
mization step), and discretizing the numerical integration (eg. by quadrature methods such as the
Tauchen method).23 Discretized value function iteration is chosen as the basis for the numerical
error bounds on the grounds that it both commonly used and is robust to the kind of situations
22The numerical error bounds are loose in the sense that the bounds tend to be orders of magnitude larger than the
actual numerical errors. A tight bound would mean that the bounds were of roughly the same order of magnitude
as the errors that occour.
23Alternatives to all of these approaches exist. Rather than ’pure’ discretization of the state variables the value
function can be approximated by fitted value function methods, such as approximating the value function by splines
or polynomials. Instead of discretizing the control variables the maximization step can be solved using optimization
algorithms, such as binary search, or using the endogenous grid method or envelope condition method. Instead of
discretizing the integral with a quadrature method one can use Monte-Carlo integration methods.
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— non-differentiability, non-interior choices, non-convex choice sets — which are of interest to us
in the application of these numerical error bounds.
Useful references for this appendix include Bertsekas (1976) who takes a similar approach to
discrete state space approximations in value function iteration, but only for the finite-horizon case
with a discrete iid exogenous shock process, also derives bounds for the optimal policy function,
but which depend on strong concavity of the return function. Closest to the results provided here,
Whitt (1978) gives numerical error bounds for the infinite horizon value function problem with
general shock processes (in fact he allows for what SLP call Case 2 value function problems, and
further for state dependent shock processes). However he does not go on to provide numerical error
bounds for the optimal policy; essential for our purposes. The results presented here are largely a
combination of these two earlier results, but with two further additions — dropping the requirement
that the return function is strongly concave24, and explicitly showing how the numerical errors in
the value function vary between different parts of the state space.
Other existing results tend to be based on ’partial discretization’: considering the errors from
approximating the state space, but not the choice variables, nor the the numerical integration. This
has the advantage that they are able to derive tighter bounds on numerical errors, and also results
relating to the speed at which numerical errors go to zero asymptotically, and on using fitted value
function methods. The disadvantage is that they also mostly require a degree of differentiability
of the value function, interiority of optimal policies, convexity of choice sets, and concavity of the
return function. Santos and Vigo-Aguiar (1998) work with the infinite horizon case looking at
partial discretization and using a fitted value function (specifically the value function is modeled
using finite elements methods, rather than being a single number for each point in the discretized
state space). They also provide results on the speed of convergence to the true value function;
namely that it is quadratic in the grid size; and that convergence to the policy function is linear
in the grid size. Their numerical error bounds are tighter than those derived here, tight enough
to be useful in practice. Stachurski (2008) provides further results on numerical error bounds for
partial discretization using a variety of more sophisticated fitted value function methods such as
approximating the value function by certain types of splines or polynomials; he shows that the
numerical errors resulting from a number of fitted value function methods popular in the literature
go to zero asymptotically as the grids get finer. Of general interest are Stachurski’s results on
shape-preserving fitted approximation methods, a methodology advocated for smooth problems by
Cai and Judd (2014). Pa´l and Stachurski (2013) show how these results can allow for periodically-
binding constraints, non-differentiable return function and value function, and non-convex choice
set, but do not consider the errors from approximating the choice variables; their results are based
on fitted value function iteration, with Monte-Carlo integration.
24We still require that the return function is strictly concave as this is required to prove that the value function will
converge and the optimal policy is unique. Strongly concave is a stronger assumption that is by Bertsekas (1976),
among others, to derive bounds for the numerical error in the optimal policy function.
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In allowing for periodically-binding constraints, non-differentiable return function and value
function, and non-convex choice set these errors are more general than those previously derived, and
are able to be applied to the value function problems found in many models of the Bewley-Huggett-
Aiyagari class. Three possible situations remain for which the error bounds are not applicable: if
the slope of the return or value function goes to infinity (say due to Inada conditions), if the return
function contains a non-concavity, and if next periods state cannot be chosen directly. These are
addressed in turn: (i) the slope of a return or value function going to infinity would occour when
Inada conditions are present. At first glance this seems problematic given the prevalence of Inada
conditions, but it is actually not likely to be any problem at all. The presence of Inada conditions
is generally used to prove theoretically that there exists, eg., a minimum level of consumption,
and thus we can work with a bounded space defined using that minimum level of consumption,
this ensures all the functions are bounded and thus that we can apply the standard theorems for
bounded value functions, having redefined the problem on this new space, the problem of the slope
of a return or value function going to infinity would no longer occour, and we could apply the error
bounds derived here as usual. (ii) when the return function contains a non-concavity the error
bounds are not valid. If one assumes that the non-concavities are of a limited size and are localized
some modified results could likely be derived. No attempt to do so is made here. (iii) if next
periods state cannot be chosen directly the error bounds derived here are invalid, but extensions
to allow for this could be made, Whitt (1978) provides some results of this nature.
A.1 The Results
We provide a quick overview of our two main theorem bounding numerical errors between the
solution to the discretized value function iteration problem and corresponding discretized optimal
policy function, respectively. We then derive as a Proposition that the numerical errors in the value
function and the optimal policy function will go to zero as the distance between the grid points of
the discretization goes to zero (ie. as the grid get ever larger and finer). It is this Proposition that
is used in the body of this paper. The rest of this appendix then provides a more formal statement,
and proofs, of these two theorems.
Our results are based on the Case 1 value function problem,
V (x, z) = sup
y=(y1,y2)∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(8)
Our intention is to bound the difference between the solution to the this problem, V , and the
numerical solution to the discretized problem, V GN , the later is the solution after N iterations (once
a standard convergence criterion is met) of value function iteration on the discrete grid (hence the
G).
We assume that the spaces for the endogenous state X, the control variables Y , and the exoge-
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nous state Z are all compact, that the return function F is continuous and bounded25, the discount
factor β is less than one, and that the transition function Q has the Feller property.
The bound on the numerical errors in the value function is given by
Theorem 3. Let V be the value function defined in equation (8). Let {V Gn } be the sequence
of functions generated by iteratively applying TG starting from a function V0 (ie. V1 = T
GV0,
Vn = T
GVn−1). Let V GN be the value function at which the algorithm stops; given the stopping
criterion ||Vn − Vn−1|| ≤ V . Then
|V (x, z)− V GN (x, z)| ≤
1
1− β
[
KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) +KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)
+ β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j)) + βV
]
where KFy1(i, j), KFy2(i, j), KV x(i, j), KV z(i, j), KEV x(i, j), KEV z(i, j), and KEV (i, j) are
constants that depend on the ’nearest’ grid points (i, j). The constants capture: the numerical
errors that occour due to discretizing the control variable (KFy1(i, j), KFy2(i, j)); the errors that
occour from discretizing this periods state in this periods value function (KV x(i, j), KV z(i, j)) and
the expectation of next periods value function (KEV x(i, j), KEV z(i, j)); and the errors that come
from the numerical integration being discretized (KEV (i, j)). All the constants are larger when the
grid points are further apart, and when the slopes of the return function and value function are
’steeper’.
A bound for those in the optimal policy function is
Theorem 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. For any (x, z) in the partition Xi × Zj, i =
1, ..., nx,j = 1, ..nz. ya and yc as defined in (28) and (30) satisfy
|ya(x, z)− yc(x, z)| ≤ dyl(x, z) (9)
where l is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l+∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− =argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ KgFx(i, j)) + β(KgV x(i, j) +KgV z(i, j) +KgV (i, j)) + δV (i, j)
}
l+ =argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ KgFx(i, j)) + β(KgV x(i, j) +KgV z(i, j) +KgV (i, j)) + δV (i, j)
}
Proofs of these theorems, as well as precise definitions of the constants that make up these
numerical error bounds occupies much of this appendix.
25Since F is a continous function defined on a compact space, it will therefore also be bounded.
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Proposition 1. Under the conditions of Theorems 3 and 4. The numerical errors in the value
function, |V (x, z)− V GN (x, z)|, and the numerical errors in the optimal policy function, |ya(x, z)−
yc(x, z)|, go to zero as the maximum distance between the grid points in the dimensions being
discretized go to zero.
Proof. Follows trivally from Theorems 3 and 4, and from the definitions of the constants (all of
which go to zero, since they are simply combinations of the distances between grid points). Q.E.D.
In summary, we have derived numerical error bounds for both the value function and the opti-
mal policy function, and shown that they go to zero asymptotically as the distance between grid
points goes to zero. They are based on the use of value function iteration with a discretized state
space; exactly as it is implemented in the computer.26 We introduced two innovations to the stan-
dard approach, the calculation of pointwise bounds, and allowing for non-strongly-concave return
functions. The numerical error bounds derived are applicable more widely than existing bounds
allowing, among other things, for borrowing constraints, and decisions to work zero hours.
The rest of the appendix is concerned with defining the relevant constants and proving the
results given in Theorems 3 & 3. We begin by bounding the numerical errors in the value function,
and then turn to the optimal policy function.
A.2 Numerical Error Bounds for the Value Function Iteration
We first bound the distance between the solution to the value function iteration and the true value
function, temporarily ignoring the issue of discretization. The convergence of the iterated value
function to the true value function is well known. But in practice our value function iteration must
stop after a finite number of steps, so it will never reach the true value function. Bounding the
distance between the solution given by value function iteration and the true value function is our
first step, and involves a well-known property of contraction mappings. We give a brief treatment
of this issue drawing on Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) (henceforth SLP), which doubles as an
introduction to the notation used in this paper. This forms Section A.2.1.
But we never get to actually solve the value function iteration — we solve a discrete state space
approximation to the value function iteration problem. Our second step is to bound the size of the
further errors introduced in by the discretization. This forms Section A.2.2.
Having bounded both of these distances we then simply apply the triangle inequality to get
26A possible source of errors not considered here are rounding errors. Rounding errors arise in all numerical
solutions since the accuracy of the numbers which computers can handle is limited so rounding errors will occour
(with double floating point numbers the computer is limited to an accuracy of about 15 to 17 digits). Bounds on
these could be derived following almost exactly the same methods as used here. Results in Santos and Vigo-Aguiar
(1998) (see section ’Stability of the Numerical Method’) suggest they will anyhow be orders of magnitude smaller
than those we deal with.
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a bound on the distance between the solution to the discrete state space dynamic programming
problem and the true value function. Section A.2.6 puts this all together.
A.2.1 Uniform Convergence of Value Function Iteration
Results for the uniform convergence of value function iteration are well-known, so we cover them
only breifly (a detailed treatment of these same results forms Appendix A.5). Those based on
bounded returns are relevant to the models treated here. Our proofs of the validity of discrete
state space approximation all require that the spaces for the exogenous and endogenous variables
are compact27 so the requirement that the return function be bounded on these spaces is generally
trivial. We study value function problems (aka. stochastic dynamic programming, aka. functional
equations) of what SLP refer to as type 1. That is ones of the form
V (x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′)} (10)
under the assumption that the return function F is bounded and continuous, the discount factor
β is strictly less than one, and the transition function Q has the Feller property.
Preliminaries: Let (X,X ) and (Z,Z) be measurable spaces of possible values for the endogenous
and exogenous state variables, respectively; let (S,S) = (X × Z,X × Z) be the product space; let
Q be a transition function on (Z,Z); let Γ : S → X be a correspondence describing the feasibility
constraints; let A be the graph of Γ; let F : A → R be the one-period return function; and let
β ≥ 0 be the discount factor.
Our metric for the space C(S) is the sup norm, ||f || = sups∈S |f(s)|. It is stressed that many of
the results below apply much more broadly, and the arguments used here can easily be adapted to
other situations.
It is well known that under some general assumptions (see SLP Theorem 9.6) that defining the
operator T on C(S) by
(Tf)(x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
f(y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(11)
Then T : C(S)→ C(S); T has a unique fixed point V in C(S) and for any V0 ∈ C(S),
||TnV0 − V || ≤ βn||V0 − V ||, n = 1, 2, ... (12)
Moreover, the correspondence G : S → X defined by
G(x, z) =
{
y ∈ Γ(x, z) : V (x, z) = F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(13)
is nonempty, compact-valued, and u.h.c.
27Compactness is needed to guarantee that we can limit the distance between any two points on the finite grid.
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This result suggests the approach to calculating the true value function V known as value
function iteration. Namely, starting from an initial function V0 ∈ C(S) we can apply the mapping
T defined in (11) to generate a new function V1. Iterating on this procedure, ie. Vn = TVn−1 we
get a sequence V0, V1, ..., Vn, ... of functions. By (12) we know that Vn → V as n → ∞, and in
fact it also tells us the speed of this convergence. Thus the results above prove that value function
iteration is globally convergent to the true value function, and gives us a rate of convergence.
So we know that using the value function iteration algorithm our solution will converge to the
true value function. However in practice we have to stop after a finite number of iterations. Can
we know how close we have ended up? The standard way to decide when to stop is based on a
convergence criterion of the form ||Vn−Vn−1|| ≤ V . A well known result for contraction mappings
is that the distance of the function VN at which the algorithm terminates from the true value
function based on the convergence criterion satisfies
||VN − V || ≤ β
1− β V (14)
We now turn to accounting for approximation errors introduced by the fact that with the computer
we cannot solve this problem exactly but only a discrete approximation of it.
A.2.2 Discrete State Space Approximation
We now derive numerical error bounds for the distance between the solution to the value function
iteration and the solution to the discretized value function iteration. Our bounds are dependent
on two assumptions, monotonicity and concavity, although both are required only in the variables
to be discretized. Thus we do not require differentiability, interiority of solutions, or convex choice
sets, as in many existing error bounds. The other difference of the approach followed here from
others in the literature has two aspects. Firstly, rather than find uniform bounds directly, we find
bounds at each point and then take the maximum across the grid points, when this approach is
combined with those for bounding errors in optimal policies the improvement is quite substantial.
A.2.3 The Discretization Procedure
Our results are based on the Case 1 value function problem,
V (x, z) = sup
y=(y1,y2)∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(15)
Our intention is to bound the difference between the solution to the this problem, V , and the
numerical solution to the discretized problem, V GN . The approach taken is to bound the distances
of each of these to solution to the discretized problem, V G. The bounding of the distance between
V and V G follows closely the approach in Santos and Vigo-Aguiar (1998), albeit without their
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assumptions of differentiability. The bounding of the distance between V GN and V
G is a well-known
property of convergence mappings.
We will also make use of the definition,
V = {V : X × Z → R|V is bounded and continuous}
In what follows the spaces are always assumed to be bounded. This is done as it implies that the
return function will be bounded (if it is continous) and thus that the value function is bounded. It
is an appropriate assumption since the discretized state spaces will in any case always be bounded
(since they are by definition finite sets). It is not however essential (see Santos and Vigo-Aguiar
(1998)), and often does not require the theoretical state space to be bounded or the return function
to actually be bounded (see the example in Section 5.1 of SLP).
We discretize the current states, x & z, the choice variable y, and the next period exogenous
state z′. The same grid is used for both this and next periods exogenous state. Those elements of
the choice variable which correspond to next periods endogenous state use the grid of the latter.
Assumption 1. Assume,
• X ⊆ Rl is compact.
• Control space Y = Y1 × Y2, Y1 = X, Y2 ⊆ Rq is compact. [Γ(x, z) ⊆ Y, ∀x ∈ X, z ∈ Z].
• Z ⊆ Rk is compact. Q is a probability measure.
• Return fn F (x, y, z) is bounded in x, y,&z, increasing in x & z, decreasing in y.
Note that F is bounded implies that V is also bounded.
We partition X into nx mutually disjoint sets X1, ..., Xnx such that X = ∪nxi=1Xi, and select
arbitrary points xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, ..., nx. Thus, our grid is XG = {x1, ..., xnx}. Define the X-grid size
dX = max
x∈X
min
xˆ∈XG
||x− xˆ||
We partition Z into nz mutually disjoint sets Z1, ..., Znz such that Z = ∪nzj=1Zj , and select arbitrary
points zj ∈ Zj , j = 1, ..., nz. Thus, our grid is ZG = {z1, ..., znz}. Define the Z-grid size
dZ = max
z∈Z
min
zˆ∈ZG
||z − zˆ||
Our partition for S = X × Z is simply the product of the X and Z partitions. So the grid is
given by SG = XG × ZG and consists of nxnz points. We partition next periods exogenous state,
z′, in exactly the same way as this periods exogenous state z. We partition Y1 implicitly via as
the intersection of Y1 and the aforementioned partitioning of X. So we define Y1G = Y1 ∩ XG.
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We partition Y2 into ny2 mutually disjoint sets Y21, ..., Y2ny2 such that Y2 = ∪
ny2
j=1Y2j , and select
arbitrary points y2j ∈ Y2j , j = 1, ..., ny2 . Thus, our grid is Y2G = {y21, ..., y2ny2}. Define the Y2-grid
size
dY2 = max
y2∈Y2
min
yˆ2∈Y2G
||y2 − yˆ2||
Our partition for Y = (Y1, Y2) is simply the combination of the Y1 and Y2 partitions. So the grid
is given by YG = (Y1 ∩XG, Y2G) and consists of nx + ny2 points.
We assume that the discretization process for the transition function satisfies
Assumption 2. QG is defined as QG(z, zi) = Q(z, Zi), i = 1, ..., nz
This assumption is not necessary to derive bounds, but does make them much tighter. Notice
that, in the case where z has been previously discretized this assumption will be satisfied by the
Tauchen Method (see Tauchen (1986)).
Consider the space of piecewise constant functions (aka step fns),
VG = {V G : X × Z → R|V G is bounded, continuous, and
V G is constant in (Xi, Zj), i = 1, ..., nx, j = 1, ..., nz}
Observe that VG is a closed subspace of V equipped with the norm ||V G|| = sup(x,z)∈X×Z |V G(x, z)|
for V G ∈ VG.
Define the mapping TG : V → VG given by
TG(V )(xi, zj) = sup y ∈ ΓG(xi, zj)F (xi, y, zj) + β
nz∑
k=1
V (y, zk)Q
G(zj , zk) (16)
for each point (xi, zj) & V ∈ V; where QG is defined by QG(z, zi) = Q(z, Zi) for i = 1, ..., nz,
and zero everywhere else; and ΓG(x, z) ≡ Γ(x, z) ∩ YG. Here the maximization & integration are
both discretized. Also, nodal values TG(V )(xi, zj) for all the vertex points (xi, zj) yield a unique
functional extension to the domain X×Z over the space of piecewise constant functions compatible
with a given partition {Xi × Zj}.
The following functional equation will play a central role in the analysis
V G(xi, zj) = sup y ∈ ΓG(xi, zj)F (xi, y, zj) + β
nz∑
k=1
V G(y, zk)Q
G(zj , zk) (17)
for each vertex point (xi, zj). This is the relevant discretized version of the Bellmans equation.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, equation (17) has a unique solution V G in VG
Proof. The proof is a standard one. One immediately sees that TG is a contraction mapping with
modulus 0 < β < 1. By a well known fixed point theorem, equation 17 has a unique fixed point
V G in VG. Q.E.D.
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A.2.4 Some Constants
We now define a variety of constants which will form part of our error bounds. First a comment
on notation. Since x (and y, z) is potentially of more than one dimension xi and xi−1 have no
obvious relation. For this purpose we introduce the notation xi(−1) to be one grid point less than
xi in every (continuous) dimension (which is being discretized); likewise xi(+1) is one grid point
more. We define a constants that are different for each (i, j) grid point. This has the advantage
that we will later derive bounds on the numerical errors in the value function from which it is clear
that the numerical errors in the value function tend to be larger where the grid points are further
apart, and where the slopes of the value function and the return function are ’steeper’.
• Bound on the value function in the x-dimension.
KV x(i, j) = max{|V (xi(+1), zj)− V (xi, zj)|, |V (xi, zj)− V (xi(−1), zj)|} (18)
• Bound on the value function in the z-dimension.
KV z(i, j) = max{|V (xi, zj(+1))− V (xi, zj)|, |V (xi, zj)− V (xi, zj(−1))|} (19)
• Bound on the expectation of the value function in the x-dimension.
KEV x(i, j) = max
xl∈XG
nz∑
k=1
KV x(xl, zk)Q
G(zj , zk) (20)
• Bound on the expectation of the value function in the z-dimension.
KEV z(i, j) = max
xl∈XG
nz∑
k=1
KV z(xl, zk)Q
G(zj , zk) (21)
• Bound on the return function in the y1-dimension.
KFy1(i, j) = max
(y1k,y2l)∈Y G
max{|F (xi, y1k, y2l, zj)− F (xi, y1k(−1), y2l, zj)|,
|F (xi, y1k(+1), y2l, zj)− F (xi, y1k, y2l, zj)|} (22)
• Bound on the return function in the y2-dimension.
KFy2(i, j) = max
(y1k,y2l)∈Y G
max{|F (xi, y1k, y2l, zj)− F (xi, y1k, y2l(−1), zj)|,
|F (xi, y1k, y2l(+1), zj)− F (xi, y1k, y2l, zj)|} (23)
• Bound on the errors resulting from numerical integration.
KEV (i, j) = max
xl∈XG
nz∑
k=1
|V (xl, zk(+1))− V (x, zk(−1))|QG(zj , zk) (24)
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Remark: These constants will all exist and be finite since F , and therefore V are assumed to be
bounded.
Remark: I use two different constants here, KEV x(i, j) and KEV z(i, j) to illustrate this possibility.
One could simply use one constant to bound of V in both the x and z dimensions as it makes
things simpler. But in trying to get tighter bounds it is useful to note that the only gradients of the
function being discretized that matter are those occuring in dimensions along which discretization
is occuring: what I do here to seperate x and z can of course equally be used to seperate two
different dimensions (variables) in x, the obvious extension along these lines provides the proof
that we can ignore the differences in the discrete dimensions (which do not need to be discretized)
as the constant associated with an already discrete dimesion will be zero.
A.2.5 Intermediate Results
We begin by bounding the difference between the true discretized value function and that we get
from our iteration, the result follows directly from equation (14).
Corollary 3. Let V G be the value function defined in equation (17). Let {V Gn } be the sequence
of functions generated by iteratively applying TG starting from a function V0 (ie. V1 = T
GV0,
Vn = T
GVn−1). Let V GN be the value function at which the algorithm stops; given the stopping
criterion ||Vn − Vn−1|| ≤ . Then
||V G − V GN || ≤
β
1− β 
We now turn to bounding the difference between the true value function and the true discretized
value function. To do this we break the current problem of the errors that come from discretizing
(x, z, y, z′) up into a series of problems of discretizing first (x, z), then y and finally z′, these are
then combined later in Lemma 5.
In the same way that TG(x,y,z,z
′) = TG has been defined above as the discretization of all the
variables, we will now define operators for each step of the discretization. Thus,
Let TG(x,z) be the contraction mapping associated with the discretization of x and z, thus TG(x,z) :
V → VG is given by
TG(x,z)(V )(xi, zj) = sup
y∈Γ(xi,zj)
F (xi, y, zj) + β
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(zj , dz′) (25)
for each point (xi, zj) & V ∈ V. Here the maximization & integration procedures are performed
exactly (as we are not discretizing y or z′).
Let TG(y|x,z) be the contraction mapping associated with the discretization of y, when x & z are
already discrete, thus TG(y|x,z) : VG → VG is given by
TG(y|x,z)(V )(x, z) = sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′) (26)
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for each V ∈ V. Where ΓG(x, z) ≡ Γ(x, z) ∩ YG. Here the maximization is no longer performed
exactly (integration is still performed exactly as we are not discretizing z′).
Let TG(z
′|x,y,z) be the contraction mapping associated with the discretization of z′ when x,y,& z
are already discrete, thus TG(z
′|x,y,z) : VG → VG is given by
TG(z
′|x,y,z)(V )(x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
F (x, y, z) + β
nz∑
i=1
V (y, zi)Q
G(z, zi) (27)
for each V ∈ V. Where QG is defined by QG(z, zi) = Q(z, Zi) for i = 1, ..., nz, and zero everywhere
else. Here the integration is no longer performed exactly.
Our result for the discretization of (x, z) is
Lemma 2. Let V be the value fn defined in equation (15). Let KV x(i, j), KV x(i, j), KEV x(i, j) &
KEV z(i, j) be as defined in equations (18), (18), (20), & (20). Then under Assumption 1 for (x, z)
in a given partion Xi × Zj, it holds that
|V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (x, z)| ≤ (KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j))
Proof. The proof is standard, and follows closely that in Santos and Vigo-Aguiar (1998).
Note that by defns of T & TG(x,z) we have that TV (xi, zj) = V (xi, zj) = T
G(x,z)V (xi, zj) for every
vertex point (xi, zj), and that the function T
G(x,z)V is piecewise constant.
Consider now an arbitrary point (x, z) is a given partion Xi × Zj . Then
|V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (x, z)| ≤ |V (x, z)− V (xi, zj)|+ |TG(x,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (xi, zj)|
+ |V (xi, zj)− TG(x,z)V (xi, zj)|
≤ (KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j)) + 0
by the triangle inequality, boundedness of V , and as TG(x,z) is a contraction mapping of modulus
β. Q.E.D.
The lemma only relies on points 1,3, and 4 of Assumption 1, point 2 is not needed here.
We turn now to the (further) discretization of y, our result is
Lemma 3. Let V be the value fn defined in equation (15). Let KFy1(i, j) & KFy2(i, j) be as defined
in equations (22) and (23). Then under Assumption 1 it must hold that
|TG(x,z)V (xi, zj)− TG(y|x,z)V (xi, zj)| ≤ KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j)
Proof. The proof is an refinement of the standard approach which can be found in Bertsekas (1976),
Chpt 5.2.
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Consider an arbitrary point (x, z). Then
|TG(x,z)V (xi, zj)−TG(y|x,z)V (xi, zj)|
= | sup
y∈Γ(xi,zj)
{F (xi, y, zj) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)}
− sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
{F (xi, y, zj) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)}|
≤ | sup
y∈Γ(xi,zj)
F (xi, y, zj)− sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
F (xi, y, zj)|
+ | sup
y∈Γ(xi,zj)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)
− sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)|
≤ KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j)
+ | sup
y∈Γ(xi,zj)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)− sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)|
≤ KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) + β0
= KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j)
where Vˆ (y1, z
′) ≡ V (y1j , z) for y1 ∈ Yjj , by the triangle inequality, boundedness of V , and as TG is a
contraction mapping of modulus β. Note that the reason the difference between the two supremums
of the integrals is zero is because the function V is only defined on the already discretized (x, z)
anyway. Q.E.D.
We now present our result for the discretization of z′ given that (x, y, z) have all been previ-
ously discretized (actually the result is exactly the same whether the others have been discretized
beforehand or not).
Lemma 4. Let V be the value fn defined in equation (15). Let KEV (i, j) be as defined in equation
(24). Then under Assumptions 1 & 2 it must hold that
|TG(x,y,z)V (xi, zj)− TG(z′|x,y,z)V (xi, zj)| ≤ βKEV (i, j)
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary point (xi, zj). Then
|TG(x,y,z)V (xi, zj)−TG(z′|x,y,z)V (xi, zj)|
= | sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
{F (xi, y, zj) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(zj , dz′)}
− sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
{F (xi, y, zj) + β
nz∑
k=1
V (y, zk)Q
G(zj , zk)}|
≤ β sup
y∈ΓG(xi,zj)
|
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(zj , dz′)−
nz∑
k=1
V (y, zk)Q
G(zj , zk)|
≤ βKEV (i, j)
where the first step comes from the definitions of TG(x,y,z) and TG(z
′|x,y,z), the third is Lemma 13
on bounding errors in numerical integration. Q.E.D.
Note that while the result itself does not depend on (x, y, z) having been previously discretized.
That Assumption 2 is satisfied by the Tauchen method is only true when z has been previously
discretized.
A.2.6 Putting it all Together
The following result combines all of the individual lemmas we had for discretizing (x, z), y, and z′
respectively. Because we have used constants that depend on (i, j) is it clear that the size of the
numerical errors will be different in different areas (different (i, j)). Numerical errors will be higher
where the points are further apart, and where the first derivatives of the return and value functions
are ’steeper’ — this can be seen by looking at the definitions of the ’local’ constants.
Lemma 5. Let V be the value function defined in equation (15). Let V G be the value function
defined in equation (17). Then for (x, z) ∈ Xi × Zj we have
|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)| ≤ 1
1− β
[
KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) +KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)
+ β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j))
]
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Proof.
|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)| = |TV (x, z)− TGV G(x, z)|
= |TV (x, z)− TG(x,y,z,z′)V G(x,y,z,z′)(x, z)|
≤ |V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (x, z)|+ |TG(y|x,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(z′|x,y,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,y,z,)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(z′|x,y,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,y,z,z′)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(x,y,z,z′)V (x, z)− TG(x,y,z,z′)V G(x, z)|
≤ |V (x, z)− TG(x,z)V (x, z)|+ |TG(x,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,y,z)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(x,y,z)V (x, z)− TG(x,y,z,z′)V (x, z)|
+ 0 + β|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)|
thus
|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)| ≤ 1
1− β (|V (x, z)− T
G(x,z)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(x,z)V (x, z)− TG(y|x,z)V (x, z)|
+ |TG(x,y,z)V (x, z)− TG(z′|x,y,z,)V (x, z)|)
so by Corollaries 2, 3, & 4,
|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)| ≤ 1
1− β ([(KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j))]
+ [KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j)] + [βKEV (i, j)])
rearranging
|V (x, z)− V G(x, z)| ≤ 1
1− β
[
KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) +KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j)
+ β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j))
]
Q.E.D.
Combining these two previous results we get our desired result; a bound on the distance between
the true value function and the discretized value function after we stop iterating, ie. the one we
will actually have.
Theorem 5. Let V be the value function defined in equation (15). Let {V Gn } be the sequence
of functions generated by iteratively applying TG starting from a function V0 (ie. V1 = T
GV0,
Vn = T
GVn−1). Let V GN be the value function at which the algorithm stops; given the stopping
criterion ||Vn − Vn−1|| ≤ V . Then
|V (x, z)− V GN (x, z)| ≤
1
1− β
[
KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) +KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)
+ β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j)) + βV
]
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Proof.
|V (x, z)− V GN (x, z)| ≤ |V (x, z)− V G(x, z)|+ |V G(x, z)− V GN (x, z)|
≤ 1
1− β [KFy1(i, j) +KFy2(i, j) +KV x(i, j) +KV z(i, j)
+ β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j)) + βV ]
by the triangle inequality and then applying the results of Lemma 5 & Corollary 3. Q.E.D.
Since the number of grid points is finite, a uniform bound can be trivially follows by simply
maximizing across all of the constants that depend on (i, j). Thus,
Corollary 4. Let V be the value function defined in equation (15). Let {V Gn } be the sequence
of functions generated by iteratively applying TG starting from a function V0 (ie. V1 = T
GV0,
Vn = T
GVn−1). Let V GN be the value function at which the algorithm stops; given the stopping
criterion ||Vn − Vn−1|| ≤ V . Then
||V − V GN || ≤
1
1− β
[
KFy1 +KFy2 + (1 + β)(KV x +KV z) + βKEV + βV
]
where
KFy1 = max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KFy1(i, j)
KFy2 = max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KFy2(i, j)
KV x = max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KV x(i, j)
KV z = max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KV z(i, j)
KV = max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KV (i, j)
Or alternatively, letting δV (i, j) be defined as the (right-hand side) bounding constant in Theorem
5, we have
||V − V GN || ≤ δV := max
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
δV (i, j)
Proof. Follows trivialy from the observation that KV x ≥ maxi=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nz
KEV x(i, j) due to definitions
of KV x, KV x(i, j), and KEV x(i, j) and fact that Q
G(·, ·) ≤ 1; as well as analagous result for
KV z. Q.E.D.
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A.2.7 A Remark on the Bounds
The constants used to bound the errors are based on the differences in various functions between
adjacent points on the grid. In the case of models where some dimensions are continuous (and we
want to discretize them) while others are already discrete these differences only need to be taken in
the dimensions that are being discretized (those that in theory are continuous). The differences in
the already discrete variables should be considered to be zero. Care must be taken in the constants
that are evaluated in the neighbourhood of a certain point as that neighbourhood should also be
taken along the already discrete dimensions, as well as the dimensions being discretized.
A.3 Numerical Error Bounds for the Optimal Policy Function
In economic models what interests us is often not the value function itself but the optimal policy
function. It is this later that determines the actions of the agent, and thus the behaivour of
variables in equilibrium. For this reason we now turn to bounding errors in the optimal policy
function. There are two existing approaches. First, one can bound errors in the policy function
in terms of those in the value function based on differentiability of value fn, interiority of optimal
policy, and the curvature of the return function (Santos and Vigo-Aguiar, 1998)28. The second
approach is that of Euler Equation Errors (Santos, 2000) which has the strength of being applicable
to any numerical method for calculating the optimal policy, not just value function iteration. Both
approaches depend on differentiability of the value function and interiority of the optimal policy.
The approach developed here takes advantage of the fact that in many applications the value
function is monotone (generally increasing) in the state variables29.
A.3.1 Convergence of the Optimal Policy Function
See SLP Theorems 3.7, 3.8, 4.9 and 9.9. These tell us that if X and Z are both compact (and
F strictly concave, continuous, etc.) then the optimal policies converge uniformly as the value
function converges. However they do not give us fixed bounds on this convergence (it does not
appear to be a contraction mapping). Thus in what follows we concentrate on getting bounds on
the degree of convergence. The standard approach in the literature is to use a strong concavity on
the return function, we use a different approach here based on monotonicity. We do this as it is
not clear how strong concavity of the return function would relate to the concavity of the utility
function under things such as adjustment costs.
28 Rinco´n-Zapatero and Santos (2009) provide results on the differentiability of the value function in the presence
of borrowing constraints.
29I avoid the assumption of strong concavity of the return function, common in the literature, as it is not obvious
how this relates to, eg., strong concavity of the utility function in the presence of adjustment costs and/or periodically
binding constraints.
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A.3.2 Bounding Errors in Optimal Policy Function without Interiority
Similarly to the value function we proceed in three steps. First we bound errors coming from the
fact that we have only an approximation of the true value function. Secondly we bound errors
coming from the discretization. Lastly we combine these two results to get our numerical error
bounds.
With this in mind we define the following: 1) The true policy function
ya(x, z) = arg max
y∈Γ(x,z)
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′) (28)
for all (x, z) ∈ X × Z. 2) The policy function on the grid that would results from the true value
function
yb(x, z) = arg max
y∈Γ(x,z)
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V˜ (y, z′)Q(z, dz′) (29)
for all (x, z) ∈ X×Z. And, 3) the approximate policy function, which is that we will actually have
yc(x, z) = arg max
y∈ΓG(x,z)
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V˜ (y, z′)Q(z, dz′) (30)
for all (x, z) ∈ XG × ZG, and extended linearly from this to the rest of X × Z. Where V is the
true value function, and V˜ is an approximation of the true value function satisfying ||V − V˜ || ≤ δV .
Thus the first step is to bound ||ya−yb|| and the second to bound ||yb−yc||; putting these together
will yield a bound on ||ya − yc||.
A new assumption will be required for both steps, which did not need to be made previously
when our interest was just in the value function. Namely,
Assumption 3. F is decreasing, bounded, and strictly concave in y.
A.3.3 Some More Constants
Some of the constants we will need when bounding the errors in the optimal policy function are
simply the same as those we already used to bind errors in the value function. Some additional
ones will however also be required and these are now given.
• Coarseness of y-grid (in neighbourhood of the optimal policy)
dyg(i, j) = max{|g(xi, zj)(+1)− g(xi, zj)|, |g(xi, zj)− g(xi, zj)(−1)|} (31)
• Bound in the neighbourhood of the optimal policy of the return function in the y-dimension.
KgFy(i, j) = max{|F (xi, g(xi, zj)(+1), zj)− F (xi, g(xi, zj), zj)|,
|F (xi, g(xi, zj), zj)− F (xi, g(xi, zj)(−1), zj)|} (32)
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• Bound in the neighbourhood of the optimal policy of the return function in the x-dimension.
KFx(i, j) = max
yk∈Y G
max{|F (xi(+1), yk, zj)− F (xi, yk, zj)|,
|F (xi, yk, zj)− F (xi(−1), yk, zj)|} (33)
A.3.4 Errors from having an approximation of the true value function
We begin by bounding the ||ya − yb|| errors. This is where our derivation of errors in the value
function that are dependent on the grid points, (xi, zj), become useful. Since the largest ones
sometimes occour at the points which are optimal policies corresponding to where the return
function F (x, y, z) is sensitive to the value of y they will not cause such large errors in the optimal
policy function. This point-by-point approach to building the bounds is often substantially better,
and cannot possibly be worse, than not exploiting this margin. Note that dyl(x, z) evolves in each
lemma (it remains the same concept, but it’s precise definition evolves).
The further assumption that will be required to derive the bounds here is the existence of the
kind of error bounds that we have derived previously for the value function.
Assumption 4. For any i = 1, ..., nx, j = 1, ..., nz, for all (x, z) ∈ Xi × Zj
|V (x, z)− V˜ (x, z)| ≤ δV (xi, zj)
After this subsection, this assumption will not be needed as it will be implied by assumptions
that are anyway required for the discretization procedure.
Lemma 6. Under Assumpions 3 and 4, and that V is bounded, ya and yb as defined in (28) and
(29) satisfy
|ya(x, z)− yb(x, z)| ≤ dyl(x, z) (34)
where l is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l+∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ δV (x, z)
}
l+ = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ δV (x, z)
}
Proof. Let ya be as defined above. First, let us assume yb > ya. We want to find a limit to how
much more yb can be than ya. So let’s take the most extreme situation by assuming that V ≥ V˜ ,
then the value of
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V˜ (y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
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the right-hand side of the equation for yb, increases by at most δV (x, z). This gives us the maximum
gain that results. Meanwhile the minimum loss from choosing yˆ > ya (within l grid points distance
of ya) is
F (x, yˆ, z)− F (x, ya, z) ≤ −
l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy (x, z)
Now, yˆ can only be the argmax (ie. equal to yb) if it does equal or better than ya, that is, if the
maximum gains minus the minimum losses are greater than zero,
δV (x, z)−
l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy (x, z) ≥ 0 (35)
The maximum distance we will have to go is thus that which corresponds to the minimum value
of l for which (35). The distance corresponding to l is given by
∑l
a=0 dy
g(+a)(x, z).
This gives us the bound captured in the lemma by l+. The analogous argument for yˆ < ya leads
to the bound given in the lemma by l−. The maximum of the two thus gives us the overall bound
dyl(x, z). Q.E.D.
A.3.5 Errors from the discretization
We now turn to the ||yb − yc|| errors. Again, we proceed first to derive grid-point specific bounds.
The discretization procedure is exactly the same as for the value function, as are many of the
necessary assumptions; they will thus not be repeated.
Again we proceed first with the discretization of (x, z), then y, and finally z′.
Discretizing (x, z) we get
Lemma 7. Under assumptions 1 & 3, discretizing x and z gives a maximum error of
|yb(xi, zj)− yc(xi, zj)| ≤ dyl(x, z) (36)
where dyl(x, z) is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l+∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j))
}
l+ = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j))
}
Proof. Following the same logic as proof A.3.4. The max gain in β
∫
V˜ Q(z, dz′) from getting x
and z onto the grid is β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j)) . The max gain in F from getting x onto grid is
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KFx(i, j) (note that F is increasing in x and decreasing in y). Thus net effect on value of f(x, y, z) =
F (x, y, z)+β
∫
V˜ Q(z, dz′) of getting onto the grid is at most β(KEV x(i, j)+KEV z(i, j))+KFx(i, j).
Thus the maximum shift is that corresponding to the minimum l that makes this net effect negative.
This gives the bound relating to l+, with the analogous argument for the min loss of getting x and
z onto the grid giving l−. Q.E.D.
The discretization of y, given that (x, z) have already been discretized is trivial. We have simply
that
Lemma 8. |yb(x, z)− yc(x, z)| ≤ dy
(result follows trivially from SLP Theorem 9.9; we want, in getting onto the grid, to go as little
distance from yb as possible, dy provides a bound on this distance). Or using seperate y = (y1, y2);
||yb − yc|| ≤ dx + dy2
Discretizing z′ we have
Lemma 9. Under assumptions 1,2, and 3,discretizing z′ gives a maximum error of
|yb(xi, zj)− yc(xi, zj)| ≤ dyl(x, z) (37)
where dyl(x, z) is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l+∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ βKEV (i, j)
}
l+ = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ βKEV (i, j)
}
Proof. Following the same logic as proof A.3.4. The max gain in β
∫
V˜ Q(z, dz′) from getting
z′ onto the grid is βKV (i, j) (as shown in lemma ). Discretizing z′ has no effect on F . Thus
net effect on value of f(x, y, z) = F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V˜ Q(z, dz′) of getting onto the grid is at most
βKEV (i, j). Thus the maximum shift is that corresponding to the minimum l that makes this net
effect negative. Q.E.D.
Combining these three lemmas we get our bounds for the numerical errors in the optimal policy
directly introduced by the discretization procedure
Theorem 6. Under Assumptions 1 2, and 3, for (x, z) in partition Xi × Zj discretizing x, y and
z gives a maximum error of
|yb(xi, zj)− yc(xi, zj)|| ≤ dyl(x, z) (38)
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where dyl(x, z) is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−+1∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l++1∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j))
}
l+ = argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j))
}
Proof. A simple combination of Theorems 7 & 8 and section 9 (the discretization of y here appears
as making it the distance corresponding to l + 1). Q.E.D.
A.3.6 An Error Bound for the distance between the approximate and true policy
functions
. This is simply a matter of combining the previous two errors.
Theorem 7. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. For any (x, z) in the partition Xi × Zj, i =
1, ..., nx,j = 1, ..nz. ya and yc as defined in (28) and (30) satisfy
|ya(x, z)− yc(x, z)| ≤ dyl(x, z) (39)
where dyl(x, z) is given by
dyl(x, z) = max{
l−+1∑
a=0
dyg(−a)(x, z),
l++1∑
a=0
dyg(+a)(x, z)}
l− =argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(−a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j)) + δV (i, j)
}
l+ =argmin
{ l∑
a=0
K
g(+a)
Fy ≥ KFx(i, j)) + β(KEV x(i, j) +KEV z(i, j) +KEV (i, j)) + δV (i, j)
}
Proof. The result the follows directly from the obvious combination of Theorem 6 and Lemma
6. Q.E.D.
A.4 SubAppendix: Some Results on Numerical Integration
The first part of the following is copied from Whitt (1978) where it constitutes Lemmas 6.1 & 6.2.
The material after the second lemma is an adaptation of these results to be of use here.
Let (S,S) be a measurable set. Let || · || be the sup-norm on the set of bounded real-valued
functions on S. Let γ(f) = sups∈S f(s)− infs∈S f(s).
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We first state a lemma which does not exploit partitions.
Lemma 10. If µ1 and µ2 are two finite measures on S, then
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤ γ(f)min{µ1(S), µ2(S)}+ ||f ||(|µ1(S)− µ2(S)|)
Proof. Observe that the upper integrals satisfy∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2 ≤ µ1(S) sup
s∈S
f(s)− µ2(S) inf
s∈S
f(s)
≤ min{µ1(S), µ2(S)}
(
sup
s∈S
f(s)− inf
s∈S
f(s)
)
+ (µ1(S)−min{µ1(S), µ2(S)}) sup
s∈S
f(s)
− (µ2(S)−min{mu1(S), µ2(S)}) inf
s∈S
f(s)
≤ γ(f)min{µ1(S), µ2(S)}+ ||f ||(|µ1(S)− µ2(S)|)
To obtain the inequality in the other direction, change the subscripts of µ1 and µ2. Q.E.D.
(the thing about upper integrals is just about avoiding assuming measurability of f)
We now exploit the partitions. For this purpose, let
γn(f) = sup
s∈Sn
f(s)− inf
s∈Sn
f(s), and
||f ||n = sup
s∈Sn
|f(s)| (40)
Let
Kµ =
∞∑
n=1
|µ1(Sn)− µ2(Sn)|
where µ1 and µ2 are finite measures on S.
Lemma 11. (a) If µ1 and µ2 are two finite measures on S, then
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤
∑
n
[γn(f)min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}+ ||f ||n(|µ1(Sn)− µ2(Sn)|)]
≤ (supnγn(f))[(µ1(S) + µ2(S)−Kµ)/2] + ||f ||Kµ
(b) If also µ1(S)=µ2(S), then
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤
∑
n
[γn(f)min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}] + γ(f)Kµ/2
≤ (supnγn(f))[µ1(S)−Kµ/2] + γ(f)Kµ/2
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Proof. (a) Apply the triangle inequality with Lemma 10, using the fact that min{x, y} = (x+ y−
|x− y|)/2 in the last step.
(b) Apply the proof of Lemma 10 on the partition subsets to obtain∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2 =
∑
n
(∫
Sn
fdµ1 −
∫
Sn
fdµ2
)
≤
∑
n
min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}
(
sup
s∈Sn
f(s)− inf
s∈Sn
f(s)
)
+
∑
n
(µ1(Sn)−min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}) sup
s∈Sn
f(s)
−
∑
n
(µ2(Sn)−min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}) inf
s∈Sn
f(s)
≤
∑
n
[γn(f)min{µ1(Sn), µ2(Sn)}] + γ(f)Kµ/2
Since γn(f) ≤ supn γn(f) and min{x, y} = (x + y − |x − y|)/2, the second inequality in (b) holds
too. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12. If µ1 & µ2 are probability measures on S, then
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤ sup
s∈S
f(s)− inf
s∈S
f(s)
Proof.
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤ µ1(S) sup
s∈S
f(s)− µ2(S) inf
s∈S
f(s)
= sup
s∈S
f(s)− inf
s∈S
f(s)
since as they are probability measures µ1(S) = µ2(S) = 1. Q.E.D.
Definition 3. Let {Sn} be a partition of S. We say that two probability measures, µ1 & µ2, on S
coincide on the partition {Sn} if µ1(Sn) = µ2(Sn) for all n.
Lemma 13. If µ1 & µ2 are probability measures on S, and they coincide on the partition {Sn}
then
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤
∑
n
([ sup
s∈Sn
f(s)− inf
s∈Sn
f(s)]µ1(Sn))
Proof.
|
∫
S
fdµ1 −
∫
S
fdµ2| ≤
∑
n
(µ1(Sn) sup
s∈Sn
f(s)− µ2(Sn) inf
s∈Sn
f(s))
=
∑
n
([ sup
s∈Sn
f(s)− inf
s∈Sn
f(s)]µ1(Sn))
Q.E.D.
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A.5 SubAppendix: Uniform Convergence of Value Function Iteration
This section provides the detailed results for dynammic programming under bounded returns that
we summarized in Section A.2.1. It is based heavily on SLP Section 9.2. We study value function
problems (aka. stochastic dynamic programming, aka. functional equations) of what SLP refer to
as type 1. That is ones of the form
V (x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′)} (41)
under the assumption that the return function F is bounded and continuous, the discount factor
β is strictly less than one, and the transition function Q has the Feller property.
Preliminaries: Let (X,X ) and (Z,Z) be measurable spaces of possible values for the endogenous
and exogenous state variables, respectively; let (S,S) = (X × Z,X × Z) be the product space; let
Q be a transition function on (Z,Z); let Γ : S → X be a correspondence describing the feasibility
constraints; let A be the graph of Γ; let F : A → R be the one-period return function; and let
β ≥ 0 be the discount factor. Thus, the givens for the problem we will study are (X,X ), (Z,Z),
Q, Γ, F , & β. We will use Az, Ayz, and so on to denote the sections of A.
Definition 4. A transition function Q on (Z,Z) has the Feller property if the associated operator
T maps the space of bounded continuous functions on Z into itself; that is, if T : C(Z)→ C(Z).
(Markov operators that have the Feller property are also said to be stable.)
Definition 5. A transition function Q on (Z,Z) is monotone if the associated operator T has the
property that for every nondecreasing function f : Z → R, the function Tf is also nondecreasing.
We are now ready to make some assumptions that will be necessary for our results.
Assumption 5. X is a convex Borel set in Rl, with its Borel subsets X .
Assumption 6. Z is a compact (Borel) set in Rk, with its Borel subsets Z, and the transition
function Q on (Z,Z) has the Feller property.
Notice that if Z is countable, then all functions on Z are continuous, so in this case the require-
ment that Q satisfy the Feller property would be vacuous.
Our metric for the space C(S) is the sup norm, ||f || = sups∈S |f(s)|. It is stressed that many of
the results below apply much more broadly, and the arguments used here can easily be adapted to
other situations.
The following lemmas shows that, under these two assumptions, integration preserves the re-
quired properties of the integrand in (41) — boundedness, continuity, monotonicity, and concavity.
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Lemma 14. Let (X,X ), (Z,Z), and Q satisfy Assumptions A.5 & A.6. If f : X × Z → R is
bounded and continuous, then Tf defined by
(Tf)(y, z) =
∫
f(y, z′)Q(z, dz′), all(y, z) ∈ X × Z
is also; that is T : C(S)→ C(S). If f is (strictly) increasing in each of its first l arguments, then
so is Tf ; and if f is (strictly) concave jointly in its first l arguments, then so is Tf .
Proof: See SLP, pg 261
In some situations the requirement that the set Z ⊆ Rk be compact is very unattractive. In
fact, it can be dispensed with; but the proof becomes more complicated. See SLP Section 12.6 for
this extension.
We now make two more assumptions
Assumption 7. The correspondence Γ : X×Z → X is nonempty, compact-valued, and continuous.
Assumption 8. The function F : A→ R is bounded and continuous, and β ∈ (0, 1).
If Z is a countable set, we interpret Assumption A.7 to mean that for each fixed z ∈ Z, the
correspondence Γ(·, z) : X → X is nonempty, compact-valued, and continuous. Similarly, in this
case Assumption A.8 means that for each fixed z ∈ Z, the function F (·, ·, z) : Az → R (the z-section
of F ) is continuous.
We note in passing the under Assumptions A.5-8 the Theorems 9.2 & 9.4 of SLP, tying to
together the the sequence problem and the functional equation, hold.
Under these same assumptions, we have the following basic result
Theorem 8. Let (X,X ), (Z,Z), Q, Γ, F , and β satisfy Assumptions A.5-8, and define the operator
T on C(S) by
(Tf)(x, z) = sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
f(y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(42)
Then T : C(S)→ C(S); T has a unique fixed point V in C(S) and for any V0 ∈ C(S),
||TnV0 − V || ≤ βn||V0 − V ||, n = 1, 2, ... (43)
Moreover, the correspondence G : S → X defined by
G(x, z) =
{
y ∈ Γ(x, z) : V (x, z) = F (x, y, z) + β
∫
V (y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
}
(44)
is nonempty, compact-valued, and u.h.c.
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Proof. Fix f ∈ C(S). Then it follows from Lemma 14 that
(Tf)(y, z) =
∫
f(y, z′)Q(z, dz′)
is a bounded continuous function of (y, z), that is T : C(S) → C(S). Moreover, since Q(z, ·) is a
probability measure, T (f + c) = Tf + c, for any constant function c. Thus we have that T satisfies
Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction (SLP Thm 3.3; Appendix A.6, Thm 12) and so
is a contraction mapping. Since C(S) is a Banach space (SLP Thm 3.1; Appendix A.6, Thm 10),
it follows from the contraction mapping theorem (SLP Thm 3.2; Appendix A.6, Thm 11) that T
has a unique fixed point V ∈ C(S), and (43) holds. The stated properties of G then follow from
the Theorem of the Maximum (SLP Thm 3.6; Appendix A.6, Thm 13), applied to (41). Q.E.D.
Theorem 8 suggests the approach to calculating the true value function V known as value
function iteration. Namely, starting from an initial function V0 ∈ C(S) we can apply the mapping
T defined in (42) to generate a new function V1. Iterating on this procedure, ie. Vn = TVn−1 we
get a sequence V0, V1, ..., Vn, ... of functions. By (43) we know that Vn → V as n→∞, and in fact
it also tells us the speed of this convergence. Thus the results of Thm 8 prove that value function
iteration is globally convergent to the true value function, and gives us a rate of convergence.
A.5.1 Howards Improvement Algorithm
When performing infinite-horizon value function iteration in practice we often Howards improve-
ment algorithm to speed it up. A description of this algorithm and a proof (for the non-stochastic
case) that its use does not in any way effect the convergence results just derived forms Exercise 4.4
of SLP. Intuitively, the increase in speed comes about because it requires us to make less use of the
maximization operation, which is computationally costly.
A.5.2 Bounding the Errors of Value Function Iteration
While we know from Theorem 8 that using the value function iteration algorithm our solution will
converge to the true value function, in practice we have to stop after a finite number of iterations.
So how can we know how close we have ended up? The standard way to decide when to stop is
based on a convergence criterion of the form ||Vn − Vn−1|| ≤ . This section gives a theorem that
bounds the distance of the function VN at which the algorithm terminates from the true value
function based on the convergence criterion.
Theorem 9. Let (X, ρ) be a complete metric space. Let {xn} be a sequence of elements of X
converging to x and satisfying ρ(xn, x) ≤ βρ(xn−1, x). Let  > 0 satisfy ρ(xn, xn−1) < . Then
ρ(xn, x) <
β
1− β  (45)
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Proof.
ρ(xn, x) ≤ ρ(xn, xn+1) + ρ(xn+1, x)
≤ ρ(xn+1, xn) + ρ(xn+2, xn+1) + ρ(xn+2, x)
...
≤
j∑
i=1
ρ(xn+i, xn+i−1) + ρ(xn+1+j , x)
taking limit as j →∞
=
∞∑
i=1
ρ(xn+i, xn+i−1) + 0
≤
∞∑
i=1
βiρ(xn, xn−1)
=
β
1− β ρ(xn, xn−1)
≤ β
1− β 
Q.E.D.
Corollary 5. Let {fn} be a sequence of functions converging to f and satisfying ||fn − f || ≤
β||fn−1 − f ||. Let  > 0 satisfy ||fn − fn−1|| < . Let || · || be the sup norm. Then
||fn − f || < β
1− β  (46)
Applying this Corollary to Value Function Iteration we get that ||VN − V || ≤ β1−β . Thus we now
have a bound on the errors of value function iteration which is expressed solely in terms of known
parameters, β & . How tight are these error bounds? For many economic models appropriate
values of β are 0.9, 0.95, & 0.99 implying β/(1− β) = 9, 19, & 99, respectively.
A.6 SubAppendix: Some Results Used for Convergence of Value Function It-
eration
Contains Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, & 3.6 of SLP, which should be consulted for proofs, rewritten into
the notation in which they apply to the stochastic case
Theorem 10 (C(S) is a Banach space). Let S ⊆ Rl+k, and let C(S) be the set of bounded con-
tinuous functions f : S → R with the sup norm ||f || = supx∈X |f(x)|. Then C(S) is a complete
normed vector space, a.k.a. a Banach space. (Note that if S is compact then every continuous
function is bounded. Otherwise the restriction to bounded functions must be added.)
Theorem 11 (Contraction Mapping Theorem). If (M,ρ) is a complete metric space and T : M →
M is a contraction mapping with modulus β, then
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1. T has exactly one fixed point V in M , and
2. for any V0 ∈M , ρ(TnV0, V ) ≤ βnρ(V0, V ), n = 0, 1, 2, ...
Theorem 12 (Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction). Let S ⊆ Rl+k, and let B(S) be
the space of bounded functions f : S → R, with the sup norm. Let T : B(S)→ B(S) be an operator
satisfying
1. (montonicity) f, g ∈ B(S) and f(s) ≤ g(s), for all s ∈ S, implies
(Tf)(s) ≤ (Tg)(s), for all s ∈ S
2. (discounting) there exists some β ∈ (0, 1) such that [T (f + a)(s)](x) ≤ (Tf)(x) + βa, all
f ∈ B(S), a ≥ 0, s ∈ S.
[Here (f + a)(x) is the function defined by (f + a)(x) = f(x) + a. Then T is a contraction with
modulus β.
Theorem 13 (Theorem of the Maximum). Let S ⊆ Rl+k and Y ⊆ Rm, let f : S × Y → R be a
continuous function, and let Γ : S → Y be a compact-valued and continuous correspondence. Then
the function h : S → R defined by
h(s) = max
y∈Γ(s)
f(s, y)
is continuous, and the correspondence G : X → Y defined by
G(x) = {y ∈ Γ(s) : f(s, y) = h(s)}
is nonempty, compact-valued, and u.h.c.
A.7 SubAppendix: Discretizing the Choice Variable y in Value Function
The following is a version of Lemma 3 in which it is not previously assumed that (x, z) has already
been discretized.
Lemma 15. Let V be the value fn defined in equation (15). Let KV x, K
g
Fy1
& KgFy2 be the
maximums across i and j of KV x(i, j), K
g
Fy1
(i, j) & KgFy2(i, j) respectively, as defined in equations
(18), (22) and (23). Then under points 1, 2 and 4 of Assumption 1 it must hold that ||TV −TGV || ≤
KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ βKV x
Proof. The proof is an improvement on the standard approach which can be found in Bertsekas
(1976), Chpt 5.2.
(The improvement being the definition of KgFy1 & K
g
Fy2
to be in the neighbourhood of the optimal
policy. This modification is very important for many economic models for reasons are explained in
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the text above).
Define N(y∗) (which depends on (x, z)) to be a grid-neighbourhood of y∗ = g(x, z), that is to be
the subspace of Y containing just y∗ and it’s nearest grid points in every direction.
Consider an arbitrary point (x, z). Then
|TV (x, z)−TG(z′)V (x, z)|
= | sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)}
− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)}|
= sup
y∈N(y∗)
{
| sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)}
− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
{F (x, y, z) + β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)}|}
}
≤ sup
y∈N(y∗)
{
| sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
F (x, y, z)− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
F (x, y, z)|
+ | sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)|
}
≤ sup
y∈N(y∗)
{
| sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
F (x, y, z)− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
F (x, y, z)|
}
+ sup
y∈N(y∗)
{
| sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)−
sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)|
}
≤ KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ sup
y∈N(y∗)
{
| sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)−
sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)|
}
≤ KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ | sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)− sup
y∈ΓG(x,z)
β
∫
Z
V (y1, z
′)Q(z, dz′)|
≤ KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ β sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
∫
Z
|V (y1, z′)− Vˆ (y1, z′)|Q(z, dz′)
≤ KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ β sup
y∈Γ(x,z)
∫
Z
KV xQ(z, dz
′)
= KgFy1 +K
g
Fy2
+ βKV x)
where Vˆ (y1, z
′) ≡ V (y1j , z) for y1 ∈ Yjj , by the triangle inequality, boundedness of V , and as TG
is a contraction mapping of modulus β. Since (x, z) was arbitrary, we have
||TV − TGV || ≤ KgFy1 + +K
g
Fy2
+ βKV x
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Q.E.D.
B Numerical Errors in the Steady-State Distribution
NOTE: This section is currently incomplete; The Proof of Theorem 15 is incorrect as it mixes
metrics. Am currently working on fixing this.
Appendix A established bounds on the errors occouring in the value function V and optimal
policy function g due to discretization. In computing Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models the optimal
policy function is used to compute the steady-state distribution of agents. Do the (bounded) errors
in the optimal policy function cause errors in the steady-state distribution to explode? It is shown
here that they do not; that the errors in the steady-state agents distribution can be bounded in
terms of the errors in the optimal policy function. Key to this result is contraction property of the
monotone-mixing condition. The monotone-mixing condition can be shown to hold for models of
the Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari class and is part of the foundation for existing theory on the existence
of equilibria in these models (Hopenhayn and Prescott, 1992).
Define P = g ◦Q, where g is the optimal policy function and Q is the transition mapping for the
exogenous state. A common approach to the convergence of the distributions for economic models
is to use the assumption that P satisfies the Feller property, which is the approach taken in SLP
(Chpt 12) and Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005). However as we wish to apply our results to hetero-
geneous agents models this assumption is not applicable (in particular the difficulties arise when
the borrowing constraints are binding30). In proving the existence of equilibria for heterogeneous
agent models we turn instead to Markov chain convergence theorems based on monotonicity and
the monotone mixing condition, which is developed in Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992). Huggett
(1993) for example demonstrates the use of this condition, which is also described as being more
useful for heterogeneous agents in R´ıos-Rull (2001). The results do require compactness of the state
space, something which can be avoided if instead of a monotone mixing condition we use ’splitting
conditions’ (see Bhattacharya and Lee (1988), Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2001)), or even more
general ’order mixing conditions’ (see Kamihigashi and Stachurski (2011)). Our use of the mono-
tone mixing condition is based on two things; its usefulness for heterogeneous agent models, and
the fact that our main use for them here is not in proving the existence of equilibria for economic
models, but in bounding the errors of discrete state space approximations, and with a discrete state
space the assumptions of compact spaces are requisite. The results presented here largely follow
the presentation of Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992), but with some of the most important for our
use being adaptated from Bhattacharya and Lee (1988) and Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2001).
Following SLP we use P to denote the transition function on (S,S) = (X ×Z,X ×Z) resulting
30It has not been proved that it is not applicable, but nor has it been proved that it is applicable.
54
from the combination of the (optimal) policy function31 g : X×Z → X, and the transition function
Q on (Z,Z). Our interest is then in the existence and uniqueness of a probability distribution µ
over S = X × Z which is a stationary distribution for P , ie. Pµ = µ, and on convergence to this
distribution. We begin with some results from Hopenhayn and Prescott (1992) which can be used
for proving the existence of a unique equilibria. LetM = P(S), the set of probability measures on
S.
B.1 Existence, Uniqueness of, and Convergence to, an Invariant Distribution
The monotone mixing condition is introduced, which, when combined with a requirement trivally
satisfied by compact subspaces of Rn needed for the existence of invariant distributions, gives us
results for uniqueness and global convergence. This result is Theorem 2 of Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992)
Theorem 14. Suppose P is increasing, S contains a lower bound (which we will denote by a)
and an upper bound (which we will denote by b) and the following condition is satisfied: Monotone
Mixing Condition (MMC): there exists s∗ ∈ S,m ∈ Z, βP > 0 such that Pm(b, [a, s∗]) ≥ 1−βP and
Pm(a, [s∗, b]) ≥ 1 − βP . Then there is a unique stationary distribution µ∗ for process P , and for
any initial measure µ0, µn ≡ T ∗nµ0 =
∫
Pn(s, ·)µ0(ds) converges to µ∗.
The following result, adapted from Bhattacharya and Lee (1988; Lemma 2.3) and Bhattacharya
and Majumdar (2001) shows how fast the sequence µn = T
∗nµ0 converges to it’s invariant distri-
bution µ∗. First we define a distance d1 stronger than that we have been using till now32. For
a ≥ 0, let Ga denote the class of all real-valued Borel measurable nondecreasing functions f on S
satisfying 0 ≤ f(s) ≤ a,∀s ∈ S. Define
da(µ, υ) = sup{|
∫
fdµ−
∫
fdυ| : f ∈ Ga}, µ, υ ∈ P(S)
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 14 we have further that
d1(T
∗nµ, T ∗nυ) ≤ β[n/m]P d1(µ, υ), ∀µ, υ ∈ P(S)
and
d(T ∗nµ0, µ∗) ≤ (1− βP )[n/m] ∀µ0 ∈ P(S) (47)
Bounding the distance between the iterated agents distribution and the discretized agents dis-
tribution is then just a well-known property of contraction mappings,
31Or more accurately the restriction gy1 of the optimal policy g : X × Z → Y = (Y1, Y2) onto Y1 = X; gy1 :
X × Z → Y1 = X.
32Till now we used the measure d(µ, υ) = sup{|µ(A) − υ(A)| : A ∈ S}, µ, υ ∈ P(S), where Fµ is the distribution
function of µ.
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Corollary 6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 14. Let {µn} be the sequence defined by repeated
application of P , ie. µn = Pµn−1, µ1 = Pµ0, from an arbirary starting probability measure µ0 ∈ S.
Let d(µN , µN+m) < , then
d((µN , µ
∗) ≡≤ 1
1− βP 
Remark: Convergence in the d1 metric is stronger than convergence in moments. Since in
heterogeneous agents what we often care about is the aggregate value (which is just the first
moment) we could use analogues of this result for convergence in moments.
B.2 The Agents Distribution with the Approximation of the Optimal Policy
So far we have looked at value function iteration and how close our approximate solution is to the
true solution (and analagously for the optimal policy function), and also at the agents distribution
and how close our approximate invariant distribution is to the true invariant distribution. One
aspect we have however ignored in looking at the agents distribution is the fact that when we
calculate it we are using not the true optimal policy function. It is this point that we address
now: how close is the invariant distribution generated by the approximation of the optimal policy
function to that generated by the approximation of the true optimal function.
This issue is also addressed in Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) using the Feller property rather
than the monotone mixing condition used here (in both cases compact state spaces are assumed):
loosely speaking, their Theorem 2 shows that the invariant distribution is continuous in the policy
function (technically, that the invariant distribution correspondence is upper semicontinuous). They
also provide a Generalized Law of Large Numbers (their Theorem 3) showing convergence of markov
chain simulations; something we will not attempt to do here (these would what be required to
provide the results bounding numerical errors relevant to the SLE). They provide a condition
which will give them the Feller property (their Condition C; that P is a stochastic contraction and
stochastically bounded (the later following trivally from S being compact), see Stenflo (2001)) and
thus allows them to bound the errors (their Theorem 6); in contrast it will follow for us directly
from the monotone mixing condition and does not require further assumptions on the optimal
policy function.
B.3 Upper Semicontinuity of the Correspondence of Invariant Distributions
We first look at the issue of whether the sequence of invariant distributions associated with the
sequence of approximations of the optimal policy function converges to the true invariant distri-
bution as the approximations of the optimal policy function converge to the true optimal policy
function, that is, whether the invariant distribution correspondence is upper semicontinuous. Note
that, like Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005), we do not assume uniqueness of the invariant distribution
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generated by the approximation of the optimal policy function33. Rather than explicitly assuming
compactness of the state space and of the monotone mixing condition we will simply assume here
that the adjoint operator, T ∗, associated with P is a contraction mapping (a property implied by
the former two conditions).
Following Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) and Stenflo (2001) the theory of this section is devel-
oped using the iterated function systems notation. Up till now the solution to the individuals prob-
lem has been given by the optimal policy function34 g(x, z) : X × Z → X, which is then combined
with the transition functionQ on (Z,Z) to give P = g·Q, with P ((x, z), A×B) = 1{g(x,z)∈A}Q(z,B),
where (x, z) ∈ X×Z and A×B ∈ X ×Z. In iterated function systems notation we instead consider
a function from the state space S = (X,Z) into itself whose value depends on shocks coming from
Ω, in this way we can makes the shock process an iid variable without losing any of the richness of
the environment. Let ϕ : X ×Z ×W → X ×Z and let Ω : (W,W)→ R be an iid random variable.
Then, for any process which can be represented by P = g ·Q can also be represented as P = ϕ ·Ω,
with P (s, C) = Ω({w|ϕ(s, w) ∈ C}), where s ∈ S = (X,Z) and C ∈ S = X ×Z (cf Stenflo (2001)).
Let us start by laying out the necessary assumptions
Assumption 9. S is a compact set.
Assumption 10. Let T ∗ be the adjoint-operator of P = g · Q = ϕ · Ω (in our standard, and
the iterated function systems notations respectively). The m-times application of T ∗, T ∗m is a
contraction mapping of modulus βP .
Theorem 15. Let {gj} be a sequence of policy functions that converge to g. Let {µ∗j} be a sequence
of probabilities on S such that µ∗j = T ∗j µ∗j for each j. Under assumptions 9 and 10, if µ∗ is a weak
limit point of µ∗j , then µ
∗ = T ∗µ∗.
Proof. (Proof is similar to that of Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) Theorem 2)
Define P = ϕ · Ω and Pˆj = ϕj · Ω (rewriting into iterated function systems notation).
For an associated pair (P, T ∗) and a probability µ, let P · µ stand for T ∗µ, and likewise Pm · µ
stand for T ∗mµ
Then, the theorem will be established if we can show the continuity of the evaluation map ev(P, µ) =
P · µ.
Recall that the space of probability measures is endowed with the topology of weak convergence,
and the distance function in the space of mappings is given by
d(ϕ, ϕˆ) = max
s∈S
[∫
||ϕ(s, w)− ϕˆ(s, w)||Ω(dw)
]
where ϕ, ϕˆ are as above, and || · || is the sup-norm on Rl+k.
33When we come to apply these results later on we will know that it is unique.
34Again, more accurately, the restricion of the optimal policy function onto Y1, see footnote 31.
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As is well known, the topology of weak convergence can be defined by the metric
d(µ, υ) = sup
f∈A
{|
∫
f(s)µ(ds)−
∫
f(s)υ(ds)|} (48)
where A is the space of Lipschitz functions on S with constant L ≤ 1 and such that −1 ≤ f ≤ 1.
Let f ∈ A. Then for any two mappings Pm and Pˆm, and any two measures µ & υ, we have
|
∫
f(s)[Pm · µ(ds)]−
∫
f(s)[Pˆm · υ(ds)]|
≤|
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)]µ(ds)−
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)]υ(ds)|
+ |
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)]υ(ds)−
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pˆm(ds)]υ(ds)|
≤|
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)][µ(ds)− υ(ds)]|+ d(Pm, Pˆm)
where the first step is the triangle inequality and the second from the definition of d(Pm, Pˆm).
Then, by (48) the theorem will be established if we can show that for every arbitrary η > 0
there exists a weak neighbourhood V (µ) of µ such that for all υ ∈ V (µ) and for all f ∈ A,
|
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)][µ(ds)− υ(ds)]| < η (49)
Under assumption 9 the Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies that the set A is compact. Hence, we
can find a finite set of elements {f j} such that for every f in A there exists an element f j such
that in the sup norm, ||f − f j || < η/3. Since f is continuous, if follows that for every f j there
exists a weak neighbourhood Vj(µ) such that for all υ ∈ Vj(µ),
|
∫
f j [µ(ds)− υ(ds)]| < η/(3βP )
Therefore, for all f with ||f − f j || < η/3, we have that
|
∫
f [µ(ds)− υ(ds)]| < η/βP
Letting V (µ) = ∩jVj(µ). Thus |
∫
f [µ(ds)− υ(ds)]| < η/βP holds for all υ ∈ V (µ) and all f ∈ A.
Thus, for all υ ∈ V (µ),
|
∫
[
∫
f(s)Pm(ds)][µ(ds)− υ(ds)]| ≤ d(T ∗mµ, T ∗mυ)
≤ βPd(µ, υ)
≤ η
where the first line follows from the definition of d since f ∈ A, the second as T ∗ is a contraction
mapping of modulus βP , the third by the definition of V (µ). Q.E.D.
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This results establishes that as the approximation of the optimal policy function converges to
the optimal policy function, the invariant distribution it implies (which need not be unique) will
converge to the invariant distribution of the true optimal policy function. It establishes this using
the assumption that the adjoint-operator of Pm, namely T ∗m, is a contraction mapping; analagously
to the result of Theorem 2 of Santos and Peralta-Alva (2005) which is based on an assumption that
P has the Feller property.
B.4 Bounding the distance to the true invariant distribution
In this section we present a theorem providing a bound on the distance between the invariant
distribution associated with the true optimal policy function and that associated with the approx-
imation of the optimal policy function. An analagous result is given by Santos and Peralta-Alva
(2005) based on an assumption that P has the Feller property, S is compact, and P is a Lipschitz
function.
We start with the definition of a Lipschitz function: f is a Lipschitz function with constant L
if, |f(s)− f(s′)| ≤ L||s− s′||, ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
Theorem 16. Let f be a Lipshitz function with constant L. Let d(Pm, Pˆm) ≤ δ for some δ > 0.
Assume that T ∗m is a contraction mapping of modulus βP . Then, under assumptions 9 & 10,
|
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)| ≤ Lδ
1− βP
Proof.
|
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)| = |
∫
f(s)Pm · µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)Pˆm · µˆ∗(ds)|
≤ |
∫
f(s)Pm · µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)Pˆm · µˆ∗(ds)|
≤ |
∫
f(s)Pm · µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)Pm · µˆ∗(ds)|
+ |
∫
f(s)Pm · µˆ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)Pˆm · µˆ∗(ds)|
≤ |
∫
f(s)Pm · µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)Pm · µˆ∗(ds)|+ Ld(Pm, Pˆm)
≤ βP |
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)|+ Ld(Pm, Pˆm)
≤ βP |
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)|+ Lδ
first line as invariant distributions, second by triangle inequality, third by definition of d and since
f is Lipschitz, fourth as T ∗ is a contraction mapping of modulus βP , fifth as d(Pm, Pˆm) ≤ δ. The
theorem follows from simply rearranging the terms. Q.E.D.
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Corollary 7. Let d(Pm, Pˆm) ≤ δ for some δ > 0. Assume that T ∗m is a contraction mapping of
modulus βP . Then, under assumptions 9 & 10,
||µ∗ − µˆ∗|| ≤ δ
1− βP
Proof. Let f : S → S be defined by f(s) = s. Then f is a Lipschitz function with constant L = 1.
Result is then just an application of Theorem 16. Q.E.D.
To make this results useful it remains for us to get it out of the iterated function systems notation
in which it is currently expressed (recall the definition of d(Pm, Pˆm)). For this we use the following
result
Lemma 16. Let g, gˆ : (X,Z) → X be two policy functions satisfying ||g − gˆ|| ≤ δg. Define
P = g · Q and PG = gˆ · QG, where Q, QG are stochastic transition matrices on (Z,Z), and QG
satisfies assumption 2. Then d(Pm, PGm) ≤ mδg.
Proof. Define Pˆ = gˆ ·Q.
First, observe that
d(Pm, Pˆm) = max
s∈S
[∫
||Pm(s, w)− Pˆm(s, w)||Ω(dw)
]
≤ mmax
s∈S
[∫
||P (s, w)− Pˆ (s, w)||Ω(dw)
]
= mmax
s∈S
[∫
||(g(s), Q(z, dz(dw))− (gˆ(s), Q(z, dz(dw))||Ω(dw)
]
≤ mmax
s∈S
[∫
||g(s)− gˆ(s)||Ω(dw)
]
≤ mmax
s∈S
[∫
δgΩ(dw)
]
= mmax
s∈S
δg
= mδg
where the first step is by the definition of d(Pm, Pˆm). The third from the our ability to use the
standard notation in place of the iterated function systems representation (cf Stenflo (2001)). The
remainder since the Qs are the same, the assumption that ||g − gˆ|| ≤ δg, and since δg is a constant
and Ω a distribution function.
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Similarly, observe that
d(Pˆm, PGm) = max
s∈S
[∫
||Pˆm(s, w)− PGm(s, w)||Ω(dw)
]
≤ mmax
s∈S
[∫
||Pˆ (s, w)− PG(s, w)||Ω(dw)
]
= mmax
s∈S
[∫
||(gˆ(s), Q(z, dz(dw))− (gˆ(s), QG(z, dz(dw))||Ω(dw)
]
= mmax
s∈S
 ∑
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nj
∫
Xi×Zj
||(gˆ(s), Q(z, dz(dw))− (gˆ(s), QG(z, dz(dw))||Ω(dw)

= mmax
s∈S
 ∑
i=1,...nx,
j=1,...,nj
∫
Xi×Zj
0Ω(dw)

= 0
where the fourth step is because the Xi × Zj , i = 1, ...nx, j = 1, ..., nj form a partition of X × Z,
and the fifth as gˆ is piecewise constant on the partition and by the assumption 2 on QG.
Combining these two by the triangle inequality we get,
d(Pm, PGm) ≤ d(Pm, Pˆm) + d(Pˆm, PGm) ≤ mδg + 0 = mδg
Q.E.D.
The interpretation of the just presented Lemma 16 is that: due to the nature of the discretization
of the optimal policy and the transition matrix for the exogenous shocks, and in particular due
to considering the optimal policy function as a piecewise constant extension on the discretization
grid, the discretization of the steady state distribution introduces no new errors. Thus the only
errors in the steady state distribution are those which we have already bounded in terms of errors
in the optimal policy function, and those coming from stopping after a finite number of iterations.
The intuition for why the discretization of the steady state distribution does not create any further
errors comes from noting that the approximate transition function PG = gˆ ·QG is piecewise constant
on the partition imposed by discretization; a property it inherits via gˆ and QG.
Thus, our result becomes
Corollary 8. Let f be a Lipshitz function with constant L. Let ||g − gˆ|| ≤ δg for some δg > 0.
Assume that T ∗m is a contraction mapping of modulus βP . Then, under assumptions 9 & 10,
|
∫
f(s)µ∗(ds)−
∫
f(s)µˆ∗(ds)| ≤ Lmδg
1− βP
and furthermore
||µ∗ − µˆ∗|| ≤ mδg
1− βP
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B.5 Combining our results on the Agents Distribution
Combining our results on the discretization of the agents distribution, and on the errors caused by
only having an approximation of the optimal policy we get
Proposition 3. Let µ∗g be the true distribution. Let µNgˆ,G be the distribution obtained by iterating
on the discretization using the approximate optimal policy until the convergence criterion ||µN+mgˆ,G −
µNg,G|| ≤ µ is reached. Let the approximation of the optimal policy function be sufficently accurate,
in the sense that ||g − gˆ|| ≤ δg. Then
||µ∗g − µNgˆ,G|| ≤
1
1− βGP
(mδg + β
G
P µ) (50)
Proof. By the triangle inequality,
||µ∗g − µNgˆ,G|| ≤ ||µ∗g − µ∗gˆ||+ ||µ∗gˆ − µNgˆ,G|| (51)
and then simply apply Corollary 8 to the first term, and Corollary 6 to the second. Q.E.D.
C Monotone Mixing Condition in Pijoan-Mas (2006) Model
Pijoan-Mas (2006) investigates an extension of Aiyagari (1994) which incorporates endogenous
labour choice in a framework of efficiency wages. The general eqm components of the model are
the same (ie. a Cobb-Douglas firm, etc.) so we will look here just at the households maximization
problem and proving that the model satisfies the montone mixing condition. Perhaps the most
important observation of the endogenizing of labour in heterogeneous agent models is that variable
labour supply provides an alternative form of partial self insurance to precautionary saving (for
more on this, see Pijoan-Mas (2006), and Marcet, Obiols-Homs, and Weil (2007)).
The household’s dynamic programming problem is,
V (a, z) = max
c,l,a′
{u(c) + n(l) + β
∑
z′
V (a′, z′)Q(z, z′)}
s.t. c+ a′ = wz(1− l) + (1 + r)a
c ≥ 0, 1 ≥ l ≥ 0, a′ ≥ a
where r & w are the return on assets and the wage per efficiency unit of labour. u, n are the
utilities of consumption and leisure, respectively, both are stictly increasing and strictly concave
(note that we assume seperability of utility, this is standard in most models in the literature which
use seperable CES; it is used in the proofs below). c is consumption, l is leisure, a is assets, and a is
the borrowing constraint. z is the labour productivity shock which takes values in E = {z1, ..., znz}
and evolves according to transition matrix Q.
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We denote the optimal policies that solve this problem by ga(a, z), gc(a, z), & gl(a, z). To
simplify notation we define S = E × A, where A = [a,∞) is the set of possible asset choices (we
will later show that in fact we can bound A from above). That the solution to this problem will
display the following properties; V (a, z) is strictly increasing in a and increasing in z, V (a, z) is
strictly concave in a. V is continuously differentiable, follows from some standard results.35. For
the purpose of all the following theory we simply assume that the value function to be solved is of
the more general form
V (a, z′) = max l, a′F (a, a′, l, z) + βE[V (a′, z′)|z]
where z takes values in a compact set with minimum z1 and maximum znz ; F is str. increasing
and str. concave in a & l, inc. and concave in z, str. decreasing and str. concave in a′; Fl is
independent of a, a′ and z. The model of Pijoan-Mas (2006) fits this general form.
We begin our proofs by showing that, for all points where the optimal policies are interior,
the optimal polices for both assets and leisure are strictly increasing (we cannot just invoke the
standard theorems because of the presence of the leisure choice, which is not a state).
Lemma 17. Let (a, z) be such that ga(a, z) > a and gl(a, z) < 1, then ga(a, z) and gl(a, z) are both
strictly increasing in a.
Proof. For optimality, the first-order conditions imply that
−Fa′(a, ga(a, z), gl(a, z), z) = βE[Va(ga(a, z), z′)|z] (52)
and
−Fa′(a, ga(a, z), gl(a, z), z) = Fl(a, ga(a, z), gl(a, z), z) (53)
(we know that V can be derivised even when the borrowing constraint binds from Rinco´n-Zapatero
and Santos (2009)).
Let a2 > a1, and ga(a1, z) > a.
Assume ga(a2, z) ≤ ga(a1, z) and Fa′ is independent of l (a sufficient condition for this would be
that utility is seperable in consumption and leisure, as is the case here).
35Marcet, Obiols-Homs, and Weil (2007) cite Thm 9.6 of SLP for existence of a solution. This is in fact incorrect.
The required Thm’s is the extensions of Thm 9.6 to the Case 2 value function (SLP’s categorization) in Exercise 9.7
of SLP. For the rest of our results we use the extensions of Thm 9.7 and 9.11 contained in Exercise 9.7 of SLP. The
’strictly’ in Thm 9.11 (V strictly inc. in z) must be dropped as the return function is only increasing in z (because
of possibility that labour supply equals zero/leisure equals one). That V is differentiable, even in presence of the
borrowing constraint, is proved in Rinco´n-Zapatero and Santos (2009)
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Then,
−Fa′(a1, ga(a1, z), gl(a1, z), z) = βE[Va(ga(a1, z), z′)|z]
≤ βE[Va(ga(a2, z), z′)|z]
= −Fa′(a2, ga(a2, z), gl(a2, z), z)
< −Fa′(a1, ga(a2, z), gl(a2, z), z)
≤ −Fa′(a1, ga(a1, z), gl(a2, z), z)
= −Fa′(a1, ga(a1, z), gl(a1, z), z)
where, steps are by FOC; by strict concavity of V in a; by FOC; as a2 > a1 & F is increasing and
strictly concave in a; as ga(a2, z) ≤ ga(a1, z), F is dec. and concave in a′; as utility is seperable in
c & l.
– Contradiction.
Thus, ga(a2, z) ≥ ga(a1, z).
So ga is strictly increasing in a for (a, z) s.t. ga(a, z) > a.
That gl(a, z) must then also be str. inc. in l for (a, z) s.t. ga(a, z) > a & gl(a, z) < 1, then
follows immediately from one of the FOCs together with the envelope condition. The envelope
condition, together with that V is str. inc. in a and that ga(a, z) is str. inc. in a implies that the
LHS of 53 is str. dec. in a; which implies that the RHS of 53 is str. dec. in a; which implies that
gl is str. inc. in a (observe again that this argument uses the seperability of the utility fn in c & l).
Trivially, these results for strictly increasing ga & gl on the ’interior’ (choice-wise) could be
extended to a result of increasing for all (a, z). Q.E.D.
We now turn to two lemmas that will be used (following the approach of Huggett (1993)) to
show the mixing condition.
Lemma 18. ga(a, z1) < a, ∀(a, z1) s.t. gl(a, z1) < 1, a > a.
Proof. Observe that, Va(a, z1) > Va(a, z), ∀z > z1, ∀(a, z1) s.t. gl(a, z1) < 1.
=⇒ Va(a, z1) > βE[Va(a, z′)|z1], ∀(a, z1) s.t. gl(a, z1) < 1.
=⇒ ga(a, z1) < a, ∀(a, z1) s.t. gl(a, z1) < 1, a > a.
where this last step follows from the envelope condition, FOC, and that V is str. inc. and str.
concave in a by the following reasoning,
Env. Condn =⇒ Va(a, z1) = −Fa′(a, ga(a, z1), gl(a, z1), z1)
FOC =⇒ = βE[Va(ga(a, z1), z′)|z1]
Therefore, E[Va(g
a(a, z1), z
′)|z1] > E[Va(a, z′)|z1] which in turn implies ga(a, z) < a. Q.E.D.
Notice that if gl(a, z1) = 1, we would get g
a(a, z1) ≤ a.
64
Lemma 19. There exists and a s.t. ga(a, znz) = a.
Proof. Suppose not. Then ga(a, znz) > a, ∀a.
Since l ∈ [0, 1] a compact set, & F is inc. and concave in l it follows that there exists a minl∈[0,1] Fl
(because of seperable utility assumption; observe also that it is given by Fl(·, ·, 1, ·)). Now, by
assumption Fa′ → 0 as a′ → ∞, and we have seen that ga is str inc. for gl < 1, and inc.
everywhere. Thus, there exists some a∗ s.t −Fa′(a∗, ga(a∗, z), gl(a∗, z), z) < minl∈[0,1] Fl. Now,
since for interior solution the FOCs require that −Fa′ = Fl, it follows that the optimal choice at
(a∗, znz) cannot be interior, so gl(a∗, znz) = 1.
Rest of proof follows as ga is inc. in z36, so then for all a > a∗, the choice of leisure equals ones
means the the budget constraint becomes c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r)a and u(c) is str. inc. and str. concave,
so it is well known that there is some maximum optimal choice of a (the maximum a may be below
a∗, but this doesn’t matter, as we still get a bound). This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Now we use the proceeding three lemmas to show that the Monotone Mixing Condition holds.
Denote a¯ as mina g
a(a, znz) = a.
Proposition 4. The model of Pijoan-Mas (2006) satisfies the Monotone Mixing Condition.
Proof. That P is monotone follows immediately from monotonicity of Q (which was assumed by
model), and monotoncity of ga(·, z), ∀z (Lemma 17).
The mixing condition: Choose s∗ = ((a(a, znz) + a¯)/2, znz). Define a sequence x1 = a, x2 =
ga(x1, znz), x3 = g
a(x2, znz),... and a sequence y1 = a¯, y2 = g
a(y1, z1), y3 = g
a(y2, z1),.... Note that
{xn} → a¯ monotonically and {yn} → a montonically. Therefore, there is an N1 such that an agent
goes from (a, z1) to {s ∈ S : s ≥ s∗} with positive probability in N1 or greater steps and there is
an N2 such that an agent goes from (a¯, znz) to {s ∈ S : s ≤ s∗} with positive probability in N2 or
greater steps. Let N = {N1, N2} in the mixing condition. Q.E.D.
D Monotone Mixing Condition in Other Models
Huggett (1993) proves that his model satistifies the monotone mixing condition. Marcet, Obiols-
Homs, and Weil (2007) claim in a footnote that their model also satisfies the MMC but provide no
proof of this result. In the rest of this appendix I show that the monotone mixing condition, and
many of the other conditions used in the paper, apply to the model of Aiyagari (1994). Given that
the model of Aiyagari (1994) is used as a standard example of this class of models it seems useful
to have this result which is otherwise absent from the literature (Aiyagari does not provide it).
36A simple implication of observation z2 > z1 implies Va(a, z
1) ≥ Va(a, z2), which by envelope condn implies
−Fa′(a, ga(a, z1), gl(a, z1), z1) = −Fa′(a, ga(a, z2), gl(a, z2), z2). From there it is just a matter of following the later
steps of the proof of Lemma 17.
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Aiyagari (1993) contains proofs of the following results (albeit for the iid case, but they are
extended to a general Markov process case in Miao (2006)): (i) g(x, z) is increasing in x and z; (ii)
If Z is compact, then so is X, and thus so is S = X × Z. (iii) That the bounds on X = [x, x¯] are
given by x = limt→∞ xlowt and x¯ = limt→∞ x
high
t , where x
low
t = g(x
low
t−1, z) and x
high
t = g(x
high
t−1 , z¯).
Proposition 5. The model of Aiyagari (1994) satisfies that P is increasing.
Proof. Optimal policies are increasing, and Q is increasing. Thus P = g ·Q is increasing. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6. The model of Aiyagari (1994) satisfies the monotone mixing condition.
Proof. Let s∗ = (x + x¯)/2. Define a sequence a1 = x, a2 = g(a1, z¯), a3 = g(a2, z¯), ... and a
sequence b1 = x¯, b2 = g(b1, z), b3 = g(b2, z), .... Note that {ai} → x¯ monotonically and {bi} → x
monotonically. Therefore, there exists an N1 such that an agent goes from x to {x ∈ S : x ≥ s∗}
with positive probability in N1 or less steps, and likewise an N2 such that an agent goes from x¯ to
{x ∈ S : x ≤ s∗} with positive probability in N2 or less steps. Choose N = max{N1, N2} in the
mixing condition. Q.E.D.
Thus we have that S is compact, P is increasing, and the MMC is satisfied. So we can apply
all of our above results on bounding errors.
r˜ is continuous in r (and w). But monotonicity need not hold. Thus I have to go and make
some assumption that rtilde is not going crazy between the grid points. This continuity of r˜ in r
is apparently proved in Bewley (1984)37. In any case a simple combination of the results presented
here suffices to prove this. Namely the combination of (i) r is a continuous function of the invariant
distribution, (ii) the invariant distribution is upper-semicontinuous in the policy function (by Thm
15, as we have MMC), and (iii) that the the policy function is continuous is the parameters of the
maximization problem (side-effect of Berge’s max thm (see SLP Thm 3.8) and that return function
F is continuous in parameters)38. Note that this approach also proves continuity of r˜ in w and β.
Remark: The price function, r(K) = αKα−1−δ, is monotone and can easily be used to evaluate
|r˜ − ˆ˜r| = |r(K)− r(Kˆ)| ≤ max{r(A+ δA)− r(A), r(A)− r(A− δA)}.
E Evaluating the Likelihood in Model of Pijoan-Mas (2006)
I here describe the steps involved in the simulated likelihood evaluation of the model of Pijoan-
Mas (2006). The idea is that for each individual in the panel M simulations are performed and
37I say apparently as I have never seen this document. I assume given that google is unable to find it that it does
not exist in digital form.
38Putting these together is easy enough here since the spaces are all compact, and so the continuities can all be
considered as based in uniform convergences meaning that interchanging their orders/combining them is no problem;
for more see Le Van and Stachurski (2007).
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their likelihoods are evaluated. We then simply sum the likelihoods across simulations and across
individuals to evaluate the likelihood of the entire panel. This process is described in three steps.
The first explains how an single individual-simulation is created. The second how that individual-
simulation likelihood, Lmi is evaluated. The third and final step explains how to sum across the
individual-simulation likelihoods to create the likelihood of the entire panel.
Step 1 (Create an individual-simulation): Simulate {amt , zmt , lmt }Tt=t0 starting from the initial
period as follows,
i) Draw the true initial asset amt0 .
First, draw the initial period asset measurement error ξ˜a,t0 and derive
amt0 = a
D
t0 − ξ˜a,t0
ii) Draw the true initial wage wmt0 ; use to calculate z
m
t0 .
First, draw the initial period wage measurement error ξ˜w,t0 and derive
wmt0 =
wDt0
ξ˜w,t0
then calculate
zmt0 =
wmt0
w
iii) We now have initial state {amt0 , zmt0 }. We can use the optimal policy functions to calculate
lmt0 = g
l(amt0 , z
m
t0 ), and next period assets a
m
t0+1
= ga
′
(amt0 , z
m
t0 ). Calculate next periods exogenous
state zmt0+1 by drawing randomly from the transition function pi(·, zmt0 ).
iv) Repeating iii until the end of period T we construct the sequence of variables {amt , zmt , lmt }Tt=t0 .
Step 2 (Evaluate Lmi ): Given the simulated sequence of variables {amt , zmt , lmt }Tt=t0 , we then
derive the measurement error. Then, we calculate the log-likelihood increment to person i at the
mth simulation as follows.
Let us denote,
ξ˜a,t = a
D
t − amt
ξ˜l,t = l
D
t − lmt
ξ˜W,t = ln(w
D
t ) + ln(l
D
t )− ln(wmt )− ln(lmt ), wmt ≡ wzmt
for t = t0 + 1, ..., t0 + T (for lt also including the case t = t0).
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Then, log-likelihood increment of simulation m for person i is,
Lmi =
T∑
t=t0
[
ξ˜2a,t
−2σ2ξ,a
− ln(σξ,a)
]
T∑
t=t0
[
ξ˜2l,t
−2σ2ξ,l
− ln(σξ,l)
]
T∑
t=t0+1
[
(ξ˜w,t +
1
2σξ,W )
2
−2σ2ξ,W
− ln(σξ,W )
]
+
[
ξ˜2w,t0
−2σ2ξ,w0
− ln(σξ,w0)
]
Step 3 (Likelihood L): We repeat the simulation and likelihood increment calculation for m =
1, ...,M and derive the simulated log-likelihood increment for individual i as follows,
Li = ln
[
M∑
m=1
exp(Lmi )
]
The total log-likelihood is then just the sum across individuals
L =
T∑
i=1
Li
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